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TURNING THE KALEIDOSCOPE: TOWARD A
THEORY OF INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS
CRAIG GREEN*
Scholars, judges, and lawyers have fought for decades over
originalism, textualism, and “living” interpretation as though
such questions arose exclusively with respect to statutes and
constitutions. That is wrong. Some judicial decisions have
meanings that change over time, much like statutory and
constitutional provisions, and sometimes interpreting a case
requires more than reading an opinion’s text. Legal actors
constantly fight over what precedents mean, and those disputes
require an understanding of what such cases meant in the past—
whether at the initial time of decision, or in their subsequent
applications. As with statutes and the Constitution, links to a
historical past can be important evidence that precedential
interpreters are applying extant legal authority, rather than
making it up. This Article offers a system for interpreting judicial
precedents that clarifies how current fights unfold and identifies
techniques for future use.
I consider four methods of interpreting precedents that rely on
different categories of historical materials and can generate
different interpretive results: (i) an opinion’s text, which indicates
a decision’s declared meaning; (ii) adjudicative context, reflecting
its implied meaning; (iii) reception by contemporary analysts,
depicting its understood meaning; and (iv) subsequent doctrinal
applications, which identify its developmental meaning. These
categories–much like the textualism, originalism, and dynamism
that are familiar in other legal contexts–yield interpretive options
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for lawyers defending clients, courts explaining decisions, and
intellectuals pursuing truth.
This Article illustrates how the foregoing methods work, and also
what they produce, by considering important precedents from the
nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries. Two examples,
Swift v. Tyson and Erie v. Tompkins, are among the most widely
studied cases in American law, yet the application of different
interpretive techniques reveals new historical materials that in
turn support new interpretations.
By comparison, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in United
States v. Windsor and Obergefell v. Hodges are uncharted
territory, with only scant historical evidence at hand. In the latter
context, methods of precedential interpretation sketch a range of
options by which legal actors may influence and solidify such
decisions’ meanings. Whether interpretive methodologies are
used for revisionist purposes or for explicitly creative ones, they
can be powerful tools for analyzing any judicial decision that is
deemed important enough to merit the effort—just as occurs with
statutory and constitutional provisions.
No interpretive system can produce simple doctrinal solutions to
hard legal problems; indeed, that impenetrability is what makes
hard problems hard. Understanding interpretive methodologies
can nevertheless identify techniques that legal actors use to
manipulate precedents’ legal power. It can also offer fresh
intellectual perspective on how law operates, and why law’s
history is so hard to escape.
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INTRODUCTION
All first-year law students are told that they must learn how to
“read cases,” and every trained lawyer claims to be skilled in doing
so. Yet methodological questions of how to interpret judicial
decisions are widely ignored.1 To introduce the obvious-but-strange
subject of interpreting precedents, one might begin with a contrast to
the well-known fields of statutory and constitutional interpretation.
1. See Charles L. Barzun, Impeaching Precedent, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1625, 1626
(2013) (describing current inattention to precedential interpretation as “astonishing”); see
also Randy J. Kozel, The Scope of Precedent, 113 MICH. L. REV. 179, 183 (2014)
(“Perspectives on the scope of precedent are . . . intertwined with deeper principles of
interpretation and adjudication.”); cf. Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent,
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1187, 1188 (2007) (“In the United States . . . the common law is
embarking on a path towards becoming increasingly textual, just as statutes have been for
hundreds of years. . . . As a consequence, legal reasoning is gradually being supplanted by
close reading.”). Important scholarly debates about dicta, and about standards for overruling
cases, have not addressed the interpretation of entities that do qualify as binding judicial
decisions. E.g., MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 3–8 (2008) (discussing
ideologies that affect decisions to overrule prior cases); Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell
Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 1044–75 (2005) (analyzing schemes for
identifying dicta and holdings).
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Lawyers have debated for decades which methods and sources to
use in interpreting statutes and constitutions.2 Labels such as
textualism, original intent, original meaning, and “living” dynamism
are almost clichés in these contexts, as they represent theoretical
positions that are familiar and powerful.3 Although modern
interpreters seldom commit to one mode of constitutional or statutory
interpretation as universally correct, debates over interpretive
methodologies have framed a generation of legal thought.4 For
example, litigation about the Voting Rights Act or constitutional
privacy cannot be altogether limited to narrow substantive topics;
interpretive methodologies connect such disputes to broader concepts
of legal authority and judicial power.5 Can old statutes have new
meanings, and if so, how? Is the Constitution’s meaning fixed, and if
so, by what? These systematic inquiries are rare when it comes to
interpreting judicial decisions.6 Vague and authoritative precedents,
however, often require every bit as much interpretation as vague and
2. E.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 9
(1994); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 9–15 (1997).
3. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3 (2011); ANTONIN SCALIA &
BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012).
For political consequences of interpretive methodologies, compare STEVEN M. TELES,
THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF
THE LAW (2008), with JIM NEWTON, JUSTICE FOR ALL: EARL WARREN AND THE
NATION HE MADE (2006).
4. See John F. Manning, The Supreme Court, 2013 Term—Foreword: The Means of
Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4, 8–48 (2014) (discussing prevalent and
longstanding attention to interpretive methodology with respect to statutes and the
Constitution). In practice, even insistent originalists sometimes derive their conclusions
from modern sociology more than framing-era history. E.g., Parents Involved in Cmty.
Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 772–82 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(advocating a “colorblind Constitution” under the Fourteenth Amendment of 1868
without citing any supportive authority older than Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559
(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), and relying instead upon nonoriginalist precedents from
the middle- and late-twentieth century).
5. E.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and Historiography, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV.
631, 665–66 (discussing connections between the Court’s privacy decisions and
“conceptual difficulties with originalism as a constitutional methodology”); Jane S.
Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 54–56 (1998) (analyzing voting rights cases, among others, to “confound the
familiar interpretive dichotomies between textualism and intentionalism, originalism and
the common law mode”).
6. Future research might explore why questions of interpretive methodology have
been important for statutes and constitutions, but not for precedents. Cf. Craig Green, An
Intellectual History of Judicial Activism, 58 EMORY L.J. 1195 (2009) (describing twentiethcentury debates over judicial role).
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authoritative statutes or constitutional provisions. In all three
contexts, the need for advanced interpretive techniques arises
whenever a legal authority is doctrinally powerful, yet is
simulaneously unclear with respect to some question of great
importance.7
This Article explores how sophisticated lawyers interpret iconic
precedents and illustrates why those methods are important.8 The
term “iconic precedents” is intended as a rough placeholder to
identify decisions that are so important that special techniques are
required to grasp their meaning. American principles of stare decisis
purport to treat most cases equally, as decisions are published in the
same reporters and databases, with supposedly comparable power to
bind future judgments.9 In practice, however, that equality is merely
formal. A few cases—one may call them “iconic”—tower in
significance while the rest go mainly unnoticed.10 At different points
7. For example, extensive interpretive efforts will be deemed unnecessary if a legal
authority is trivially important, or if it unambiguously resolves appurtenant doctrinal
questions. We shall see, as a practical matter, that advanced interpretative techniques are
applied to only some precedents, statutes, and constitutional provisions. See infra notes 8,
10, 13.
8. “Sophisticated lawyer” is a necessarily imprecise term that denotes all judges,
academics, and practitioners who are able to self-consciously navigate matters of
interpretive methodology. In some areas of legal practice, time and resource constraints
will affect whether that category is small or large in number.
9. Tiersma, supra note 1, at 1278.
10. The term “iconic case” identifies decisions that represent fundamental aspects of a
legal system and whose meaning necessarily extends beyond the adjudicator’s explanatory
opinion. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “iconic” as “[d]esignating a person or thing
regarded as representative of a culture or movement; important or influential in a particular
(cultural) context.” OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2006), http://www.oed.com/view/Entry
/90882?redirectedFrom=iconic#eid [https://perma.cc/QL2F-GG7W?type=image]. Particular
determinations about which cases qualify as iconic raise debatable issues of legal culture that
change over time, just as is the case with debates over a specific precedent’s meaning. Readers
must not allow historical variety among iconic cases—much less quibbles over borderline
examples—to distract from the thesis that some cases are different from others with respect to
(a) their power and (b) their corresponding interpretive techniques. If some readers wished to
advocate a third category of “semi-iconic cases,” or to array cases along an “iconic spectrum,”
that would have no large effect on my approach. This Article is less concerned with identifying
iconic cases on a list, or drawing clear lines around the set, than with analyzing fundamental
relationships between precedential power and interpretive technique. Cf. DANIEL T.
RODGERS, CONTESTED TRUTHS: KEYWORDS IN AMERICAN POLITICS SINCE
INDEPENDENCE 16 (1987) (“These are at best exemplars of the ways in which a certain,
powerful class of words have functioned in our political culture. . . . [T]here is something to be
said for a serious look . . . at a few of the most potent tools and expansive political metaphors
we have possessed. . . . The words we use . . . have been made, remade, repudiated, fought
over. . . . The keywords, the metaphors, the self-evident truths of our politics have mattered
too deeply for us to use them in any but contested ways.”).
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in time, iconic cases such as New York Times v. Sullivan, Brown,
Korematsu, Lochner, Dred Scott, and Marbury have been
authoritative, controversial, or reviled, but their persistent cultural
potency explains why they produce ongoing interpretive struggles.11
By comparison, the noniconic decisions that were published
immediately before and after Marbury or Brown are doctrinally
unimportant and forgotten—along with the overwhelming majority of
other judicial rulings.12 If thousands of ordinary decisions were erased
from research databases, hardly anyone but specialists would care or
even notice.13
Readers may notice a parallel between this account of iconic cases and the
interpretation of comparably “iconic” statutory or constitutional provisions. See William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1215 (2001).
Methodological disputes about statutory and constitutional interpretation do not analyze
simple, clear, and unimportant legal authorities. See supra note 7. No sensible person
would fight over originalism or dynamism in trying to understand “two Senators,” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 3, or “the State of Arizona,” 25 U.S.C. § 463c (2012). Statutory and
constitutional methodologies become salient only with respect to vague phrases like “due
process” or “employment discrimination,” which themselves are sufficiently important to
justify interpretive struggle. The same is true with respect to interpretive methodologies
concerning precedents. Perhaps obviously, “vagueness” in any form of legal authority
must be defined in operation rather than the abstract, as it depends entirely on context
and the legal questions under dispute. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489–92
(2015) (discussing whether the ostensibly unambiguous clause “established by the State”
was vague as applied to insurance exchanges under the Affordable Care Act).
11. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954); Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432 (1943); Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803). Modern disputes over what these landmark cases signify for current
legal problems are too many for adequate citation. E.g., Thomas B. Colby & Peter J.
Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 528–33 (2015) (introducing a
“nascent rebirth of mainstream conservative support for judicial protection of
unenumerated economic rights”); Kenji Yoshino, The Anti-Humiliation Principle and
Same-Sex Marriage, 123 YALE L.J. 3076, 3081 (2014) (essay) (discussing “a potential
revival of Brown’s lost logic in the context of same-sex marriage”).
12. For trivia buffs, the distinctly noniconic cases published before and after Marbury
are Turner v. Fendall, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 117 (1801), and Clark v. Young, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
181 (1803). The slightly more well-known cases surrounding Brown are Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280 (1955), and Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302
(1955).
13. The radical unevenness of precedents’ importance has been a dominant feature of
Anglo-American law for more than a century. See O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HARV. L. REV. 457, 458 (1897) (“The reports of a given jurisdiction in the course of a
generation take up pretty much the whole body of the law . . . . We could reconstruct the
corpus from them if all that went before were burned.”). That characteristic is also a
premise of American legal education, as the very first casebook proposed to take “a
branch of the law . . . and, without exceeding comparatively moderate limits, to select,
classify, and arrange all the cases which had contributed in any important degree to the
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The importance of iconic cases is what fuels controversy over
their interpretation and status. Landmark rulings often renounce or
reformulate prior practice, and where these shifts have special
significance, they demand unusual methods of interpretation and
justification. Ordinary cases can be explained with a string-cite or
headnote, but to fully understand Brown or Marbury would take a
library and a lifetime.
This Article systemizes interpretation of iconic cases using four
kinds of historical material and four types of precedential meaning: (i)
an opinion’s text indicates a decision’s declared meaning; (ii)
adjudicative context reflects a precedent’s implied meaning; (iii)
reception by contemporary analysts depicts understood meaning; and
(iv) later applications identify developmental meaning. As with other
kinds of textualism (declared meaning), originalism (implied and
understood meaning), and dynamic legalism (developmental
meaning), historical materials concerning precedents often point in

growth, development, or establishment of any of its essential doctrines.” 1 C.C.
LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, at vii (Bos., Little,
Brown & Co. 1871). The notion that one could describe or learn about some expansive
and longstanding field of law from a few dozen cases and a few hundred pages depends on
the prior assumption that “leading” or “landmark” precedents are the ones that matter
most. See id. at vi–vii (“The most important element [in selecting cases] . . . was the great
and rapidly increasing number of reported cases in every department of law. . . . [T]he
shortest and best . . . way of mastering . . . doctrine effectually is by studying the cases in
which it is embodied. But the cases which are useful and necessary for this
purpose . . . bear an exceedingly small proportion to all that have been reported. The vast
majority are useless and worse than useless for any purpose of systematic study. . . . [T]he
many different guises in which the same doctrine is constantly making its
appearance . . . [are] the cause of much misapprehension.”). Culturally constructed
techniques of doctrinal analysis taught in law school continue to affect the behavior of
alumni as they become practicing lawyers and judges. Especially because the latter groups
tend to face even more urgent deadlines and resource constraints than are present in law
school research, a few cases tend to matter a lot, and the devil may take the rest.
Physical collections of case reporters once made it easier to visualize just how
many insignificant decisions are formally part of the United States legal system, though
even those tens of thousands of physical volumes with published cases omitted nearly all
trial court decisions and cases that ended in settlement or plea agreement. Perhaps twentyfirst-century lawyers should imagine the results screen from a search of all state and
federal decisions for all electronically available cases that include the words “of” or “and.”
With a great deal of time and money, a sophisticated empiricist might be able to estimate
the fraction of total judicial decisions that have ever been cited anywhere by anyone. But
any practical lawyer who has drafted a brief or judicial opinion would further stress that
only a small fraction of even cited cases is actually meaningful, much less irreplaceable.
The dismissiveness expressed by Holmes and Langdell regarding the significance of most
judicial cases during the first decades of printed reporters seems immensely more
warranted in present times of electronic research and resources.
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different directions, as they unseat or reinforce interpretations that
otherwise seem conventional.
Where the foregoing evidence does not fit neatly into a single
interpretation, fracture-points emerge that lawyers, judges, and
academics can use in modern struggles over precedential
interpretation and authority. Any system of interpreting cases must
therefore describe a world of contested opportunities rather than one
of simple doctrinal answers.14 These four categories of evidence
demonstrate that there is no meaningful choice about whether to use
history in precedential interpretation. “The only legal materials that
are or ever have been or ever will be available are historical—cases
that have already been decided, statutes that have already been
enacted, and so on.”15 Instead, more interesting questions are what
kinds of history to use and how. We shall see that to study
methodologies for interpreting iconic cases will clarify the
relationship between law and history, as well as the professional
classifications of legal history and legal practice.16
Iconic cases lead double lives. In one respect, they are simply
historical events that occur at specific times and derive from
particular people, environments, ideas, and interests.17 An iconic

14. As Bordieu has written, “[n]othing is more paradoxical . . . than [for] people
whose whole life is spent fighting over words [to] strive at all costs to fix . . . the one true
meaning of . . . ambiguous, overdetermined or indeterminate symbols, words, texts or
events” that “generate interest [precisely] because they have always been at stake in
struggles . . . [over] their ‘true’ meaning.” PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE
17 (Richard Nice trans., Polity Press 1990) (1980) (observing that this paradox recurs for
“all sacred texts, which, being invested with a collective authority . . . can be used as the
tools of a recognized power . . . through interpretation”). Against that backdrop, I should
stress that the categories listed here are not exhaustive, nor are they necessarily listed in
sequential importance. Even as interpreters debate whether a particular case qualifies as
iconic, see supra note 10, they might also debate which interpretive methodologies should
apply to iconic cases, as well as whether one category of evidence is more persuasive than
another.
15. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 146 n.6 (1977).
16. For an analogous discussion of jurisprudential canons, see J.M. Balkin & Sanford
Levinson, Legal Canons: An Introduction, in LEGAL CANONS 3, 3–32 (J.M. Balkin &
Sanford Levinson eds., 2000). See also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the
Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as a Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1000
n.11 (1992) (“Judicial precedents, like religious icons, develop their own tradition of faith,
having independent meaning.”). The main influence on my view of law as a cultural
product, however, is Dan Rodgers’s transformative scholarship on the relationships
between ideas and material realities. See, e.g., CULTURES IN MOTION (Daniel T. Rodgers
et al. eds., 2014); RODGERS, supra note 10.
17. See Christopher Tomlins, Framing the Field of Law’s Disciplinary Encounters: A
Historical Narrative, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 911, 912 (2000).
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decision’s historical reality can be discussed with different emphases:
political histories link cases to partisan struggles, while economic
histories focus on material conditions, and intellectual histories
explore ideologies. These and other modes of analysis are judged by
prevailing standards of expertise, sophistication, and connection to
other scholarship.18 For professional historians, categories of
precedential meaning (declared, implied, understood, developmental)
are data points to be used in support of narratives that other
historians and intellectuals may appreciate as nuanced, truthful, well
crafted, and above all else, interesting.
In a second sense, however, judicial precedents are more than
academic objects; they are conduits of power that influence current
legal disputes and violence.19 In this operative reality, cases have a
formal status—affirmed, overruled, revised—and they have a
doctrinal meaning that changes over time. An iconic decision like
Carroll Towing is not just a past event; it prescribes current standards
for tortious negligence, just as Lochner today is a cautionary tale
about the discredited freedom of contract.20 For professional legal
communities, analyzing iconic cases is more than a historical exercise,
and standards for evaluating precedential interpretation are more
practical than intellectual. Lawyers and judges use categories of
precedential meaning as tools to persuade legal audiences that some
disputed doctrinal result is correct in the present tense.
Any system of precedent implies that judicial decisions must be
understood. As legal authorities, precedents can be authoritative only
if they are legible and portable.21 If a decision is opaque or
understood solely by marginal elites, that precedent can have only
limited effect.22 If judicial decisions from the past are supposed to
18. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Losing One’s Head: Judges and the Law in
Nineteenth-Century American Legal History, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 253 (1999) (book
review); Christopher Tomlins, History in the American Juridical Field: Narrative,
Justification, and Explanation, 16 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 323 (2004).
19. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1628 (1986).
20. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2616–18 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (discussing Lochner’s modern status); Loera v. United States, 714 F.3d 1025,
1031–32 (7th Cir. 2013) (discussing United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d
Cir. 1947)).
21. See JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO
IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 218–21 (1998); Michel Foucault,
Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY 87, 87–89
(Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991).
22. Imagine Hammurabi’s Code in a language that only he could read. See Kathryn E.
Slanski, The Law of Hammurabi and Its Audience, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 97 (2012).
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channel current legal force, they must be able to transport ideas and
instructions from one context to another, thus synchronizing the
activities of officials, lawyers, and actors who are dispersed across
space and time.23
Judicial decisions’ historical and operative aspects are equally
important. Indeed, the two cannot be separated without undermining
the premise of all precedential systems: that present legal power is
guided by history’s dead hand.24 In practice, however, the past and
present meanings of iconic decisions diverge. Each is constructed
using different techniques in the service of different goals. By
examining links between iconic cases’ historical and current
significance, this Article builds a template for comprehending the
long, porous border between law and history—a border that is critical
for lawyers and historians alike.
This Article proceeds in three steps. Part I applies my approach
to two historical icons, Erie v. Tompkins and Swift v. Tyson.25 The
four categories of interpretive material discussed supra will show that
beliefs about these well-known cases are upside down. Modern
lawyers tend to view Swift as an instance of untrammeled power that
contrasts with Erie’s judicial restraint,26 but historical analysis reveals
the opposite. In the 1840s, Swift located judicial authority in a
carefully crafted network of precedents and authorities that formed
an aspirationally cohesive system. In the 1930s, by comparison, Erie
applied brute judicial force to establish a self-consciously novel
regime of authority with meager explanation. The fact that Erie’s
adventurism was accepted at the time speaks volumes about the New
Deal Court’s approach to constitutional law, and more broadly about
iconic precedents’ disruptive power.
Part II briefly examines United States v. Windsor, which
invalidated a key section of the Defense of Marriage Act, and

23. See CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, FREEDOM BOUND: LAW, LABOR, AND CIVIL
IDENTITY IN COLONIZING ENGLISH AMERICA 1580–1865, at 68–70 (2010).
24. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (citing first
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921); and then
citing Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 1991 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 13,
16) (“[T]he very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such
continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.”);
GILMORE, supra note 15, at 14.
25. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
26. E.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: A Comment
on Professor Lessig’s Theory of Translation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1448 n.52 (1997).
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Obergefell v. Hodges, which invalidated state restrictions on same-sex
marriage.27 Windsor and Obergefell addressed the greatest civil rights
issue in a generation, but in both circumstances the Court’s
explanation left unresolved important ambiguities.28 This
juxtaposition of great doctrinal importance with unclear explanation
is the defining feature of icons like Brown or Erie, and that same
characteristic is what justifies unusual methods of precedential
interpretation with respect to more recent cases.
No one can know whether Windsor or Obergefell will retain their
iconic status—and each case has a much slimmer historical record
than Swift or Erie—but both decisions are useful examples for
studying interpretive methodologies. The Court’s incomplete
opinions suggest that future interpreters will conduct their own fights
over what the decisions mean by using nontextual tools, such as
adjudicative context, contemporary reception, and subsequent
applications. Regardless of whether either precedent endures as an
icon, Windsor and Obergefell thus illustrate this Article’s relevance
for any past, present, or future case where a judicial opinion, standing
alone, seems inadequate to explain the decision’s legal significance.
Part III concludes by discussing the relationship between
techniques of legal history and preconditions for transmitting legal
power.29 Having described a system for interpreting iconic precedents,
this Part notes the limited goals that such systems can achieve. The
double lives of iconic cases embody a schism in our legal order. On
one hand, imperatives of doctrinal effectiveness often simplify
historical realities in order to effectuate the rule of law. On the other
hand, inaccurate caricatures of the past may risk exposure of
precedential interpretations as historically inauthentic and thus
illegitimate. Legal doctrine and legal history—despite and because of
their incommensurabilities—are thus revealed as equally crucial
elements of American precedentialism.

27. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593, 2604–05 (2015) (invalidating same-sex
marriage laws in Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee); United States v. Windsor,
133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013) (invalidating Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012))).
28. See Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay
Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817, 873 (2014).
29. See supra notes 17–18, 21–23 and accompanying text.
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I. ERIE’S MANY MEANINGS
Erie is an ideal context for studying precedential interpretation
because, as we shall see, the decision’s iconic status has emerged
through layers of historical misunderstanding. Most Erie scholarship
today defends the Court’s decision as properly revered, or assumes
that a defense is unnecessary.30 These writings are interesting on their
own terms, and they illustrate how Erie is continually rebuilt for
modern audiences. But their ahistorical approach cannot explain what
Erie meant at the time it happened, nor can they describe how the
Erie of 1938 became the iconic “Erie” that is so well known today.
To understand Erie in its own time requires understanding its
nemesis Swift, and this Article’s interpretive methods will be similar
for both decisions. Applying precedential textualism, I will look first
to the Justices’ written opinions, which demonstrate each case’s
declared meaning. Then, I will use precedential originalism to
contextualize those words with information about the lawyers and
30. Compare Ernest A. Young, A General Defense of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 10
J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 17, 18 (2013) (“This article seeks primarily to rescue Erie from its
academic critics.”), with Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 596
(2008) [hereinafter Green, Repressing Erie] (“Erie’s bare holding . . . is established beyond
boredom, and this Article will not dispute it.”), and Craig Green, Erie and Problems of
Constitutional Structure, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 661, 669 (2008) [hereinafter Green, Constitutional
Structure] (“With Erie’s doctrinal future secure, can anyone still muster energy to debate
whether the decision has a valid constitutional basis?”). See also Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa,
Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 870,
872 (2007) (insisting that Erie is “of central importance in determining whether and to what
extent [customary international law] has the status of federal common law”); Henry J.
Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383,
386 (1964) (“[T]he constitutional ground taken in Erie was precisely the right ground . . . .”);
Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie—The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682,
1685–86 (1974) (defending Erie as “constitutional” because it “rests upon premises related to
the basic nature of our federal system”).
Exceptions to the ahistorical mainstream include TONY FREYER, HARMONY &
DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT AND ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1981)
[hereinafter FREYER, HARMONY]; TONY ALLAN FREYER, FORUMS OF ORDER: THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND BUSINESS IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1979) [hereinafter FREYER,
FORUMS]; EDWARD PURCELL, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION:
ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2000) [hereinafter PURCELL, BRANDEIS]; and
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870–1958 (1992) [hereinafter PURCELL,
LITIGATION]. For other historically oriented works, see RANDALL BRIDWELL & RALPH
U. WHITTEN, CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON LAW: THE DECLINE OF THE
DOCTRINES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND FEDERALISM (1977); GILMORE, supra
note 15; MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860,
at 245–52 (1977); and Irving Younger, What Happened in Erie, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1011
(1978).
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judges (implied meaning), and with the decisions’ contemporary
reception by various commentators (understood meaning). Finally, I
will apply methods of living precedentialism to examine the cases’
application in subsequent judicial decisions and scholarship
(developmental meaning). Although particular historical materials will
obviously be different for Swift and Erie, each category of historical
evidence presents another dimension of what the two cases meant
over time, and the materials reveal more interpretive cracks than
coherence. The discussion herein illustrates how new interpretive
techniques can uncover new categories of historical evidence, and
how that new evidence can generate new doctrinal interpretations. It
offers a novel exegesis of two familiar cases, while also charting a
general pattern for interpreting any precedent that modern legal
actors deem to be important and controversial.31
A. Swift v. Tyson: Creating a Monster
The only thing most lawyers know about Swift is that Erie
overruled it. To ignore Swift, however, overlooks an enormous
amount. For example, Swift’s unanimous result was explained by
Justice Joseph Story, a dominant judicial figure and arguably
America’s greatest conflicts scholar.32 We shall see that Swift was
probably more orthodox in its time than Erie is today.33 To grasp why
Swift would become outrageous, we must first consider the long
period in which it was normal.
In 1842, Swift was not primarily about judicial power or
federalism; it was about negotiable paper and commerce.34 John Swift
sued in New York federal court to enforce payment on a bill of
exchange. The bill embodied George Tyson’s promise to pay two
speculators for offering Tyson the option to buy certain real estate.
The speculators later gave Tyson’s payment obligation to Swift, and
in return, Swift agreed to cancel debts that the speculators owed
him.35
When Swift sought payment on the bill of exchange, Tyson
refused because the original property deal was a fraud. Tyson claimed
that the speculators’ trickery voided Swift’s right to collect, but Swift
31. See supra note 10 (explaining what makes such precedents “iconic”).
32. BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 30, at 123.
33. See R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN
OF THE OLD REPUBLIC 336 (1985).
34. See, e.g., FREYER, HARMONY, supra note 30, at 1–43.
35. Id. at 5.
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demanded payment because he had paid valuable consideration and
knew nothing about the speculators’ misdeeds. Tyson replied that
Swift had not paid “consideration” for the bill of exchange because,
under New York state-court cases, speculators’ preexisting debts did
not qualify.36
1. Textualism: Declared Meaning
Interpreting Swift starts with the declared meaning in the Court’s
opinion. From this textualist viewpoint, Swift was a minor case that
addressed one issue of commercial law and one point of statutory law.
The Court’s “only real question” was whether cancelling Swift’s debt
should qualify as valuable consideration—like cash—“in the sense of
the general rule applicable to negotiable instruments.”37 New York
precedents were split, with recent decisions favoring Tyson’s stance
but an opinion authored by Chancellor James Kent supporting
Swift’s.38 Decisions from other jurisdictions, including the United
States Supreme Court, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and England, had
endorsed Swift’s legal theory by treating the cancellation of prior
debts as equivalent to cash.39
Swift’s grab bag of authority from various jurisdictions bolstered
the Court’s own judgment that a canceled prior debt should count as
valid consideration. “It is for the benefit and convenience of the
commercial world, to give as wide an extent as practicable to the
credit and circulation of negotiable paper . . . .”40 A rule granting
payment to Swift would have allowed creditors to get satisfaction
from debtors without resorting to litigation.41 More importantly, a
pro-Swift ruling would have let people like Tyson create negotiable
instruments “of equivalent value to cash,” without paying a premium
to compensate for those instruments’ limited alienability.42 This would
have allowed such credit instruments to circulate more freely in

36. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 15–16 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
37. Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 16–18, 22 (collecting sources).
40. Id. at 20.
41. See id. at 6 (statement of Swift’s counsel). For example, Swift would not have to
sue the speculators to recover their preexisting debt; he could accept their bill of exchange
as payment.
42. Id. at 20.
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mercantile business transactions, thereby promoting “the benefit and
convenience of the commercial world.”43
In contrast, the Court feared that a victory for Tyson could ruin
negotiable instruments for the “large class of cases” where banks
discount “old securities . . . which have arrived at maturity” in
exchange for debtors’ proffer of “new notes . . . by way of renewal or
security.”44 The Court wrote that “[p]robably more than one-half of
all bank transactions in our country, as well as those of other
countries, are of this nature. [Tyson’s proposed doctrine] would strike
a fatal blow at all discounts of negotiable securities for pre-existing
debts.”45 In theory, Tyson’s arguments would require banks to
investigate whether a third party’s bill of exchange, when offered to
cover existing debt, was obtained through inequitable conduct. In
practice, however, that investigation would be so costly that creditors
would have to price bills of exchange “at a ruinous discount” to cover
risks that subsequent holders like Swift might be unable to collect.46
Only one page in Swift discussed the issue that would someday
be notorious: “[A]dmitting the doctrine [of refusing payment] to be
fully settled in New York, it remains to be considered, whether it is
obligatory upon this Court, if it differs from . . . the general
commercial law.”47 There was no doubt at the time that “general
commercial law” existed, and it certainly applied to bills of exchange.
This is why the Court cited so many cases—including New York
decisions—in which judges had analyzed bills of exchange without
relying on “any local statute, or positive, fixed, or ancient local
usage[;] . . . they [instead deduced their results] from the general
principles of commercial law.”48 A major goal of commercial law was
to allow merchants to operate within a developed system of trade,
and American courts were uniformly glad to oblige in this context by
applying nationally and internationally harmonized legal doctrines.49
The narrow question in Swift was whether federal courts were
required to follow New York courts’ interpretation of general
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 18.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., supra notes 39–48 and accompanying text; infra notes 128–138 and
accompanying text (discussing Swift’s efforts to accomplish such objectives); infra notes
128–138 (discussing similar efforts by New York courts in Stalker v. M’Donald, 6 Hill 93
(N.Y. 1843) (Walworth, Ch.)).
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commercial law, even when the latter seemed demonstrably incorrect
on the merits.
The statutory question in Swift concerned the First Congress’s
Rules of Decision Act, which ordered that “the laws of the several
states . . . shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law
in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply.”50 Swift
held that, in this context, the statutory term “laws” excluded judicial
interpretations of general commercial law.51 Nineteenth-century
common law assumed that judges did not make law from whole cloth;
instead, adjudicators sought to apply preexisting authorities such as
precedents, customs, traditions, and widespread notions of reason and
justice.52 Within that tradition, judicial decisions were, “at most, only
evidence of what the laws [were]; and [were] not of themselves
laws.”53 Further, Swift reasoned that even though precedents “are
often reexamined, reversed, and qualified by the Courts themselves,”
one could not use the singular noun to say that any new judicial ruling
was itself a new “law.”54
Instead, Swift interpreted “laws of the several states” to mean
“rules and enactments promulgated by the legislative authority [of a
state], or long established local customs having the force of laws.”55
The Court held that constitutional, statutory, and local customary law
embodied the kind of fiat-based, localized authority that Congress
had wanted federal courts to follow; judicial decisions about
commercial law, however, did not.56
Prior Supreme Court decisions had applied the Rules of Decision
Act only to “positive statutes of the state, and the construction
thereof adopted by the local tribunals, and to rights and titles to
things having a permanent locality, such as the rights and titles to real
estate, and other matters immovable and intraterritorial in their
nature and character.”57 Swift saw no reason—absent explicit
50. Judiciary (Rules of Decision) Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012)).
51. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18–19.
52. Cf. id. at 19 (“[S]tate tribunals are called upon to perform the like functions as
ourselves, that is, to ascertain upon general reasoning and legal analogies, what is the true
exposition of the contract or instrument, or what is the just rule furnished by the principles
of commercial law to govern the case.”).
53. Id. at 18.
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 18–19.
57. Id. I have not found direct evidence that Swift intended to reference slavery with
its term “intraterritorial in their nature.” During the same year, however, Justice Story
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congressional instruction—that the Rules of Decision Act should
govern “questions of a more general nature, not at all dependent
upon local statutes or local usages.”58 Swift thus concluded that New
York courts’ interpretation of general commercial law, if
substantively incorrect, should not prohibit federal courts from
reaching a different result.
As a matter of declared meaning, Swift’s judicial text portrays an
almost boring decision. The Court described its commercial-law
ruling as consistent with the bulk of prior case law and unbroken
business practice. Perhaps even New York state courts would fall into
line soon. For although Swift’s interpretation of general commercial
law never required state courts to follow federal outcomes, the Court
believed that tradition and good sense would prevail, thereby leading
state tribunals sooner or later to enforce bills of exchange like Tyson’s
as well.59
2. Originalism: Implied and Understood Meanings
Every lawyer knows that written judicial opinions are an
accessible resource for interpreting what a case means, as published
reporters offer highly legible and portable justifications for many
courts’ decreed results. The unstated context of a judicial decision,
however, can be important if legal interpreters deem the published
opinion to be unsatisfying or incomplete. In Swift, for example, details

wrote the Court’s opinion in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842), which
came rather close to that conclusion:
By the general law of nations, no nation is bound to recognise the state of slavery,
as to foreign slaves found within its territorial dominions, when it is in opposition
to its own policy and institutions, in favour of the subjects of other nations where
slavery is recognized . . . . The state of slavery is deemed to be a mere municipal
regulation, founded upon and limited to the range of the territorial laws.
Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 611 (emphasis added). For political reasons and otherwise, it
may have been vital for Swift to hold that federal judges in diversity cases would not opine
about how “general common law” would regulate slavery—or even abolish it. See also,
e.g., NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 346–47, 354 (documenting Justice Story’s role in
developing the law surrounding slavery).
58. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18–19.
59. Perhaps ironically, Justice Catron’s concurrence showed most clearly the Court’s
expectation that state courts would change their minds in response to Swift. Catron
objected that part of the majority’s holding was dictum, and that it was “improbable” that
contrary state courts would “yield to a mere expression of opinion of this Court.” Id. at 23
(Catron, J., concurring) (emphasis added). By contrast, “if the question [addressed in
dictum] was permitted to rest until it fairly arose, the decision of it either way by this
Court, probably, would, and I think ought to settle it.” Id.
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about the lawyers and the authoring judge support interpretations of
“implied meaning” that diverge from the opinion’s published text.
Further complexities appear by examining Swift’s audience for the
decision’s “understood meaning” when it was rendered. The
following subsections consider all of these agents who produced
originalist interpretive material: lawyers and judges for implied
meaning, and contemporary observers for understood meaning.
a.

Lawyers60

Though the Supreme Court explained Swift as a decision of only
middling importance, the lawyers representing Swift and Tyson
argued as if it were monumental. Swift’s lawyer, William Pitt
Fessenden, emphasized the importance of commercial policy and
celebrated negotiable paper’s “great[] service to civilized man, in
facilitating the transmission of the equivalent of money, and
thus, . . . answering, in some respects, the purposes of money itself.”61
For Fessenden, the Swift case threatened the basic stability of
America’s monetary system. Although negotiable securities might be
hard for some modern readers to appreciate as an alternative to
specie currency, (consider bitcoin or credit cards), that function would
have been painfully clear in the year 1842.62
The unspoken background for Fessenden’s argument was the
Panic of 1837, which had left the country with years of double-dipped
aftershocks in what would be the economy’s worst downturn until the
Great Depression.63 Unstable banks and securities prompted many
60. Twenty-first-century readers might instinctively doubt whether lawyers’
arguments can illuminate the meaning of judicial decisions. This is because today’s lawyers
only rarely quote briefs or oral arguments to support particular interpretations of court
decisions. Compare Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 747 (2007) (Roberts, C.J.) (interpreting Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), based on arguments made by the lawyers litigating in 1954), with Adam Liptak,
The Same Words, but Differing Views, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007, at A24 (quoting those
same lawyers in 2007 decrying the Chief Justice’s conclusions about Brown as “100
percent wrong,” “preposterous,” and “dirty pool”). In the 1840s, however, lawyers’
arguments were so important that they were printed in advance of the judges’ opinions.
E.g., Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 3–14. Unless one were to insist on some form of
precedential hypertextualism—the text, the whole text, and nothing but the text—lawyers’
arguments can offer a very useful source of contextual meaning.
61. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 7 (statement of Swift’s counsel).
62. James A. Henretta, The “Market” in the Early Republic, 18 J. EARLY REPUBLIC
289, 297–98 (1998) (“[M]ost American money was not . . . gold or silver, but ‘token’ or
artificial money . . . .”); see FREYER, FORUMS, supra note 30, at 5, 36.
63. ALASDAIR ROBERTS, AMERICA’S FIRST GREAT DEPRESSION: ECONOMIC
CRISIS AND DISORDER AFTER THE PANIC OF 1837, at 7–8 (2012) (“[The years 1836–48]
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commercial actors to demand cash instead of accepting credit.64 Those
refusals to accept financial notes shrank the effective money supply
and prompted deflation. As money became more scarce and valuable,
the price of everything else dropped. A smaller quantity of
decreasingly available, increasingly valuable money was able to buy
more goods, services, property, and labor. And as prices fell,
employers and consumers cut salaries and spending, which again
reduced the money in people’s pockets and reinforced deflationary
pressure.65
Fessenden claimed that to adopt Swift’s position would reduce
litigation because already “thousands of suits have been prevented by
receiving a bill of exchange or promissory note, . . . in discharge of a
debt, which . . . the debtor . . . could discharge in no other way.”66
Fessenden’s deeper argument, however, was about economic
confidence. He implied that any refusal to accept commercial notes as
equivalent to cash would undermine the desirability and circulation of
credit instruments, thereby echoing the deflationary economic crisis
that continued to devastate so many Americans.67

began with the collapse . . . and panic that caused . . . a ‘paralysis of credit’ among U.S.
financial institutions. . . . By 1843, the United States was frozen out of international
financial markets. . . . Economic decline unleashed civil and political disorder and caused
an unraveling of the unwritten compact that held the federal system together. . . . [I]f we
measure a crisis by . . . political and cultural shock . . . as well as by . . . economic
dislocation, then the crisis of 1836–1848 is clearly a rival to the depression of the 1930s.”);
Peter L. Rousseau, Jacksonian Monetary Policy, Specie Flows, and the Panic of 1837, 62 J.
ECON. HIST. 457, 486 (2002) (“The Panic of 1837 was the culmination of a series of policy
shifts and unanticipated disturbances that shook the young U.S. economy at the core of its
financial structure . . . .”).
64. ROBERTS, supra note 63, at 47 (“[By 1842], two hundred banks had closed
entirely. In the interim, economic activity ground to a halt. Money became scarce, and
prices and trade declined precipitously.”).
65. JESSICA M. LEPLER, THE MANY PANICS OF 1837: PEOPLE, POLITICS, AND THE
CREATION OF A TRANSATLANTIC FINANCIAL CRISIS 231 (2013) (“Nine states defaulted
on their loans. Foreign investors feared a general repudiation of state debts and drastically
reduced the flow of capital and credit to the United States. . . . Although the actual crisis in
1837 was more acute, the Panic in 1839 brought on the worst deflation Americans had yet
experienced. The English called the years that followed ‘the hungry forties.’ ” (footnotes
omitted) (citing first REGINALD CHARLES MCGRANE, FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS AND
AMERICAN STATE DEBTS 265–69 (2013); then citing Namsuk Kim & John Joseph Wallis,
The Market for American State Government Bonds in Britain and the United States, 1830–
43, 58 ECON. HIST. REV. 736, 755–56 (2005); and then quoting W.H. Chaloner, The
Hungry Forties, in INDUSTRY AND INNOVAITON: SELECTED ESSAYS—W.H. CHALONER
232, 232–42 (D.A. Farnie & W.H. Henderson eds., 1990))).
66. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 6 (statement of Swift’s counsel).
67. Id.
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Fessenden also discussed federal courts’ reputation among
international investors, who had been crucial to the 1837 Panic.68
According to Fessenden, the federal courts faced a basic choice: if
Tyson were to prevail, then diversity cases involving New York
transactions would deny payment applying New York law, while
identical cases concerning non-New York transactions would grant
payment under general common law. Such inconsistencies from one
case to the next would ruin the Supreme Court’s international
credibility:
By all [outside] the United States, this Court is looked to as the
judiciary of the whole nation, . . . whose commerce and
transactions are as widely diffused as is the use of bills of
exchange . . . . How can this Court preserve its control over the
reason and affections of the people of the United States . . . [if]
it has decided . . . the same identical question, arising on a bill of
exchange, first one way, and then the other, with vacillating
inconsistency? In what light will the judicial character of the
United States appear abroad, under such circumstances[?]69
Fessenden argued that federal courts should instead decide all general
common law cases by reference to “the actual consciences and
judgments of the minds of the [federal] judges who constitute those
Courts”—just as state common law cases were left “to the best
judgment of the state Courts, without respect to the decision of any
Court of the United States.”70
Tyson’s contrary position was argued by Richard Henry Dana,
who used the Rules of Decision Act to invoke broad theories about
federal courts and the nature of common law.71 Dana framed Tyson’s
argument by invoking the nation’s earliest legal history. After the
American Revolution, every state had created a judicial system by
statutorily receiving English common law and authorizing state-court
modifications “to meet the exigencies of an enterprising people.”72
68. Rousseau, supra note 63, at 483 (“Disturbances from across the
Atlantic . . . aggravated the monetary pressure . . . . Most serious was a renewed series of
commercial bill rejections in England . . . .”); see Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 8 (statement of
Swift’s counsel) (“If there is any question of law . . . widely general in its nature and
effects, it is the present question [i.e., the negotiability of bills of exchange]. It is one in
which foreigners, the citizens of different states, in their contests with each other, nay,
every nation of the civilized commercial world, are deeply interested.”).
69. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 8–9 (statement of Swift’s counsel).
70. Id. at 9.
71. Id. at 9–14 (statement of Tyson’s counsel).
72. Id. at 11.
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But that emphatically did not happen for federal courts. There was
never a federal statute adopting English common law, and Dana
explained that Congress had created federal courts that were
“anomalous in character [because they were] without rules of
decision.”73 Relying on basic principles of federalism and separation
of powers, Dana argued that no application of common law in federal
courts could be legitimate in the absence of some prior constitutional
or legislative authorization.74
Dana claimed that the Rules of Decision Act had never licensed
federal courts to apply English or “general” common law. Instead, the
Act ordered federal courts to apply common law derived from “the
several states,” thereby avoiding “perpetual confliction between the
state and Federal Courts” in contexts where the two systems might
disagree over particular common-law requirements.75 Dana explained
that “[o]ur law idiom is essentially of common law origin, yet not
foreign. It is the language familiar to us in the jurisprudence of the
respective states.”76 Moreover, Dana argued that “[i]n coming
together . . . , the framers of the Constitution, and our representatives
in [the first] Congress . . . had in view the language, laws, and
institutions of the states which they represented.”77 According to
Dana, Congress never adopted English common law, much less some
kind of imaginary “uniform” common law.78 Instead, Congress had
told federal courts to follow the common law as it existed in state
courts and as previously authorized by state reception statutes.79
Dana argued that the Rules of Decision Act “express[ed] all that
was necessary for the adoption of the state laws.”80 But he further
noted that
[the Act] is all the provision there is upon the subject; and in so
far as it falls short of the adoption of laws for the direction of
the Courts, the defect is still unprovided for. The common law
has never been otherwise adopted, nor have the Courts the

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 11–12, 14.
Id. at 10–11 (emphasis added).
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id.
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power to create or adopt laws—they must administer the law as
existing.81
According to Dana, a requirement of statutory authorization for
common-law decisionmaking reflected Congress’s foundational
power to control federal courts, including federal judges’ obligation to
apply law instead of inventing it. Without addressing Swift’s
arguments about international commerce, Dana concluded that
Tyson’s position was mandated by constitutional principle and also by
statute.82
Unfortunately for Tyson, the Court ignored Dana’s thesis about
judicial lawmaking, instead concluding that the Rules of Decision
Act’s term “laws” did not include general commercial law.83 On the
other hand, the Court endorsed Fessenden’s economic thesis only in
mild tones.84 And thus began interpretive debates about Swift’s
original meaning that have lasted for 150 years. One interpreter might
emphasize the Court’s result, which favored Fessenden and Swift and
arguably implied a preference for commerce over legalism.85 A
different interpreter, however, could focus on the opinion’s cautious
language and the wide gap between the lawyers’ arguments and the
Court’s explanation.86 Perhaps Swift was milquetoast after all—or
maybe not. To further explore ambiguities about Swift’s original
context requires examining the case from the deciding Justices’
perspective.
b.

Judges

Much like lawyers’ courtroom arguments, judicial biographies
offer a powerful source of implied precedential meaning. Few judges
are studied as full human beings, but for those who are—legal
celebrities like Marshall, Taney, Holmes, Cardozo, and Warren—
their lived experiences offer context for studying their judicial work.87
Justice Story’s life is particularly significant for interpreting Swift
because he did not accept the lawyers’ characterization of a pitched

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 18–19.
See id. at 20.
E.g., HORWITZ, supra note 30, at 250.
See, e.g., NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 336, 338.
E.g., JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION (1996).
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battle between law and economics.88 Instead, he saw a case where
those concepts reinforced one another, under the management of
erudite federal judges like himself.89
Understanding Swift’s author begins with Story’s published
Commentaries. In their day, these publications were unprecedented in
scope and impact, and they remain among the most significant legal
scholarship ever written in America.90 Distinctively important for

88. See JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 238–39
(1909) (“Among the causes which led to the decision in Swift v. Tyson, the chief seems to
have been the character and position of [Justice] Story.”). One might analyze all nine
Justices who decided Swift, but an aggregate approach could distort reality just as
grievously as an individual focus. There is often simply no way to identify who
meaningfully created a collectively written work.
89. NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 116–17 (“Behind Story’s opinions was a vision of
economic man and a plan for economic progress. At the center of this American plan,
shaping and guiding the process, were American common lawyers and judges.”).
90. See Paul Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v. Pennsylvania
and Justice Joseph Story’s Judicial Nationalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 247, 247 (“[Story] was
unquestionably ‘one of our greatest jurists and legal theorists.’ His numerous
Commentaries . . . helped create a national legal system. His vast legal scholarship made
him a ‘one-man West Publication Company.’ ” (quoting NEWMYER, supra note 33, at
282)); H. Jefferson Powell, Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution: A Belated
Review, 94 YALE L.J. 1285, 1286 (1985) (“Alexander H. Stephens credited Story with
virtually creating ex nihilo the nationalist constitutionalism that legitimized Abraham
Lincoln’s successful war against secession . . . . Professor Morton Horwitz has identified
Story as a key actor in ‘the transformation of American law’ between 1780 and 1860, while
Professor James McClellan has portrayed Story as, even more than John Marshall, the
author of the political and constitutional system of the modern United States.” (footnotes
omitted) (citing first 1 ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS, A CONSTITUTIONAL VIEW OF THE
LATE WAR BETWEEN THE STATES 505 (Phila., Nat’l Publ’g Co. 1868); then quoting
HORWITZ, supra note 30, at 255–56; and then citing JAMES T. MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH
STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 305–09 (1971))); NEWMYER, supra note 33,
at 193 (noting James Kent’s statement that Story’s scholarly “comprehensiveness” threw
“all my little brief & narrow Sketches into the Shade”); see also BRIDWELL & WHITTEN,
supra note 30, at 123 (“[T]here is no question that Justice Story was the most learned and
scholarly man ever to sit on the high bench.”); NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 184 (“By
modern standards [Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution] look[] like a great beached
whale; but in the nineteenth century it swam majestically in the raging seas of
constitutional disputation.”); id. at 19 (describing Story as “the most prolific legal publicist
in the nineteenth century”); 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED
STATES HISTORY 144 (2d ed. 1926) (“[S]tory well earned the place of honor in American
legal history to which he was assigned by the Bar; and his decisions will always be one of
the great glories of the American Judiciary.”); ALAN WATSON, JOSEPH STORY AND THE
COMITY OF ERRORS: A CASE STUDY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 2 (1992) (describing Story as
“the prime architect of nineteenth-century American conflicts law”); Ernest G. Lorenzen,
Story’s Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws: One Hundred Years After, 48 HARV. L.
REV. 15, 38 (1934) (“In the United States and England, Story is revered today as the
father of the conflict of laws. In this one hundredth anniversary year of the publication of
his Commentaries, the rest of the world joins the Anglo-American in rendering homage to
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current purposes are Story’s commentaries on bills of exchange, his
commentaries on conflicts of laws, and his commentaries on the
Constitution.91
i. Commercial Law
Story’s commentaries on bills of exchange assembled cases from
both sides of the Atlantic.92 Story synthesized cases around shared
practicalities and principles, thus presenting commercial law as a
unified, singular object to be evaluated for its coherence and
pragmatism.93 His vision of transatlantic unity matched the economic
function of negotiable paper. Shared legal principles allowed credit to
move across borders, with goods and services following close
behind.94 In the mid-nineteenth century, enforceable commercial
instruments allowed people who were divided by national boundaries
to nonetheless rely on each other for credit and payment, and such
transnational business activities were indispensable on both sides of
the Atlantic.95
the great American jurist, and to acclaim him one of the leading personalities of all time in
the field of the conflict of laws.”).
91. See generally JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BILLS OF
EXCHANGE (Bos., Little, Brown & Co. 4th ed. 1860) (1843) [hereinafter STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE]; JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (Bos., Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1834) [hereinafter STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON CONFLICTS]; 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (Bos., Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) [hereinafter
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION].
92. NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 246 (“Onto the body of the common law [Story]
graft[ed] the ‘enlightened and liberal rules’ of commercial law, which he drew from every
age and all nations.”).
93. Id. at 285 (“Bringing rational order out of apparent chaos was, as Story saw
it . . . the distinguishing mark of Mansfield’s commercial law . . . and in this tradition Story
made the search for organizing principle the essence of his legal science.”); cf. Ellen
Holmes Pearson, Revising Custom, Embracing Choice: Early American Legal Scholars &
The Republicanization of the Common Law, in EMPIRE AND NATION: THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD 93, 95 (Eliga H. Gould & Peter S. Onuf eds.,
2005) (discussing Mansfield’s efforts to tame the “confusing, unwieldy system” of English
common law through the “creation of a commercial law code” of systematic judicial
precedents).
94. See Henretta, supra note 62, at 302.
95. Id. at 302; J. Sperling, The International Payments Mechanism in the Seventeenth
and Eighteenth Centuries, 14 ECON. HIST. REV. 446, 446 (1962) (quoting financier Nathan
Rothschild’s opinion that England was “the Bank for the whole world . . . [as] all
transactions in India, in China, in Germany, in the whole world are guided here and
settled through this country”); see also FREYER, FORUMS, supra note 30, at 3 (“Between
1815 and 1860 the value of the [United States’s] foreign trade grew from $166 to $762
million. . . . In 1810, 93 million pounds of cotton were exported, and, after [1815], the
volume increased steadily . . . [to] more than one billion pounds annually in the late
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Story saw uniform commercial law as a precondition for the
international mercantile economy that had dominated American life,
and he sought—as a commentator and also a judge—to describe and
prescribe standards that would regulate bills of exchange effectively
across borders.96 Story was always certain that his analysis of
commercial practice and legal doctrine was correct, which explains his
faith that Swift’s reasoning would ultimately persuade lawyers or state
judges who might otherwise disagree.97
ii. Conflicts of Law
Story’s commentaries on conflicts of law reveal a different side of
Swift. The entire topic “conflicts of law” presupposes variation among
the laws of different nations and states.98 Even as Story synthesized
the substantive law governing bills of exchange, he had no delusions
about a preordained or unified commercial law in the AngloAmerican world.99 More than anyone, Story understood the
multilayered and polycentric structure of nineteenth-century common
law, and that experience was certainly important in Swift.100 Story’s
1850s.” (footnote omitted) (citing first Joseph J. Klein, The Development of Mercantile
Instruments of Credit in the United States, 12 J. ACCT. 321, 321–45 (1911); then citing
Nathan Isaacs, Business Postulates and the Law, 41 HARV. L. REV. 1014, 1014–30 (1928)));
id. at 4 (“[L]ong-distance credit transactions were made through the medium of special
commercial contracts, particularly bills of exchange and promissory notes.”); id. at 24
(“The inconveniences arising from [state-law] diversities would seem . . . not only to
trouble the lawyer and the court, but to render the commercial and trading part of the
community liable to perpetual mistakes, losses, and vexations.” (quoting Book Review,
The American Jurist, 29 N. AM. REV. 418, 422 (1829) (reviewing Joseph Story, An Address
Delivered Before the Members of the Suffolk Bar, at Their Anniversary, on the Fourth of
September, 1821, 1 AM. JURIST 1 (1829)))).
96. See FREYER, FORUMS, supra note 30, at 79–80; NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 120,
281–82.
97. See FREYER, HARMONY, supra note 30, at 18.
98. See WATSON, supra note 90, at 1.
99. See NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 289 (“Story came to understand . . . the
centrifugal disruption of uniformity caused by federalism and the unevenness of doctrinal
transplantation.”); id. at 305–06 (“[Story] knew from practice that . . . . [t]he commercial
wants to which these groups adjusted law were not abstract verities written in the clouds
but instead the practical calculations of businessmen who needed law to help them
mobilize resources, expand markets, and maximize profits.”); Pearson, supra note 93, at 94
(“[L]ocal versions of common law continued to evolve as each state built its own form of
republican government and redefined the common law system to fit new republican
parameters.”).
100. NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 288 (“Commercial common law was not, [for Story],
a vague, mystical creation, a ‘brooding omnipresence in the sky,’ as Holmes would later
put it. The comparative and historical techniques, as Story applied them, were demanding
and rigorous, and the ‘universal reasoning’ they ascertained was based . . . more on what
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commentaries explained that courts had applied conflicts doctrine for
centuries, with the overriding goal of creating an interjurisdictional
system that could manage frictions and complexity.101
Story saw that, taken as a conflicts case, Swift had no perfect
answer. If the Court were to grant payment on the bill of exchange,
that would create disparities and “confliction[s]” between federal
courts and state courts in cases about New York transactions.102 Yet
to deny payment would differentiate federal cases about New York
transactions from federal cases about non-New York transactions.103
Conflicts of law jurisprudence was designed to address exactly these
kinds of difficulties, and so was Swift. With respect to
transjurisdictional mechanisms like bills of exchange, Story wrote that
the Supreme Court—like state courts—should apply the transnational
law of merchants.104 According to Justice Story, capital should flow
freely across borders, aided by interterritorial legal doctrines, and no
state court could claim authoritative superiority in applying such
aspirationally uniform and enduring principles.105 In this respect,
Story was not only confident in his substantive analysis regarding bills
of exchange; he also thought that Swift’s approach to conflicts of law
could manage any period of interjurisdictional difference.106
iii. Constitutional Law
Story’s commentaries on the Constitution place Swift in an
appropriately political context.107 Story dedicated these commentaries

was than on what should be.” (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1916)
(Holmes, J., dissenting))).
101. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON CONFLICTS, supra note 91, at 8. See generally
WATSON, supra note 90, at 2.
102. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
104. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18–19 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 646 (1938).
105. Id. at 19.
106. See id. (“Undoubtedly, the decisions of the local tribunals upon such subjects are
entitled to, and will receive, the most deliberate attention and respect of this Court; but
they cannot furnish positive rules, or conclusive authority, by which our own judgments
are to be bound up and governed. The law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly
declared in the language of Cicero, adopted by Lord Mansfield in Luke v. Lyde, 2 Burr.
883, 887, to be in a great measure, not the law of a single country only, but of the
commercial world.”).
107. Story’s Harvard professorship highlights the politics of legal education and
scholarship. As the Federalist Party lost national elections to Jeffersonian Democrats, its
first response was to add new federal judges who could maintain order until the next
election. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1
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to John Marshall, and they defended the same broad national powers
that the Chief Justice had upheld throughout his judicial career.108 In
the Jacksonian era that Story occupied, such nationalist views were
controversial, and the response to his work was correspondingly
mixed.109
Even as Story urged all judges—federal, state, and English—to
support transatlantic commerce, his constitutional commentaries
assigned federal courts a privileged position.110 Federal judges were
constitutional architects on topics like federalism and separation of
powers, and Story practiced what he preached. Story wrote the
majority opinion in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, which proclaimed the
need for uniform federal law and declared the Supreme Court as its
mouthpiece.111 He also authored the Court’s decision in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, which enforced federal fugitive slave statutes despite
state liberty laws that were significantly more protective.112
In Swift, Story read the Rules of Decision Act much like vague
constitutional provisions that left important unresolved issues for the

Cranch) 299 (1803). When Democrats kept winning, however, Federalists relied on
Harvard to manufacture conservative lawyers and legal culture to counter Jeffersonian
excess. See R. Kent Newmyer, Harvard Law School, New England Legal Culture, and the
Antebellum Origins of American Jurisprudence, 74 J. AM. HIST. 814, 817–19 (1987). In this
regard, everything about Story’s scholarly work was deeply political in nature. NEWMYER,
supra note 33, at 217 (“The duty of ‘public men’ was to resist [Jacksonian political abuse],
and in the lead had to be the ‘professional intelligence’ of the country. At the head of this
intelligentsia, one assumes, were certain Justices of the Supreme Court.” (quoting Letter
from Justice Story to Richard Peters (Apr. 24, 1833), in 2 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH
STORY 140, 141 (William W. Story ed., New World Book Mfg. Co. 1971) (1851))).
108. 1 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 91, at iii.
109. See NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 219; Powell, supra note 90, at 1285–86.
110. FREYER, HARMONY, supra note 30, at 18 (“Story . . . suggested . . . that a prime
‘tendency’ of federal jurisdiction was ‘to increase the confidence and credit between the
commercial and agricultural states. No man can be insensible to the value, in promoting
credit, of . . . prompt, efficient, and impartial administration of justice in enforcing
contracts.’ ” (quoting 3 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 91,
at 564)); NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 121 (“To strengthen the federal courts and
regularize the process of adjudication . . . was to enhance the potential for the kind of law
American business needed; it was to accelerate the ‘tendency’ toward the goal of a
national system of contract and credit . . . .” (quoting 3 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 91, at 564)); cf. JOSEPH STORY, JOSEPH STORY AND THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 106 (Valerie L. Horowitz ed., Lawbook Exch. Ltd. 2006)
(1844) (“[N]o legislature can make a system half so just, or perfect, or harmonious, both
from want of time, and experience, and opportunity of knowledge, as judges, who are
successively called to administer justice, and gather light from the wisdom of their
predecessors.”).
111. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 344, 347–48 (1816).
112. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 625–26 (1842).
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Court to decide. Under all circumstances, Story had deep faith in the
Supreme Court’s ability to interpret vague language in a way that
would implement constitutional values. In deciding Swift, as
elsewhere, Story did not perceive a real tension between law and
democratic politics. Congress had enacted the Rules of Decision Act
with apparently sensible intentions, but it was the Court’s duty to
interpret and apply the legislature’s unspecified term “laws of the
several states,” just as the Court interpreted unclear constitutional
terms in other kinds of cases.113
Justice Story’s biography reflects a celebratory view of federal
courts’ leadership, and Swift definitely fits the pattern. Topics like
“general commercial law” were key to America’s economic and
national success, and Story and Swift envisioned common lawmaking
as an elite, professional, transnational discourse based on enduring
principles and adaptive practicality.114 In the United States, federal
courts were major agents of both stasis and change, and in that
political context, the triumph of Swift over Tyson was one more
victory for Marshallian nationalism over states-rights restrictions.115
Story might even have thought that the genius of general common
law, wielded by conservative visionaries like himself, could strengthen
commercial bonds and buffer the partisan sectional divisions that
would eventually prompt national war in the 1860s.116 Law,
economics, and constitutional politics were bound together in this one

113. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 400 (1819); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
114. See FREYER, FORUMS, supra note 30, at 41, 79; FREYER, HARMONY, supra note
30, at 33; NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 281 (“[Story’s] constant premise . . . was his longheld distrust of legislative competence and a preference for law made by judges.”);
Henretta, supra note 62, at 301–03.
115. See NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 197–98 (describing “the classic dilemma of
adjudication” as “the need to adjust old law to new history while preserving the semblance
of legal continuity on which judicial authority must rest”); Pearson, supra note 93, at 98
(noting that some nineteenth-century American jurists, such as Philadelphia lawyer and
law lecturer Peter DuPonceau, viewed the common law as “America’s ‘national law,’ ”
which “had gradually ‘become incorporated and in a manner identified not only with the
national jurisprudence, but, under the name of Constitution,’ with America’s government”
(citations omitted)); id. at 106 (noting objections by state-sovereignty Republicans that “it
would be ‘altogether a hopeless attempt, to endeavor to extract from such discordant
materials, [a] uniform system of national jurisprudence’ ” (citations omitted)).
116. NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 290 (“Commercial operations, as Story noted in his
Commentaries on the Constitution, depended on political unity, on constitutional union;
ties of union, on the other hand, would be strengthened by uniform private commercial
law, which would enhance business relationships between citizens of different states, thus
circumventing and finally diminishing state and regional particularism.”).
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man’s life, and from a biographical viewpoint, they can also be seen in
the Swift opinion that Story was perfectly suited to write.
c.

Contemporary Reactions

Three interpretations of Swift should now be visible: ‘‘nothingto-see” textualism, ‘‘law-versus-economics” lawyering, and “trust-thejudges” biography. But there is another category of originalist context
to consider. Reception history, as it is called, allows interpreters to
discern a case’s “understood meaning” based on contemporary
reactions of lawyers, judges, and commentators. Such reception
history is rare in legal discourse and scholarship, though it sometimes
appears in variants of constitutional interpretation.117
Even the most careful legal historians have overlooked
immediate reactions to the Swift decision,118 and that silence has been
read to mean that either: (a) Swift was an unremarkable application
of longstanding principles,119 or (b) the Court’s pro-commercial
aggression had become a dominant and accepted ideological
system.120
All of those judgments are incorrect. Within a month of the
Court’s decision, at least twelve newspapers—from New Orleans to
New Hampshire, from Ohio to New York City—printed descriptions
of Swift as an “Important Decision.”121 Each of these sources
117. One basis for resisting reception history is a form of ultra-legalism that posits the
meaning of legal sources as independent of social and cultural facts, such that cases like
Swift “are what they are,” regardless of what observers thought at the time. Cultural
scholars have debunked comparable symbolic naturalization in other historical contexts.
E.g., Clifford Geertz, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS 3, 3–30 (1973).
118. NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 334 (“The [Swift] decision was barely noticed by
contemporary newspapers and periodicals . . . .”); see FREYER, HARMONY, supra note 30,
at 17–18; FREYER, FORUMS, supra note 30, at 89, 152; see also BRIDWELL & WHITTEN,
supra note 30, at 69; HORWITZ, supra note 30, at 245–52 (ignoring Swift’s contemporary
reception); PURCELL, LITIGATION, supra note 30, at 60–61; 2 WARREN, supra note 90, at
89; cf. GILMORE, supra note 15, at 33–34 (citing only judicial decisions that applied or
endorsed the doctrine).
119. See FREYER, FORUMS, supra note 30, at 170; NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 336.
120. See FREYER, FORUMS, supra note 30, at 53; HORWITZ, supra note 30, at 249–50.
121. Important Decision, PUB. LEDGER (Phila.), Jan. 28, 1842, at 2; Important
Decision, THE SUN (Balt.), Jan. 28, 1842, at 2; Important Decision, OHIO STATESMAN
(Columbus), Feb. 8, 1842, at 1; Important Decision, DEMOCRATIC STANDARD
(Georgetown, Ohio), Feb. 15, 1842, at 3; Important Decision, N.H. PATRIOT & ST.
GAZETTE, Feb. 24, 1842, at 1; Important Decision, S. PIONEER & CARROLL, CHOCTAW &
TALLAHATCHIE COUNTIES ADVERTISER (Carrollton, Miss.), Apr. 23, 1842, at 1;
Important Decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, N.Y. HERALD, Jan. 29, 1842,
at 1; Important Decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, N. AM. & DAILY
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proclaimed, in nearly identical terms: “The Supreme Court of the
United States has pronounced an opinion settling an important
commercial question, which ought to be soon and generally
known.”122 While emphasizing Swift as a ruling about bills of
exchange, newspapers also mentioned the Court’s holding that the
Rules of Decision Act “only extends to the statutes and permanent
usages of a State, and not to the judicial decisions of the States upon
questions of general commercial law.”123
Such contemporary reactions offer a striking contrast from
modern legal interpretations of Swift. Early reports did not link Swift
with mid-nineteenth-century fights over constitutional federalism and
nationalism.124 Nor did contemporaries view Swift as a judicial
usurpation that violated separation of powers.125 Despite the litigants’
ambitious arguments about constitutional structure, no early news
report analyzed Swift in that light, nor was the case an occasion for
partisan struggle.
Commentary on Swift from the nineteenth-century legal
profession was also ostensibly apolitical, as the country’s most
prominent legal writers formed a tight circle of mutual admiration.
Just as Story’s Swift opinion had cited James Kent’s work as legal
support, Kent praised the Supreme Court’s decision in Swift, and
Story-as-publicist expressed admiration for his own product on the
bench.126 A powerful consensus of academic and lawyerly
ADVERTISER (Phila.), Feb. 1, 1842, at 2; Important Decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States, S. ARGUS (Columbus, Miss.), Feb. 15, 1842, at 2; Important Decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States, CONN. COURANT, Feb. 12, 1842, at 3; Supreme Court
Decision, DAILY PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Feb. 9, 1842, at 4; Supreme Court
Decision, NEW ORLEANS WKLY. PICAYUNE, Feb. 14, 1842, at 3. Legal periodicals were
scant at the time, yet at least three mentioned Swift for its commercial holding. See Bills of
Exchange, 1 PA. L.J. 219 (1842); District Court of the United States, for the Western District
of Virginia, Prentice v. Lane., 6 W.L.J. 46 (1848) (discussing Swift several years after the
fact); Selections from McLean’s Reports, 1 W.L.J. 134, 135 (1843) (noting the “striking
illustration of the inconclusiveness of precedents”); see also 2 WARREN, supra note 90, at
88–89 (referencing additional historical newspaper sources).
122. See sources cited supra note 121.
123. Id.
124. Story was publicly decried in other contexts as improperly boosting central
governmental authority, yet Swift was consistently absent from such indictments. E.g.,
Speech of Charles J. Ingersoll, in U.S. MAG. & DEMOCRATIC REV., Jan. 1839, at 230; Life
of Joseph Story, by His Son, EVENING POST (N.Y.C.), Jan. 29, 1852, at 2 (pt. 1), Feb. 4,
1852, at 2 (pt. 2) (reviewing LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY (William W. Story ed.,
1851)).
125. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 121.
126. FREYER, HARMONY, supra note 30, at 46; STORY, COMMENTARIES ON BILLS OF
EXCHANGE, supra note 91, at 191–92, 204–10 & n.4.
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commentary endorsed Swift for almost forty years, with literally no
dissent,127 as the decision was interpreted as a leading case of
commercial law and federal jurisprudence.
Despite these endorsements, however, Swift did not produce
national doctrinal uniformity with respect to commercial paper. In
Stalker v. M’Donald,128 New York’s high court rejected Swift’s
treatment of bills of exchange, thereby creating a “confliction”
between federal and state courts that would endure for five
decades.129 Chancellor Walworth criticized Swift’s interpretation of
cases from New York and elsewhere, as he also disparaged Swift for
issuing dicta on facts that were not before the Court.130 To understand
Stalker’s critique, however, modern readers must note that Walworth
wholeheartedly accepted Swift’s interpretation of the Rules of
Decision Act and the Supreme Court’s relationship to general
commercial law:
[I]n questions of local law, . . . the decisions of the highest court
of judicature of the state are the evidence of what the law of the
state is; and are to be followed in preference to those . . . even of
the United States. On a question of commercial law, however, it
is desirable that there should be . . . uniformity of decision, not
only between the courts of the several states and of the United
States, but also between our courts and those of England, from
whence our commercial law is principally derived, and with
which country our commercial intercourse is so extensive.131
According to Walworth, Swift’s mistake did not involve the
nature of general commercial law, separation of powers, federal
overreaching, or the state sovereignty of New York to establish its
own rules concerning bills of exchange. Walworth simply believed
that Story and his peers had misread applicable commercial law
precedents, and he asserted New York’s legal authority only by
declining to follow the Supreme Court’s mistake. Walworth held that
127. The first categorical attack on Swift’s federal general common law was Robert G.
Street, Is There a General Commercial Law of the United States, 21 AM. L. REG. 473
(1873); see infra text accompanying note 166.
128. 6 Hill 93 (N.Y. 1843).
129. Id. at 95; W.M. Crook, Uniform State Laws: An Economic Legal Development
Resulting from the Relation of the State to Federal Government, 4 TEX. L. REV. 316, 319
(1926).
130. Stalker, 6 Hill at 95, 104. Walworth issued his own dictum in Stalker, which New
York courts adopted and applied in other cases. See, e.g., Farrington v. Frankfort Bank, 24
Barb. 554, 565 (N.Y. App. Div. 1857).
131. Stalker, 6 Hill at 95.
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the New York rule, not Swift, was the accurate reflection of general
common law as it was adopted from England and applied in other
state courts; he also took special pains to emphasize New York’s
unwavering doctrinal stability in enforcing bills of exchange according
to proper legal principles.132
The fact that the state courts of New York rejected Story’s view
of doctrine and finance is immensely important, but it has never been
adequately discussed.133 By 1842, New York was America’s greatest
city, with vastly more international trade than anywhere else in the
country.134 New York judges therefore had deep experience with the
law and practice of interjurisdictional commerce. If Story was so
obviously right about the economic stakes in Swift or Stalker, how
could New York courts retain a contrary and self-destructive rule for
many decades, with frequent opportunities to change course?135
Justice Story had written that Swift’s approach to bills of exchange
was indispensable to American banking and credit. And although
academics and some state courts agreed, the legal center of American
finance unapologetically did not.136
It is not clear why New York rejected the doctrine that Swift and
its admirers so warmly endorsed. Yet it is evident that the dispute did
not turn on federalism, separation of powers, judicial role,
doctrinalism, popular democracy, pro-commercial interest, or any
other extant scholarly explanation. One important possibility,
suggested in Walworth’s opinion itself, concerns New York’s
reputation for doctrinal stability as the preeminent commercial court

132. Id. at 111–12.
133. America’s second financial center, Philadelphia, also followed New York’s rule.
See, e.g., Pratt’s Appeal, 77 Pa. 378, 382 (1875); Trotter v. Shippen, 2 Pa. 358, 358 (1845).
134. Rousseau, supra note 63, at 462–63 (noting that New York banks held a reserve
base “more than ten times that of New Orleans, and . . . nearly triple the combined specie
reserves of deposit banks in Alabama, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee”);
see SVEN BECKERT, THE MONIED METROPOLIS: NEW YORK CITY AND THE
CONSOLIDATION OF THE AMERICAN BOURGEOISIE, 1850–1896, at 17–18 (2001) (“By
1860, . . . [New York’s] chief rivals, Boston, Philadelphia, and Baltimore . . . traded in
goods only one-quarter the value of those which passed through the port of New York.”).
135. See, e.g., Grocers’ Bank v. Penfield, 69 N.Y. 502 (1877).
136. Twelve states (California, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Texas) followed
Swift’s commercial-law doctrine, whereas thirteen states (Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa,
Kentucky, Maine, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin) did not. Arthur Biddle, In re Huddle & Seitzinger, 14 AM.
L. REV. 503, 506–13 (1880).
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in America.137 Perhaps the battle between Swift and Stalker turned on
the axiom that New York courts would take orders from no one on
issues of commercial law, yielding to neither federal courts nor selfconfident publicists. Stalker’s outcome may thus have been influenced
by a regional competition between Chancellor Walworth’s Gotham
and Justice Story’s Washington, D.C. In both cities, self-confident
judges claimed to represent the best transnational thinking about
commercial law, and they sought to wield correspondingly decisive
power over the nation’s economic future through their judicial
decisions. In this sense, nineteenth-century jurists may thus have
understood the conflict of Stalker versus Swift as a now-forgotten
choice between a commercial empire led by New York’s state courts
and one directed by national federal judges like Story.138
Nearly all modern commentators have ignored the reaction of
America’s great commercial center, thereby lending Swift’s economic
analysis a patina of inevitability—just as Story and national elites
would have preferred. New York’s persistent doctrinal conflict,
however, shows that Story’s educated analysis did not tell (and could
not know) the whole truth about American law and American
commerce. Pro-Swift judges and national-elite commentators
described only one plausible vision of commercial credit and bills of
exchange. The proliferation of that vision in the decades to follow
resulted from complicated political, cultural, and regional dynamics; it
did not derive from objectively neutral economic truth or financial
efficiency.
3. Living Precedentialism: Developmental Meaning
This Part has thus far focused on originalist nineteenth-century
materials from the time Swift was decided. As is true with statutes and
constitutions, however, precedents’ original meanings do not stand
pat.139 Over nine decades, Swift came to represent far more than
commercial credit and pluralism. As Grant Gilmore wrote, “Swift v.
Tyson became a headless monster, marked down for destruction by

137. Stalker, 6 Hill at 111–12. Modern readers might compare Delaware’s current
status as a nerve center of American corporate law. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition,
117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 590 (2003).
138. Cf. GILMORE, supra note 15, at 34 (suggesting that the Swift decision is what
made “the Supreme Court of the United States . . . a great commercial law court.
[Thereafter, as] novel issues generated controversy and conflict, the Court’s function was
to propose a generally acceptable synthesis”).
139. Cf. BALKIN, supra note 3; ESKRIDGE, supra note 2.
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all right-thinking men.”140 This subsection demonstrates that Swift’s
path to the heretical stake was astonishingly slow, episodic, and
political. To understand Swift’s development will require consulting
judicial opinions, academic commentary, and democratic politics from
the late-nineteenth century; yet those labors will ultimately produce
fresh interpretations of Swift’s successor, Erie v. Tompkins.141
Even when Swift was decided, its result governed more than
negotiable instruments, and the Supreme Court issued many rulings
over twenty years that applied, expanded, and debated the proper
scope of federal general common law.142 Throughout this period,
however, judicial dissents were rare and mild, and no judge or
commentator criticized the category of Swift-era common law as
unwise or illegitimate.143
Between 1860 and 1910, only two judicial opinions questioned
Swift; both of these were dissents, and neither one had much doctrinal
impact on other cases. The first dissent arose from Gelpcke v. City of
Dubuque, a case about municipal bonds that had been issued to
support railroad construction.144 When the Panic of 1837 destroyed
the city’s tax base, Dubuque refused to make payments, claiming that
the state statute authorizing the bonds violated the state
constitution.145 Iowa’s highest court had rejected similar arguments
many times before, but it reversed course in 1862 and invalidated
municipal bonds that were identical to Dubuque’s.146
Gelpcke’s plaintiffs tried to avoid Iowa’s newly dangerous
precedent by filing their suit against Dubuque in federal district court;
on appeal, the United States Supreme Court voted eight to one that
Dubuque should pay its bonds.147 The Court did not reinterpret Iowa

140. GILMORE, supra note 15, at 61.
141. See infra Section I.B.
142. E.g., Carpenter v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 495, 496 (1842)
(applying Swift’s federal general common law to insurance contracts).
143. E.g., Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1885) (applying federal general
common law to equitable remedies against corporate directors); Williamson v. Berry, 49
U.S. (8 How.) 495 (1850) (private statutes in an ejectment case); Rowan v. Runnels, 46
U.S. (5 How.) 134 (1847) (contract law concerning slavery).
144. Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 202–03 (1864); see also
MICHAEL ANTHONY ROSS, JUSTICE OF SHATTERED DREAMS: SAMUEL FREEMAN
MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE CIVIL WAR ERA 89–90 (2003).
145. Gelpcke, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 203–04.
146. Id. at 205; ROSS, supra note 144, at 89.
147. Stephen Field became the tenth Justice only months before Gelpcke was decided,
and December 1863 was the only term in which all ten Justices would sit together. As it
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state law—that would have been impossible given authoritative
judgments from the state’s own high court. Instead, Gelpcke
protected bondholders using federal general common law. “It cannot
be expected that this court will follow every [state court] oscillation,
from whatever [political] cause arising . . . . [Iowa’s] earlier decisions,
we think, are sustained by reason and authority. They are in harmony
with the adjudications of sixteen States of the Union.”148 And the
majority opinion closed with a swagger: “However we may regard the
late case in Iowa as affecting the future, it can have no effect upon the
past. . . . We shall never immolate truth, justice, and the law, because a
State tribunal has erected the altar and decreed the sacrifice.”149
Whatever Iowa’s courts might do with bondholder cases on their own
dockets, Gelpcke made clear that litigants in federal courts would
receive general common law principles only and exactly as federal
judges saw fit to apply them.
Gelpcke’s lone dissenter, Justice Miller, was an Iowa resident
who had recused himself from similar bond cases involving his
hometown.150 Miller predicted that Iowa’s state courts would never be
convinced by the majority’s reasoning.151 “Thus we are to have two
courts, sitting within the same jurisdiction, deciding upon the same
rights, arising out of the same statute, yet always arriving at opposite
results, with no common arbiter of their differences.”152 He
declaimed, “[w]hat this may lead to it is not possible now to
foresee.”153
The risk of “confliction” between state and federal courts had
been inherent and foreseeable ever since Swift, with Stalker as
immediate proof.154 Nonetheless, in other cases outside the context of
municipal bonds, the entire Court—including Justice Miller—
continued to apply general commercial law with no reservations
whatsoever.155
happens, however, Chief Justice Taney did not participate in Gelpcke because of illness.
See 1 G. EDWARD WHITE, LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 430 (2012).
148. Gelpcke, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 205–06.
149. Id. at 206–07.
150. Lee Cty. v. Rogers, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 181 (1868).
151. ROSS, supra note 144, at 89–92, 169–75, 222, 224.
152. Gelpcke, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 209 (Miller, J., dissenting).
153. Id.
154. Compare case cited supra note 75 and accompanying text (anticipating such
“confliction”), with sources cited supra notes 129–135 and accompanying text (discussing
Stalker).
155. See Yates v. City of Milwaukee, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497, 506 (1870) (Miller, J.)
(applying “general common law” that did “not depend upon State statute or local State
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In the particular circumstance of Iowa’s bond crisis, Miller’s fears
were confirmed when thousands of citizens rallied to protest being
“persistently pursued in the federal courts by certain holders
of . . . railroad bonds.”156 One politician ranted: “You freed the
negro . . . and fastened eternal white slavery upon yourselves and [your]
children by lowering and knuckling to . . . the monied monopolies of
the country.”157 Gelpcke’s bank was sacked, and Otto Gelpcke fled to a
jailhouse as a mob besieged his home.158 When Miller dissented in a
later bondholder case, he offered his own personal report of Gelpcke’s
consequences:
These frequent dissents . . . are as distasteful to me as they can
be to any one else. But when I am compelled, as I was last
spring, by the decisions of this court, . . . to jail . . . over a
hundred of the best citizens of Iowa, for obeying, as they
thought their oath of office required them to do, an injunction
issued by a competent court of their own State, . . . I must be
excused if, when sitting here, I give expression to convictions
which my duty compels me to disregard in the Circuit Court.159
By century’s end, the Court had heard roughly 300 bond cases, as
identical issues arose in nearly every state.160 Pennsylvania’s Chief
Justice Black wrote that enforcing railroad bonds was “beyond all
comparison, the most important cause that has ever been in this court
since the formation of the government.”161 And Iowa’s state courts
bemoaned that “counties and cities throughout the State . . . incurred
debts amounting to several millions of dollars, . . . exceeding their
ability to pay. Disaster, the child of extravagance and debt, and

law,” and declaring that “this court has never acknowledged the right of the State courts to
control our decisions, except, perhaps, in a class of cases where the State courts have
established, by repeated decisions, a rule of property in regard to land titles peculiar to the
State”); see also Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 33 (1883) (similar).
156. ROSS, supra note 144, at 169–70.
157. Id.
158. Winslow’s Career in Dubuque: How He Became General Manager of a Bank—
And What Became of the Bank, DAILY INTER OCEAN (Chi.), Jan. 16, 1877, at 6; Duties of
Trustees in Compromising Debts, N.Y. TRIB., Aug. 27, 1875, at 2; The Dubuque County
Railroad Indebtedness—The Gelpcke Claim Settled, MILWAUKEE DAILY SENTINEL, May
6, 1864, at 1. The city of Dubuque reportedly had only 40,000 inhabitants and $1.5 million
in debt. The Dubuque County Railroad Indebtedness—The Gelpcke Claim Settled, supra,
at 1.
159. Butz v. City of Muscatine, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 575, 587 (1869) (Miller, J., dissenting).
160. FREYER, HARMONY, supra note 30, at 60.
161. Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 158 (1853) (Black, C.J.).
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dishonor, the unbidden companion of bankruptcy, are the bitter but
legitimate consequences of that decision, ‘and the end is not yet.’ ”162
Although Swift’s general common law had never entered such
political minefields, the public silence that accompanied Gelpcke—
outside of Iowa—is impressive.163 Only one sentence can be found in
newspapers announcing the decision,164 and despite heated fights over
comparable state decisions, no commentary in the next decade (again
excepting Iowa) criticized federal courts’ “general common law” as a
category.165 Political battles over municipal debt never focused their
attacks on federal general common law itself until 1873, after an
entirely separate financial panic.166 In this much later period, it was
Justice Miller’s opposition to railroad bonds—not concerns about
federal general common law—that almost carried him to two
presidential nominations.167
The second judicial dissent that criticized Swift in the nineteenth
century arose from cases involving industrial accidents. Injuries from
trolleys, industry, and railroads were more prevalent in Guilded-Era
America than anywhere in the world, and such accidents affected many
aspects of public life.168 In 1862, the Supreme Court applied federal
162. Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa 28, 33 (1869). The Iowa court did not identify the
reference for its quotation, but the most likely source is the Bible. Matthew 24:6 (King
James).
163. The Supreme Court’s early bond cases were Butz, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 575 (7–2
decision); Lee County v. Rogers, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 181 (1868) (8–0 decision); Gelpcke v.
City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863) (8–1 decision). Also notable were Olcott v.
Supervisors, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 678 (1872); Chicago v. Sheldon, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 50 (1869);
Havemeyer v. Iowa County, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 294 (1865); Thomson v. Lee County, 70 U.S.
(3 Wall.) 327 (1865).
164. Supreme Court of the United States, DAILY NAT’L INTELLIGENCER (D.C.), Jan.
12, 1864, at 3 (“Mr. Justice Swayne delivered the opinion of the Court, reversing the
judgment of the said District Court, with costs, and remanding the cause for further
proceedings to be had therein, in conformity to the opinion of this Court.”). Because
Gelpcke consisted of three consolidated cases, the Intelligencer printed that same sentence
three times.
165. Compare Summary of Events, 5 AM. L. REV. 126, 156–58 (1870) (endorsing
Gelpcke), with Iowa Reports, 1 W. JURIST 216, 218–23 (1867) (opposing Gelpcke in a
publication from Des Moines).
166. Street, supra note 127, at 473; see Nicolas Barreyre, The Politics of Economic
Crises: The Panic of 1873, the End of Reconstruction, and the Realignment of American
Politics, 10 J. GILDED AGE & PROGRESSIVE ERA 403, 403 (2011) (describing the financial
panic following Reconstruction.).
167. ROSS, supra note 144, at 237–38.
168. See PURCELL, LITIGATION, supra note 30, at 19; 2 GEORGE BROWN TINDALL &
DAVID EMORY SHI, AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 590 (9th ed. 2012); BARBARA
WELKE, RECASTING AMERICAN LIBERTY: GENDER, RACE, LAW, AND THE RAILROAD
REVOLUTION, 1865–1920, at 3–4 (2001).

94 N.C. L. REV. 379 (2016)

416

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

general common law to resolve Chicago City v. Robbins, which
concerned a pedestrian who was injured beside a construction site.169
Illinois law would have excused the owner for his contractor’s negligent
excavations, yet the Supreme Court unanimously imposed liability
under federal general common law:170 “[W]here private rights are to be
determined by the application of common law rules alone, this
Court . . . does not feel bound by [state] decisions.”171
General “common law rules alone” were similarly decisive in
1884, when Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad Co. v. Ross
decided whether employees could sue employers for a coworker’s
negligence.172 (This was the nationally significant “fellow-servant
rule.”173) The Court unanimously agreed that general common law
should decide the issue, but they split 5–4 on the merits.174 Justice
Stephen Field’s majority opinion allowed the plaintiff to recover, citing
as support a nationally prominent treatise and case law from several
different states.175 Justice Joseph Bradley wrote a one-paragraph
dissent that fully endorsed the application of federal general common
law, but he argued that the “long-established” rule of fellow-servant
immunity meant the defendant should win on the merits.176
For yet another decade, the Court’s fights about the content of
general common law unanimously presumed such law’s existence and
validity. In 1893, however, every member of the Ross majority had
retired except Field.177 In that year, the majority opinion in Baltimore
169. Chi. City v. Robbins, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 418, 418–20 (1862), aff’d, 71 U.S (4 Wall.)
657 (1866).
170. Freyer has written that Miller and Justice Samuel Nelson dissented from this
decision without opinion, but those dissents are not recorded in the United States Reports.
Compare FREYER, HARMONY, supra note 30, at 65, with Robbins, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at
418–29. The Robbins Court’s holding was unanimously affirmed in a subsequent appeal
concerning the same facts, raising further questions about whether Miller and Nelson had
dissented earlier. See Robbins v. Chi. City, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 657 (1866).
171. Robbins, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 428–29 (maintaining an exception to this rule for
federal courts to apply state law “[w]here rules of property in a State are fully settled”).
172. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R., 112 U.S. 377, 377–78 (1884).
173. The “fellow-servant rule” was an exception to the principle that defendantemployers should be liable for their agents’ negligence, and it denied recovery to plaintiffemployees for countless workplace injuries and deaths. Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack
Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 51–
54 (1967).
174. Ross, 112 U.S. at 377.
175. Id. at 390–91; see also G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 52 (2003).
176. Ross, 112 U.S. at 396 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
177. Cf. Balt. & Ohio R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 390 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting);
Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 106 (1893) (Field, J., abstaining).
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& Ohio Railroad Co. v. Baugh held—fully consistent with Robbins,
Ross, and other Swift-era cases—that tort rules such as fellow-servant
immunity did not pose any “question of local law, to be settled by an
examination merely of the decisions of [Ohio] . . . , but rather one of
general law, to be determined by a reference to all the authorities, and
a consideration of the principles underlying the relations of master and
servant.”178 Despite the Court’s unbroken adherence to prior cases
concerning the applicability of federal general common law, Baugh
overruled the substantive result in Ross, reinterpreting general common
law to hold that the defendant-employer was not liable for a fellowservant’s negligence.179
One might have easily predicted that Justice Field would dissent
from Baugh’s judgment that his own opinion in Ross was incorrect. But
no one could have foreseen Field’s unprecedented claim in Baugh that
“the settled law of Ohio . . . should control.”180 Ignoring fifty years of
federal cases and acres of tort law, Field wrote that master-servant
relations “are matters of legislative control, and are in no sense under
the supervision or direction of the judges or courts of the United
States.”181 Field continued: “There is no unwritten general or common
law of the United States on the subject. Indeed, there is no unwritten
general or common law of the United States on any subject.”182 This
latter statement contradicted numerous judicial authorities, including
Field’s opinion in Ross itself.183
178. Balt. & Ohio R.R. v. Ross, 149 U.S. 368, 370 (1893); id. at 378 (explaining that the
fellow-servant rule was inherently “a question in which the nation as a whole is interested.
It enters into the commerce of the country”).
179. Id. at 390 (Field, J., dissenting) (“The opinion of the majority not only limits and
narrows the doctrine of the Ross case, but, in effect, denies, even with the limitations
placed by them upon it, the correctness of its general doctrine . . . .”); cf. id. (Fuller, C.J.,
dissenting) (“I dissent because, in my judgment, this case comes within the rule laid down
in Chicago, Milwaukee, & Railway v. Ross, 112 U.S. 377, and the decision unreasonably
enlarges the exemption of the master from liability for injury to one of his servants by the
fault of another.”).
180. Id. at 391 (Field, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 394; see, e.g., Chi. City v. Robbins, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 418 (1862), aff’d, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 657 (1866); Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
182. Baugh, 149 U.S. at 394 (Field, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
183. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R. v. Ross, 112 U.S. 377, 383 (1884) (citing
“numerous cases, both in this country and in England” as support for the Court’s federal
general common law ruling); id. at 390 (“There is, in our judgment, a clear distinction to be
made in their relation to their common principal, between servants of a corporation
exercising no supervision over others engaged with them in the same employment and
agents of the corporation, clothed with the control and management of a distinct
department, in which their duty is entirely that of direction and superintendence. . . . This
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Resuscitating arguments that had been ignored for fifty years,
Field claimed that (1) the federal government was composed only of
states, (2) common law could not be adopted without explicit
legislative enactment, and (3) general common law would
impermissibly differentiate between state and federal courts in the
same geography.184 Field also argued that federal general common law
was “nothing less than an attempt to control the State in a matter in
which the State was not amenable to Federal authority,” thereby
violating “the judicial independence of the states” and
“encroach[ing] . . . the sovereign rights reserved to them by the Tenth
Amendment.”185 The most quotable passage of Field’s opinion depicts
a superficially heartfelt conversion:
I admit that learned judges have fallen into the habit of
repeating this doctrine as a convenient mode of brushing aside
the law of a State in conflict with their views. And I confess
that . . . I have, myself, in many instances, unhesitatingly and
confidently . . . repeated
the
same
doctrine.
But,
notwithstanding the great names which may be cited in favor of
the doctrine, and notwithstanding the frequency with which the
doctrine has been reiterated, there stands, as a perpetual
protest against its repetition, the Constitution of the United
States, which recognizes and preserves the autonomy and

view of his relation to the corporation seems to us a reasonable and just one, and it will
insure more care in the selection of such agents, and thus give greater security to the
servants engaged under him in an employment requiring the utmost vigilance on their
part, and prompt and unhesitating obedience to his orders.” (emphasis added)); id. at 390–
91 (citing Wharton’s treatise on the law of negligence); id. at 394 (“There are decisions in
the courts of other States, more or less in conformity with those cited from Ohio and
Kentucky, rejecting or limiting, to a greater or less extent, the master’s exemption from
liability to a servant for the negligent conduct of his fellows. We agree with them . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
184. Id. at 393–95; cf. supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text (describing similar
arguments from Swift).
185. Baugh, 149 U.S. at 397–99 (Field, J., dissenting). For other examples of Field’s
extreme assertions of states’ rights in his Baugh dissent, see id. at 401 (“[T]he general
government and the States, although both exist within the same territorial limits, are
separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other,
within their respective spheres. The former in its appropriate sphere is supreme, but the
States, within the limits of their powers not granted, or, in the language of the Tenth
Amendment, ‘reserved,’ are as independent of the general government as that
government within its sphere is independent of the States.” (quoting Collector v. Day, 78
U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 124 (1870))); see also id. at 402 (“To this autonomy and independence
of the States their legislation must be as free from coercion as if they were separated
entirely from connection with the Union. There must also be the like freedom from
coercion or supervision in the action of their judicial authorities.”).
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independence of the States—independence in their legislative
and independence in their judicial departments.186
This dramatic renunciation, however, is difficult to square with the
rest of Field’s opinion in Baugh itself, which concludes with a four-page
defense of Ross based exclusively on federal general common law.187
Furthermore, Field showed no qualms about applying general common
law in any subsequent case—any more than Justice Miller did after
Gelpcke.188 During their own time, the Gelpcke and Baugh dissents
were nothing more than highly personalized, fringe critiques that were
not fully explained or consistently applied by even their own authors.
Unsurprisingly, these opinions had no doctrinal effect on the Court’s
continued elaboration and application of federal general common law.
Nonjudicial critiques of federal general common law were equally
rare and slow to develop. The first published commentary attacking
Swift appeared in 1873—over thirty years after Swift—and such
arguments achieved very little popularity for at least another quartercentury after that.189 Some observers decried Swift, others attacked
Gelpcke, and a few previewed arguments that would be featured much
later in Erie.190
Only a few historians have even noticed this florescence of antiSwift commentary, and its timing has never been adequately
explained.191 The only causal factors mentioned in existing scholarship
involve the Civil War or some kind of shift in legal thought,192 but each
of these theories has problems. The Civil War, for example, was never
mentioned by Swift’s nineteenth-century critics, and it seems
temporally remote from writings that were authored decades later.193

186. Id. at 401.
187. Id. at 408–11.
188. See Oakes v. Mase, 165 U.S. 363, 364 (1897); Bucher v. Cheshire R.R., 125 U.S.
555, 585 (1888) (Field, J., dissenting).
189. FREYER, HARMONY, supra note 30, at 85–100 (collecting sources). Where
nineteenth-century commentators lodged constitutional objections, they were never linked
to a specific constitutional provision; instead, commentary relied on abstract theoretical
arguments about ahistorical first principles. Id.
190. Id. at 85–87.
191. See id. at 85–100.
192. E.g., id. at 93–100 (“The impact of the Civil War itself . . . was no doubt a
factor . . . .”); BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 30, at 123 (citing the “legitimation of a
positivistic judicial philosophy . . . at the expense of the historical school of
jurisprudence”); GILMORE, supra note 15, at 93 (stating without explanation that “[t]he
Swift v. Tyson device, which had over a long period been of great service, had ceased to
work”).
193. See FREYER, HARMONY, supra note 30, at 85–100 (collecting sources).
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By contrast, the character of legal thought changes so frequently that
such dynamics are hard to associate with any particular stance on Swift.
Legal thinking surely mutated on many occasions between the 1840s
and the 1920s, in many different times and places. Upon close scrutiny,
however, there was a wide assortment of late-nineteenth-century
characters who criticized Swift, and none of them seemed terribly
interested in macro-shifts of legal thought—whether such dynamics
were called positivism, proto-realism, or anything else.194
One unexplored causal explanation for Swift’s fall from grace
might emphasize the development of legal institutions during this halfcentury. Harvard Law School began retooling American legal
education in 1870, and new legal publications flourished alongside new
law schools and bar associations.195 These engines of legal culture
promoted an image of experts and expertise that was different from
prior generations. Legal commentary became a more accessible
enterprise than the one built on Story’s genius, and the new generation
of written commentary was more intensely nationalized than before.196
New organizations and publications represented conscious efforts to
approach law in different ways, and those institutional changes yielded
new opportunities for some jurists and scholars to challenge Swift’s
quondam orthodoxy.
Changes in the publication of professional legal analysis coincided
with broader political fights concerning federal courts. Federal courts
were central to debates about freed slaves, and the late 1870s witnessed
many proposals to limit the availability of diversity jurisdiction,
especially for corporate litigants.197 In 1880, a congressman from Iowa
claimed that federal courts “have grown to be largely corporation mills,
in which the tolls are taken largely from the individual citizen . . . it has
become the fact that . . . the old feudal system . . . has sought refuge
behind the judicial system.”198 Likewise, Senator Garland of Arkansas
lamented that federal courts, in applying Swift-era common law, had
194. Id.
195. See J. WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS
249–378 (1950); WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF
MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION 1–6 (1993); CHARLES WARREN, HISTORY OF
THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL AND OF EARLY LEGAL CONDITIONS IN AMERICA (1909);
Michael I. Swygert & Jon W. Bruce, The Historical Origins, Founding, and Early
Development of Student-Edited Law Reviews, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 739, 750–64 (1985).
196. Swygert & Bruce, supra note 195, at 750–63.
197. FREYER, HARMONY, supra note 30, at 79–84; PURCELL, LITIGATION, supra note
30, at 15.
198. FREYER, HARMONY, supra note 30, at 80.
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“done little else than wreck the towns and counties and cities within
their jurisdiction.”199 Some of these critics emphasized federal decisions
about municipal bonds and busts, while others worried over personal
injury suits and insurance claims.200 These objections captured broad
public frustration, and they also resonated through new institutions of
professional reason; all of these voices would become more powerful in
the decades to come.
The intermingling of law, intellect, and politics that prompted
Swift’s collapse can be seen quite clearly in the life of Oliver Wendell
Holmes, whose ideas would be prominently featured in Erie.201 Soon
after graduating law school, Holmes became co-editor of the American
Law Review, one of the first periodicals to publish a diatribe against
Swift.202 Holmes also edited a revised edition of Kent’s Commentaries,
which led him to renounce Swift’s older perspective on common law.203
Holmes was a paragon for the self-conscious confidence and novelty of
late-nineteenth-century thought, and his appointment to the Supreme
Court carried such talents and beliefs into even greater national
prominence.204
Justice Holmes manifested his opposition to Swift through dissents
in three cases: Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., Southern Pacific Co. v.
Jensen, and Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co.205 In Kuhn, the majority held that “when
contracts and transactions are entered into[,] . . . the Federal courts
properly claim the right to give effect to their own judgment as to what
is the law of the state . . . even where a different view has been
expressed by the state court after the rights of the parties accrued.”206
199. Id.; see also id. at 81 (“[O]pposition to the Swift doctrine was a major factor
behind Congressional efforts to limit federal jurisdiction.”).
200. See discussion supra note 189.
201. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (discussing Holmes’s resistance to
Swift).
202. See G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE
INNER LIFE 105, 108, 112–13 (1993).
203. Id. at 104–05; see sources cited supra note 126.
204. WHITE, supra note 202, at 3–5, 476–88; see id. at 299 (“[W]ith Holmes’ ninetieth
birthday radio address . . ., he had become a rival to Marshall in the pantheon of eminent
and visible judges . . . .”).
205. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 523 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting); S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205,
218 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 370 (1910)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
206. Kuhn, 215 U.S. at 360 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). As with Swift,
Gelpcke, Ross, Robbins, and Baugh, the Supreme Court in Kuhn did not rest its judgment
on an interpretation or reinterpretation of any particular state’s law. Instead, federal
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But Holmes tossed aside several decades of Swift-era cases with a turn
of phrase, noting abstract “uncertainty and vacillation” about “the
theory upon which Swift v. Tyson, and later extensions of its doctrine,
have proceeded.”207
Holmes’s Kuhn dissent did not technically attack the results of
Swift or its progeny, but his logic was simple and broad: (1) all cases
involving property and tort law must “surely” be governed by state law,
(2) such law is derived solely from state courts or legislatures, and (3)
when the Supreme Court “know[s] what the source of the law has said
that [the result] shall be, our authority is at an end.”208 Contradicting a
lifetime of precedent, Holmes wrote in conceptual terms that “[t]he law
of a state does not become something outside of the state court . . . by
being called the common law. Whatever it is called, it is the law as
declared by the state judges, and nothing else.”209
In Jensen, the Court refused to compensate a stevedore under a
New York statute because the latter “conflict[ed] with the general
maritime law.”210 A five-Justice majority held that, “in the absence of
some controlling statute, the general maritime law, as accepted by the
federal courts, constitutes part of our national law.”211 Because general
maritime law denied recovery, the Court held that a New York statute
was powerless to do otherwise. Holmes’s dissent was again
irreconcilable with Swift and prior practice: “If admiralty adopts
common law rules without an act of Congress . . . [t]he only authority
212
available is the common law or statutes of a state.”
Holmes
thundered that “[t]he common law is not a brooding omnipresence in
the sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign . . . that can be
identified . . . . It always is the law of some state . . . .”213
Holmes’s most trenchant critique involved the Taxicab case of
1928.214 A corporate plaintiff had dissolved in one state and
reincorporated in another so that it could use federal diversity

courts in these circumstances relied on principles of federal general common law that they
themselves ultimately created. Id.
207. Id. at 370 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
208. Id. at 372.
209. Id.
210. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 212 (majority opinion).
211. Id. at 215.
212. Id. at 222 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
213. Id.
214. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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jurisdiction to litigate a contractual dispute.215 Applying “general law,”
the Supreme Court enforced the contract under federal general
common law and disregarded state precedent to the contrary.216 For the
first time, Holmes in his dissent characterized objections to Swift as the
identification of a “fallacy.” Echoing Field’s rhetoric while making a
very different argument, Holmes claimed that Swift’s fallacy had
“resulted in an unconstitutional assumption of powers by the courts of
the United States which no lapse of time or respectable array of
opinion should make us hesitate to correct.”217
Holmes described this fallacy in metaphysical terms, concerning
the basic conditions of law’s existence. He wrote that, if common law
were to exist as “one august corpus” located in decisions from various
courts, “[i]f there were such a transcendental body of law outside any
particular state but obligatory within it . . . , the courts of the United
States might be right in using their independent judgment as to what it
was.”218 “But,” Holmes wrote with unbending confidence, “there is no
such body of law.”219
[L]aw in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not
exist without some definite authority behind it. The common
law . . . whether called common law or not, is not the common
law generally, but the law of that state existing by the authority
of that state and without regard to what it may have been in
England or anywhere else.220
According to Holmes, Swift and Story had operated “under the tacit
domination” of this fallacy, and despite proposing to yet again
“leave Swift v. Tyson undisturbed,” Holmes wished not to “spread
[its] assumed dominion into new fields.”221
Late-twentieth-century commentators have viewed Holmes’s
Taxicab dissent as an apotheosis of pre-Erie criticism of federal
general common law, but it was never anything like that.222 Holmes
voiced arguments that were quite different from Miller’s practical

215. Id. at 522 (majority opinion); cf. FREYER, FORUMS, supra note 30, at 26 (noting
similarly prevalent forum shopping with respect to individuals as early as 1825).
216. Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 525.
217. Id. at 532–33 (Holmes, J., dissenting); cf. supra note 186 and accompanying text.
218. Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 533.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 533–34.
221. Id. at 535.
222. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Commentary, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on
Context in Interpretive Theory, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1787 (1997).
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concern over state-federal “confliction” and from Field’s TenthAmendment federalism. Nor were Holmes’s twentieth-century
critiques appreciably stronger than their elders. For example,
Holmes’s greatest quote of all time was probably “[t]he life of the
law has not been logic: it has been experience.”223 Holmesian attacks
on federal general common law, however, discarded experience
entirely and relied on conceptual analysis of “fallacies” and
“brooding omnipresence.”224 Holmes’s arguments were doctrinally
muddled as well: he refused to defend or reconcile Swift, but he also
could not justify overruling it.
Holmes’s breezy polemics echoed commentary from the
American Law Review more than it resembled his precursors’
judicial opinions.225 He claimed that federal general common law did
not “exist,” yet that verb was either vague or untrue. How could
general common law not “exist” when authoritative courts—
including the Taxicab majority—had held otherwise for eighty
years? Federal judges and marshals—throughout the country and
even in Iowa—continued to enforce federal general common law as
law. Such law thus satisfied all of the ordinary criteria for law,
including loyal adherents, governmental violence, and a legitimating
ideology.226
Whatever the substantive weakness of Holmes’s argument, his
Taxicab dissent quickly became a rallying point for critiques of
federal courts’ abuse. The idea that corporate litigants could
manipulate substantive contract law merely by shuffling papers,
changing state citizenship, and removing their cases to federal court
became increasingly unacceptable. A wonderful example of this
criticism appeared in the early federal courts casebook by Felix
Frankfurter and Wilber G. Katz.227 After an anti-Swift polemic and

223. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1909).
224. Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 532–33; S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222
(1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
225. Cf. sources cited supra note 188–189 and accompanying text.
226. For an exploration of what scholars call “Holmesian positivism,” compare William
R. Casto, The Erie Doctrine and the Structure of Constitutional Revolutions, 62 TUL. L.
REV. 907 (1988), with Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal
Positivism, 84 VA. L. REV. 673 (1998), and Green, Repressing Erie, supra note 30, at 667–
70. On violence in legal decisionmaking, see Cover, supra note 19, at 1628.
227. See generally CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION
AND PROCEDURE (Felix Frankfurter & Wilber G. Katz eds., Callaghan & Co. 1931)
(compiling critiques of both abusive federal courts and manipulative corporate litigants).
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an excerpt from the Taxicab case,228 the authors reproduced the
following pamphlet: “Why Corporations Leave Home.”
A good many businessmen know that by incorporating in some
state other than that of where the business is to be carried on
the corporation gains the right to bring and defend law suits in
the Federal courts that might otherwise be tried in the state
courts . . . . The opinion is found among both lawyers and
laymen that in labor cases the United States courts are less
likely to be affected by local and temporary tides of feeling or
purely political considerations, while in the protection of
corporate titles and trade names there seems solid reason for
expecting more from the Federal than the state courts.229
According to Frankfurter and Katz, this pamphlet was “printed and
widely circulated among attorneys” by a company whose “principal
activities” were to incorporate and manage corporations under the laws
of Delaware “whose principal business offices are maintained outside
the state of incorporation.”230
Policymakers also recognized pro-corporate distortions caused by
Swift’s federal general common law. One year after the Taxicab
decision, President Hoover appointed a National Commission on Law
Observance and Enforcement.231 The study found that a large majority
of federal diversity actions were tort or contract disputes; of those,
almost sixty percent involved out-of-state corporate defendants; and
such out-of-state corporations were defendants in eighty-six percent of
the suits filed by resident plaintiffs.232 Statistics like these exacerbated
concern that federal courts were manufacturing defendant-friendly
doctrines that benefited national corporations and damaged local
victims.233 Diversity plaintiffs had a lower success rate than any other
category of litigant—half the success of claimants against the United
States—and negligence plaintiffs lost more often than anyone.234

228. Id. at 154 n.3, 159–66.
229. Id. at 167.
230. Id. at 167 n.2. Frankfurter’s revised casebook, published one year before Erie,
amplified objections to Swift-era common law by adding discussion of Gelpcke and other
municipal bond precedents. CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON FEDERAL
JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 206–10 & nn.1–4 (Felix Frankfurter & Harry Shulman
eds., rev. ed. 1937).
231. PURCELL, LITIGATION, supra note 30, at 21.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 79–84.
234. Id. at 22.
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All of these developments combined to place federal general
common law, alongside other pro-business doctrines such as economic
due process and limited federal commerce power, in the cross-hairs for
protests that federal courts had distorted American justice and had sold
out America’s economy.235 Such was the political environment when
Erie was argued, not six months after the failure of Roosevelt’s “courtpacking plan,” and on the first day in session for Roosevelt’s newest
appointee, Justice Stanley Reed.236 By 1938, Swift was indeed a
“headless monster” in Holmesian academic circles.237 But that
conclusion was debatable at the time, and in any event, it represented
only Swift’s developmental meaning, which had emerged over a long
period that is now forgotten. Although Holmes blustered in the 1920s
that Swift was timeless in its “unconstitutional assumption of powers,”
it would be a serious mistake for any modern jurist to take such words
at face value.238
B.

Erie v. Tompkins: Hooray for Our Side

Erie is one of the best-known cases in American law, yet it
remains an unsolved puzzle.239 Modern commentary falls in two camps:
a few interpreters assume that the opinion’s text is the exclusive source
of Erie’s meaning, while most jurists obscure the text and reconstruct
Erie on Holmesian foundations.240 This Article will supplement existing
debates by analyzing the same four categories of historical materials
discussed above—some of which have been completely ignored with
respect to Erie—and generating distinctive arguments about the
decision’s meanings.241

235. See FREYER, FORUMS, supra note 30, at 148.
236. PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 30, at 105.
237. GILMORE, supra note 15, at 61.
238. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532–33 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
239. See Green, Repressing Erie, supra note 30, at 595 n.2, 596 n.4 (collecting sources
discussing Erie).
240. Compare Green, Repressing Erie, supra note 30, at 596–97 (textualism), with other
sources cited supra note 30 (nontextual interpretations). Theorists who link Erie with
separation of powers often claim that federal courts lack authority to “make” federal
common law. The core premise of such arguments is Holmes’s metaphysical claim that
“there is no . . . body of law” in existence that federal judges could apply to such cases. See
Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 532–34. See supra note 226 and accompanying text
(questioning the accuracy of that premise).
241. Although particular historical materials will of course be different for Swift in the
nineteenth century as compared to Erie in the twentieth century, the interpretive methods
applied to both cases will be identical.
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Erie’s facts were simple. Tompkins was hurt while walking beside
train tracks.242 His lawyer believed that the railroad negligently failed to
close a train-car door.243 Under Pennsylvania cases, Tompkins was a
trespasser who could recover only for wanton negligence, which this
was not. Thus, he sued in federal court and claimed that the railroad’s
safety standards posed questions of general law, not local law.244 Most
state courts would have used the doctrine of “permissive pathways” to
allow pedestrians like Tompkins to recover for ordinary negligence.245
The district court and Second Circuit in Tompkins’s case reached that
same conclusion, but they did so as a matter of federal “general law.”246
1. Textualism: Declared Meaning
For modern commentators who seek to defend Erie, the opinion’s
text is an embarrassment.247 The Court began with fireworks: “The
question for decision is whether the oft-challenged doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson shall now be disapproved.”248 Textual analysis of the Court’s
opinion, however, reveals inadequate support for its boldly affirmative
answer.
The Court’s opinion contained three separately enumerated
elements. The first criticized Swift in general terms, citing commentary
from 1873 to 1923.249 The Court implied without holding that Swift had
misread the term “laws” in the Rules of Decision Act,250 and the
opinion cited several academic and professional critiques that discussed
the Taxicab case.251 Nothing in section one purported to justify
overruling Swift or upsetting Tompkins’s jury verdict.
Erie’s second section criticized Swift for producing social and
political “defects,” while failing to provide appreciable “benefits.”252

242. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 69 (1938).
243. PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 30, at 96.
244. Erie, 304 U.S. at 69; PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 30, at 96–97.
245. Tompkins v. Erie R.R., 90 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1937), rev’d, Erie, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
246. Id.; Younger, supra note 30, at 1020–21.
247. See Green, Repressing Erie, supra note 30, at 602–14.
248. Erie, 304 U.S. at 69.
249. Id. at 71–74; see FREYER, HARMONY, supra note 30, at 85–100.
250. Erie, 304 U.S. at 72–73 & n.5 (citing Charles Warren, New Light on the History of
the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 51–52, 81–88, 108 (1923)). But see
WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789:
EXPOSING MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE 79, 148
(Wythe Holt & L.H. LaRue eds., 1990) (disputing Warren’s thesis).
251. Erie, 304 U.S. at 73–74.
252. Id. at 74.
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The Court discussed age-old problems about “confliction” among state
and federal courts, as well as vagueness in separating “general” from
“local” law.253 The Court also mentioned recent concerns about
favoring out-of-state corporations, including manipulations of diversity
jurisdiction (Taxicab) and tort standards (Robbins and Baugh).254
At the end of section two, the Court explained that all of the
arguments about Swift’s practical effects were dicta:
The injustice and confusion incident to the doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson have been repeatedly urged as reasons for abolishing or
limiting diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. . . . If only a
question of statutory construction were involved, we should not
be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied
throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality of the
course pursued has now been made clear, and compels us to do
so.255
The Court held quite explicitly that, regardless of Swift’s defects or
benefits as a matter of policy, Erie’s doctrinal result depended
exclusively and deliberately on constitutional law.
Erie’s third section offered—in two pages and seven-hundred
words—the Court’s only constitutional arguments against Swift. The
majority held that because “Congress has no power” to regulate
“substantive rules of common law” through legislation, federal courts
lacked comparable power through adjudication.256 The Court quoted
states-rights arguments from Justice Field’s Baugh dissent, relying on
extreme “autonomy and independence of the states.”257 And the
opinion concluded by referencing the Tenth Amendment without
citation.258
Section three blended Field’s arch-federalism with Holmes’s Black
& White Taxicab dissent, though the two arguments were not at all
similar.259 For example, because Holmes asserted an intellectual
253. Id. at 74–76.
254. Id. at 74–77 & nn.11, 13; see also id. at 76 n.15.
255. Id. at 77.
256. Id. at 78. Note that the Court’s argument was not about separation of powers. On
the contrary, the Court first limited Congress’s authority, by excluding the legislative
power to prescribe substantive common law, and then inferred an identical limit on the
power of the federal courts. The argument’s logic assumes a comparability among the
branches’ powers, not their constitutional separation.
257. Id. (quoting Balt. & Ohio R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893) (Field, J.,
dissenting)).
258. Id. at 80; see U.S. CONST. amend. X.
259. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78–79.
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“fallacy” concerning the existence of law, he was less interested in
Field’s defense of states’ power than he was in limiting federal judges’
power to innovate.260 In any event, Holmes never explained how his
metaphysical analysis of “law in the sense in which courts speak of it
today” rendered Swift “unconstitutional,”261 and Erie did nothing to
solve that mystery. Accordingly, the Holmes quotations in Erie remain
to this day more of a judicial homage than a constitutional argument.262
From a textualist perspective, the differences between Erie and
Swift are striking. Swift presented itself as a minor gap-filler that leaned
heavily on judicial precedents, common-law practice, and economic
necessity.263 Swift interpreted the Rules of Decision Act to create space
for the Court’s commercial lawmaking, which meant that every step of
Swift’s approach was subject to congressional correction. Swift’s
judgment about commercial paper was federal general common law,
and its decision that federal courts should apply that judgment was
federal choice of law.
By contrast, Erie was a deliberately violent departure from onehundred years of precedent, supported by vague references to
federalism and by quotes from three judicial dissents. Although the
Court disclaimed “hold[ing] unconstitutional” the Rules of Decision
Act or any other federal statute, its constitutional basis placed a
necessary limit on what future legislators could do—including
reauthorizing Swift’s common law by statute.264 These textual
characteristics make it all the more interesting to explore how Swift
became a “monster,” with Erie emerging as a triumphantly vanquishing
hero.
2. Originalism: Implied and Understood Meanings
Erie’s text is cracked if not broken. Because Justice Field’s
theories of dual sovereignty were rejected long ago, Erie’s modern
defenders try to minimize the opinion’s Tenth-Amendment verbiage
about “rights which . . . are reserved by the Constitution to the several
260. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532–33 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
261. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79.
262. Beyond the passages discussed supra, the Erie Court’s majority opinion also
contained a few sentences that were purely declaratory rather than explanatory or
analytical. E.g., id. at 78 (“Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by
acts of Congress, the law to be applied is the law of the state.”); id. (“There is no federal
general common law.”).
263. See NEWMYER, supra note 33, at 336.
264. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79–80.
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states.”265 The Cult of Holmes remains unmistakably strong, but
today’s emphasis on interpretive methodology weakens efforts to
convert his sparkling epithets—“brooding omnipresence” and
“transcendental law”—into persuasive constitutional arguments.266
Erie’s textual flaws require other kinds of interpretive material to
understand this iconic precedent, and this subsection will consider
Erie’s “implied meaning” based on evidence about the decision’s
lawyers, judges, and contemporary audience.
a.

Lawyers

We have seen that the lawyers in Swift argued their case as though
it were a mountain, but the Court decided a molehill.267 The opposite
was true in Erie. No lawyer had suggested that “the oft-challenged
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson should be disapproved.”268 Nor did anyone
but the Supreme Court foresee that as even a possibility. The district
judge—a Roosevelt appointee hearing his first civil case—had applied
federal general common law without hesitation.269 And a Second
Circuit panel that included Learned Hand and Thomas Swan had
unanimously used federal general common law with casual
confidence.270
Even in the Supreme Court, the litigating parties focused on minor
details: When the train struck, was Tompkins parallel to the tracks or
walking diagonally?271 Did lower courts misread the federal general
common law of contributory negligence?272 Exactly how settled was
Pennsylvania’s rejection of the “permissive pathways” doctrine?273
None of the lawyers sensed that Erie might be a bombshell, and even
the railroad’s brief referenced “persistent criticisms of Swift v. Tyson”
only en route to showing that such critiques were “misdirected.”274 For

265. See Robert Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era: Can It Be “Revived”?, 51 DUKE
L.J. 1513, 1635 (2002).
266. Cf. WHITE, supra note 202, at 488.
267. See supra Sections I.A.1–I.A.2(a).
268. Erie, 304 U.S. at 69.
269. Younger, supra note 30, at 1020–21.
270. Tompkins v. Erie R.R., 90 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1937), rev’d, Erie, 304 U.S. 64
(1938); see also, e.g., Younger, supra note 30, at 1022–23; Michael E. Smith, Let Us Now
Praise Famous Men, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1643, 1643 (1994) (book review).
271. E.g., Brief on Behalf of Petitioner at 4, 7–9, Erie, 304 U.S. 64 (No. 367).
272. E.g., id. at 46–48.
273. E.g., Brief on Behalf of Respondent at 18–26, Erie, 304 U.S. 64 (No. 367).
274. See PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 30, at 97–101.
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both sides, the main puzzle was to understand why the Court chose to
hear the case at all.275
The railroad did try to somewhat limit the application of Swift and
its successors, claiming that the dividing line between general and local
law should be whether relevant state cases were firmly established.276
On this approach, general common law would apply in federal and
state courts alike, but only for undecided questions. When doctrine is
firmly established, state courts are duty bound to follow past
precedents instead of general principles, and Erie’s lawyers claimed
that federal courts should do the same.277
Tompkins replied with a barrage of Supreme Court decisions that
had ignored settled state law.278 Echoing the bond cases, Tompkins
wrote that “[t]he ultimate aim of both [state and federal courts] is
justice, and where a State Court has gone astray, to compel Federal
adhesion to such injustice is not only to destroy the judicial function
but to make a feti[s]h of legalistic conflicts principles.”279 Tompkins
claimed that, even if the Court was sometimes vague in separating local
and general law, a broad standard was the right one: “Let the Federal
Courts exercise their own judgment on all principles of general law,
except where local rules of property, . . . [or] peculiar local
customs . . . have grown up.”280
Erie’s constitutional arguments were never briefed or argued, and
this was because the experienced lawyers on the scene—including the
district judge and Second Circuit panel—unanimously failed to
anticipate Erie’s result or rationale in any way.281 Though some
intellectuals had criticized Swift for nearly sixty-five years, there was no
signal that the case might be overruled until Brandeis’s opinion was
announced from the bench.282

275. See Robert H. Jackson, The Rise and Fall of Swift v. Tyson, 24 A.B.A. J. 609
(1938); PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 30, at 98.
276. Brief on Behalf of Petitioner, supra note 271, at 28–38 & n.1.
277. Id.
278. Brief on Behalf of Respondent, supra note 273, at 6–12, 17–18.
279. Id. at 13.
280. Id. The railroad’s reply brief did not revisit its theory of “settled” state law.
281. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 87–90 (1938) (Butler, J., dissenting);
Tompkins v. Erie R.R., 90 F.2d 603, 604–05 (2d Cir. 1937) (detailing lawyers’ arguments
and the court of appeals’ conclusion), rev’d, Erie, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Younger, supra note
30, at 1020–21 (discussing relevant proceedings in district court).
282. Justice Brandeis “pointedly inquired” about Swift v. Tyson at oral argument, but
such questions were not understood to prefigure any radical decision by the majority of
Justices. PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 30, at 99.
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To construe Erie’s arguments as inevitable or necessary is victors’
history soaked in hindsight. Some theorists viewed Swift as a “headless
monster” at the time,283 but the lawyers and judges who participated in
Erie missed that memo. Erie’s litigative context shows that the decision
was not compelled by a consensus shift in legal thinking any more than
Swift was compelled by a consensus view of financial necessity.284 Swift
had weathered critiques since 1873, and when Erie came, it shocked its
participants like a thunderbolt.285 The Court’s decision was not the
lingering consequence of a civil war, nor was it some natural dawn that
had gradually broken Swift’s jurisprudential darkness. Instead, Erie was
a historically contingent product of the Court and its members at the
time.
b.

Judges

In search of originalist context, Erie’s interpreters have often
turned to biography, as Louis Brandeis is among America’s most
famous judges, and Erie is his most famous opinion.286 This subsection
considers the virtues and flaws of seeking Erie’s implied meaning based
on details about its author. Edward Purcell’s book, Brandeis and the
Progressive Constitution, offers a strong argument for viewing Erie this
way, and his thesis appears in striking terms:
Most immediately, [Erie] was due to Brandeis. The Court’s
decision was largely due to his drive to overrule Swift, and its
opinion was almost wholly due to his insistence that it
rest . . . on specific constitutional grounds of his own choosing.
Erie was, perhaps to an unusual degree, a decision of the

283. GILMORE, supra note 15, at 61.
284. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
285. See PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 30, at 97–101; Jackson, supra note 275, at
609 (speculating that “[t]he first intimation that all was not well must have come when the
Supreme Court granted certiorari,” though of course that is precisely what the Erie
Railroad’s petition had sought). It is especially hard to think that a railroad’s attorney
would have ever knowingly jeopardized the longstanding existence of corporate-favorable
federal general common law, and the historical record does not suggest that counsel did so
in Erie. See Jackson, supra note 275, at 609 (noting that “the railroad company in its brief
was careful to avoid any suggestion that its argument involved a repudiation of Swift v.
Tyson”).
286. Compare Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (privacy), and Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (free speech), with Younger, supra note 30, at 1011 (“[Erie] is the keystone of
the procedure course taught at every American law school.”).
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Supreme Court that embodied the well-considered and
fundamental constitutional theory of only a single justice.287
A major consequence of treating Erie and Brandeis as exactly
identical is to displace a textualist focus on states-rights federalism in
favor of an originalist analogy to authorial intent. In this Article’s
terminology, Purcell seeks to focus on Erie’s implied meaning rather
than its declared meaning, and that choice of methodology has serious
substantive consequences. Like many modernists, Purcell seeks to
shelve Erie’s awkward text in order to interpret the case based on
broad constitutional principles—such as judicial restraint and
separation of powers—that a “good progressive” like Brandeis might
have endorsed.288 According to Purcell, Brandeis’s Erie opinion
“implemented the Progressive values that he had absorbed, nourished,
and articulated for a lifetime[, especially including] what he regarded as
the compatible causes of social justice, organizational efficiency, and
popular government.”289
Purcell insists that interpreters can be misled by reading Erie too
closely, as the opinion’s botched language could muddy the
constitutionally progressive truth that lies beneath.290 There is no
denying that Erie quotes Justice Field’s dual-sovereignty federalism
and uses language from the Tenth Amendment, but Purcell insists that
such elements do not represent what Brandeis stood for in life.291
Therefore, they cannot describe what his judicial masterwork really
meant.292

287. PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 30, at 114. The strength of Purcell’s personal
focus on Brandeis overwhelms his acknowledged caveats concerning “sweeping political,
social, and legal developments that extended back for more than half a century.” See id. at
109, 113–14.
288. See id. at 120–24, 190–91 (explaining Brandeis’s Erie decision as a link between his
ideas of judicial restraint and social progressivism).
289. Id. at 140, 165.
290. See id. at 296 (“The opinion’s relatively terse and misleading language
compounded the normal problems of interpretation . . . .”); id. at 156 (“The opinion, in
sum, was brief—perhaps even gnomic—and devoid of detailed legal and social analysis. Its
purposes were Brandeisian, but its argument was not.”); id. at 159 (“Brandeis treated the
social facts sketchily and quite inaccurately, and he relied on a picture of the world that he
fundamentally rejected.”); id. at 163 (“Why would Brandeis write such a flawed, abstract,
oblique, and misleading opinion? . . . [I]n the context of early 1938, he had quite a number
of reasons for doing so.”); id. at 163–64 (listing five possible rationales underlying the
opinion).
291. See id. at 114, 179, 182, 189 (drawing distinctions between Brandeis’s ideology and
the Erie opinion’s text).
292. See id. at 6, 305 (urging readers to look past Erie’s textual meaning).
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A second consequence of Purcell’s biographical approach stems
from his conclusion that Erie’s implied meaning was properly
understood for only a brief period of time.293 Purcell portrays Brandeis
as a singularly personal link between Holmes’s critique of Swift’s
theoretical “fallacies” and socially progressive constitutionalism.294 The
climax of Brandeisian jurisprudence, however, had nearly passed when
Erie was decided. Brandeis left the Court within a year, and he died in
1941.295 By Purcell’s account, the centralization surrounding World
War II altered “the landscape of American life . . . dramatically,” such
that Brandeis’s “political rhetoric of ‘Progressivism’ suddenly appeared
quaint and even archaic.”296 For this reason, Purcell’s book is largely
dedicated to explaining how the Brandeisian “original Erie” was
coopted and distorted after just a few years by subsequent theories and
political movements.297
To appreciate disputes over how to characterize Erie’s implied
meaning, one might consider a different biographical interpretation,
drawn from Anthony Freyer’s book Harmony and Dissonance.298
Freyer views the Court’s Erie opinion not as espousing Brandeis’s own
idiosyncratic progressivism, but as a confluence point for Swift’s critics
over a broader timespan.299 Erie cited a variety of sources: from the
arch-Texan Robert Street to Field’s rant in Baugh, from the urbane
theorizing of John Chipman Gray to Charles Warren’s statutory
research.300 Freyer’s image of an eclectic Brandeis who “gathered his
citations” describes a fastidious quote-clipper more than a visionary
progressive prophet.301
Some difficulties with biographical analysis of Erie are somewhat
endemic to biography as a genre. For example, the personalized subject
of a biography can be celebrated, simplified, or given inflated

293. Id. at 195 (noting that the “legal, social, and political concerns” articulated in Erie
were “passing away as Brandeis delivered his opinion”).
294. See id. at 137 (“Brandeis was inspired by a related motive, private and compelling.
Perhaps because of his advancing age, [Brandeis] viewed Erie as an opportunity to pay his
last respect to the departed Holmes.”).
295. See id. at 195–201; G. Edward White, The Canonization of Holmes and Brandeis:
Epistemology and Judicial Reputations, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 576, 577, 607 (1995).
296. See PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 30, at 198–99.
297. See infra Section I.B.3 (charting Erie’s developmental meaning).
298. FREYER, HARMONY, supra note 30.
299. Id. at 131–42.
300. See FREYER, HARMONY, supra note 30, at 85–100; see also Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72 & n.4 (1938).
301. FREYER, HARMONY, supra note 30, at 133.
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importance.302
Bulky
organizing
labels—including
Purcell’s
“progressivism”—often do not fit particular individuals very well.303
And it can be hard to connect any individual’s life with collectively
written products like Supreme Court opinions.
Problems of this sort become particularly evident if one considers
Brandeis’s colleagues, who played various important roles in producing
the Erie majority. For instance, an early Brandeis draft described the
Court’s constitutional ruling very tentatively: “We need not determine
whether the objections disclosed by experience are alone sufficient
reason for abandoning [Swift].”304 It was a comment from Justice Stone
that pushed Brandeis to write more forcefully: “If only a question of
statutory construction were involved, we should not be prepared to
abandon [Swift].”305 Likewise, Chief Justice Hughes caused Brandeis to
add longer quotations from Field than he had planned, and it was
Hughes who first said at conference: “If we wish to overrule Swift v.
Tyson, here is our opportunity.”306
Even Justice Butler in dissent influenced the Court by requesting
clarification of “precisely the principle or provision of the Constitution
held to have been transgressed.”307 Brandeis replied with TenthAmendment rhetoric concerning “rights” that were “reserved . . . to the
several states.”308 And, indeed, it was the physically failing Justice
Cardozo who made certiorari possible in the first place by granting the
railroad a preliminary stay.309 Insofar as all of these different people—
with all of their disparate goals and beliefs—were significant in Erie’s
creation, then Brandeis cannot be retrofitted as the decision’s single
interpretive compass.
A similar challenge concerns the uneasy relationship between
“Brandeis’s constitutional progressivism” and the non-Brandeisian,
nonprogressive words in Erie’s decisive third section. As a matter of
intellectual genealogy, Holmes’s dissents echo nineteenth-century

302. See Nick Salvatore, Biography and Social History: An Intimate Relationship, 87
LABOUR HIST. 187 (2004).
303. See Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of Progressivism, 10 REV. AM. HIST. 113, 114
(1982).
304. FREYER, HARMONY, supra note 30, at 135, 138.
305. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77 (1938); see FREYER, HARMONY, supra
note 30, at 135, 138.
306. FREYER, HARMONY, supra note 30, at 131 (citing 2 MERLO J. PUSEY, CHARLES
EVANS HUGHES 710 (1951)); PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 30, at 179.
307. PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 30, at 179–80.
308. Id.
309. Younger, supra note 30, at 1023–24.

94 N.C. L. REV. 379 (2016)

436

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

commentary, and section three of Erie embraces Holmes. Yet Holmes
had a conflicted relationship with “progressivism,” and Swift’s early
critics were not progressives by any metric—nor was Field in Baugh.310
Perhaps the correct answer is to acknowledge, contrary to
Purcell’s thesis, that Erie’s decisive repudiation of Swift had no
necessary or enduring connection with Brandeisian progressivism.
Every word in part three could have been written by a nonprogressive
jurist like Holmes or Street, and some words that Brandeis chose to
include in that section were not progressive at all. Methodological and
substantive tensions between the textualism of Erie’s declared meaning
and the originalism of the decision’s implied meaning could hardly be
more starkly represented.
To read Erie as its author’s creation is obviously correct in one
sense, but there are many ways to interpret that fact. One could follow
Purcell’s invitation and deemphasize text in favor of idealized
biography. One could embrace Freyer by haphazardly mixing
Brandeis’s progressive motivations with states-rights federalism and
abstract theories. Or one could conclude that, whatever the opinion’s
author intended to say, Erie was simply not well drafted. Using
Brandeis’s personal experiences to interpret Erie may be attractive for
modern interpreters who happen to appreciate his legacy more than
that of Field or even Holmes. But political imperatives to redeem Erie
as a fundamentally desirable precedent cannot resolve interpretive
questions about how biographical analysis should fit with other
historical materials, including the Court’s textual opinion itself.
c.

Contemporary Reactions

Erie’s puzzling text and fractured context led the Harvard Law
Review to the remarkable understatement that “[t]he opinion in Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins lacks much of the precision which an important
reexamination of constitutional distribution of power might be
expected to contain.”311 That reaction, however, represented only the
smallest part of Erie’s contemporary audience. Even vocal critics of the
Court’s constitutional argument believed that they understood the
decision—including Felix Frankfurter, a friend and associate of
Brandeis, who would soon join the Court himself.312 In 1938, then-

310. WHITE, supra note 202, at 378–79.
311. Congress, the Tompkins Case, and the Conflict of Laws, 52 HARV. L. REV. 1002
(1939).
312. PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 30, at 196, 202.
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Professor Frankfurter wrote privately that he “disagree[d] in toto with
Brandeis’ constitutional view as to Swift v. Tyson” because Erie had
wrongly relied on the Tenth Amendment and extremist federalism.313
Most early commentators were also critical, if they bothered to
mention Erie’s constitutional holding at all.314
Erie did not win immediate fans based on what Purcell has called
its progressive constitutionalism, yet some observers did eventually
appreciate the decision’s significance. Initially, Erie was thoroughly
unmentioned by general circulation periodicals.315 In May 1938,
however, Justice Stone told journalist Arthur Krock that Erie was “the
most important opinion since I have been on the court,” sparking
several national newspaper articles.316 Krock later wrote that his own
313. Id. at 202–03.
314. E.g., Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., Status of the Rule of Judicial Precedent, 14 U. CIN.
L. REV. 271 (1940) (conference of the Cincinnati Bar Association).
315. Younger, supra note 30, at 1029 (noting a cursory Law Week entry as the lone
exception).
316. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 476–77
(1956). For early newspaper reactions to Erie, see Arthur Krock, A Momentous Decision
of the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1938, at 22 (calling the decision “transcendently
significant” in its decision to reverse the venerable landmark, “Smith [sic] v. Tyson”); id.
(declaring Erie “a stout[] blow in behalf of the original American system”); id. (“State
Rights Reasserted”); id. (“[Reed] wondered whether Justice Brandeis’s decision does not
deprive Congress ‘of power to declare what rules of substantive law shall govern the
Federal courts.’ Many lawyers think it does.”); Arthur Krock, Final TVA-Utilities
Settlement Seems Nearer, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1938, at 20; Arthur Krock, More About the
Epochal Tompkins Decision, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1938, at 22 (describing the Court’s
“voluntary confession of error” and “admission of error under pressure”); Chesly Manly,
Black’s Friends Rush to Defense of Legal Ability, CHI. DAILY TRIB., May 16, 1938, at 4
(describing Erie as a “history making opinion [that] grew out of an obscure damage suit”);
Lewis Wood, Court Again Helps New Deal, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1938, at 40 (“Aside from
cases already mentioned, perhaps the most momentous event of the term was the upset of
a ninety-six-year-old rule in the Erie vs. Tompkins case. . . . [T]he court swept aside ancient
precedents, newly holding that State court interpretation of the Federal law shall be
applied by Federal courts which in the past have used their own definitions of the general
law.”); In Praise of Black, WASH. POST, June 10, 1938, at X9 (statement of Harold C.
Havinghurst) (“Subsequently the majority of the court came to Black’s point of view, and
the old doctrine was expressly overruled in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.”); id.
(explaining that “Holmes’s dissent triumphs”); id. (“Once more the Supreme Court’s
dissent becomes the Supreme Court’s decision, but rarely in a more momentous instance
than this. And there is romance, too, in what even the layman can see is no mere musty
matter of law.”); id. (“Justice Holmes’s co-dissenters . . . lived on . . . to the day when the
Supreme Court was so constituted that it would follow them and the spirit of Holmes in
righting the errors of almost a hundred years.”); Overlooked by the Press, WASH. POST,
May 6, 1938, at X8 (“[Erie] is of perhaps greater fundamental importance than the NRA,
the AAA or other much publicized judgments of recent years.”); id. (calling Erie “perhaps
the most interesting story to emanate from the Court in this most interesting period of its
history”); id. (“It abruptly reverses a trend toward centralization which has been
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Erie article had generated a responsive “shower of approving letters
from lawyers.”317
Frankfurter sought to further boost Erie’s public profile by writing
to President Roosevelt on April 27:
I certainly didn’t expect to live to see the day when the Court
would announce, as they did on Monday, that it itself has
usurped power for nearly a hundred years. And think of not a
single New York paper—at least none that I saw—having a
nose for the significance of such a decision.318
In July 1938, Solicitor General Robert Jackson delivered a lecture to an
American Bar Association section entitled “The Rise and Fall of Swift
v. Tyson.”319 Jackson’s speech celebrated Swift’s demise, yet he also
refused to endorse Erie’s constitutional reasoning.320
Even as journalists trumpeted Erie’s significance and impact, they
wrote surprisingly little that the general public could understand. There
was no discussion, for example, of federal general common law’s effect
on corporate litigation, municipal bonds, or workplace accidents.321 Nor
did newspaper accounts recoil at what one writer called “State Rights
Reasserted.”322 Despite the Tenth Amendment’s obvious and
acknowledged appearance, no contemporary public discussion ever
linked Erie with pre-New Deal federalism. To be sure, Erie was not
celebrated as an instance of anti-corporate progressivism, but its
apparent revival of states-rights ideology also was not construed as
resuscitating discredited jurisprudential principles from the previous
decade.
This historical record seems to indicate that the press and public
interpreted Erie alongside other seismic changes at the Court in 1938—

proceeding for nearly a century in the judicial field. It reaffirms and re-establishes the
absolute sovereignty of the States in the broad field of ‘general law.’ . . . And by so doing it
throws incalculable emphasis on the States as the vital and sovereign units in the
American form of government.”); Supreme Court Admits an Error: Decision of 1842
Reversed in Opinion Handed Down by Justice Brandeis, DAILY BOS. GLOBE, May 1, 1938,
at C4.
317. Krock, Final TVA-Utilities Settlement Seems Nearer, supra note 316, at 20.
318. Younger, supra note 30, at 1029.
319. Jackson, supra note 275, at 609.
320. See id. at 644; Craig Green, Can Erie Survive as Federal Common Law?, 54 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 813 (2013).
321. Even the “romance” of Warren’s statutory research drew more press than these
issues of national legal policy. Krock, More About the Epochal Tompkins Decision, supra
note 316, at 22.
322. Krock, A Momentous Decision of the Supreme Court, supra note 316, at 22.
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though Erie is seldom viewed in this light by modern audiences.323 For
decades, federal courts had been pilloried as subverting democratic
control and economic health.324 National judges were seen as captives
of formalism and constitutional purity that had invalidated legislative
reforms and damaged ordinary Americans, with Roosevelt’s courtpacking plan as a high-water mark of such political critique.325
In this highly volatile context, Erie offered a sudden public
apology—“voluntarily” and quite unsolicited, as the newspapers
wrote—that explicitly renounced its predecessors’ longstanding
jurisprudence as unconstitutional.326 Brandeis and Holmes had been
dissenters on issues of federal general common law as recently as
1928.327 Ten years later, reinforced by Roosevelt’s appointees, their
views now ruled the Court, and it was the old regime’s holdover
“Horsemen” who fulminated in dissent. The New Deal’s good guys had
won again, and constitutional progress marched on with confidence.
Perhaps the public and press did not need to know much more than
that.
Erie’s radical judgment fueled different reactions among various
groups. Legal practitioners saw the case as a major development in
their clients’ battles over federal general common law, which had lasted
for a half-century.328 Legal academics attacked the Court for shoddy
reasoning, if not bad results.329 And although the press seemed pleased
with Erie, it is less clear what their readership truly understood about
the case.
For interpretive purposes, these reactions to Erie from its time are
extremely useful in contradicting certain modern views of the decision.
For example, no one in 1938 celebrated Erie as a grand case involving
separation of powers, dual-sovereignty federalism, or Brandeisian
progressivism. Evidence of Erie’s understood meaning makes it harder
to accept that, for example, Erie’s great progressive holding fell in the
323. Compare, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 192, 769 (5th
ed. 2013) (discussing major constitutional shifts in the late 1930s without mentioning Erie),
with, e.g., BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND
PROBLEMS 509–10 (5th ed. 2013) (presenting Erie without mentioning contemporary
changes in constitutional law).
324. PURCELL, LITIGATION, supra note 30, at 26.
325. Id. at 218; cf. id. at 26 (quoting Sen. Robert LaFollette’s view of federal courts as
“a Frankenstein which must be destroyed”).
326. Supreme Court Admits an Error, DAILY BOS. GLOBE, supra note 316, at C4.
327. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
328. PURCELL, LITIGATION, supra note 30, at 22–27.
329. PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 30, 216–28 (collecting sources).
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woods without anyone hearing it at the time. Likewise, Erie’s
purportedly constitutional basis was viewed as the decision’s most
disfavored element, and also its least important. The grand
‘constitutional Erie’ that has sparked so much modern controversy
lacks any basis in the original history of 1938; instead, we shall see that
it was the novel creation of legal-process scholars in the 1950s and
political conservatives in the 1980s.
3. Living Precedentialism: Developmental Meaning
Tracing Erie’s developmental meaning is difficult not only because
the story spans eighty years, but also because it concludes in the
ambiguous present. This subsection will consider three categories of
post-hoc reactions—from courts, commentators, and policymakers—
that have contributed to make Erie what it is today.
Federal courts’ reaction to Erie was uniformly and immediately
positive.330 President Roosevelt appointed six new Justices after Erie,
and all of them focused on implementing the decision rather than
undermining it.331 Judges debated Erie’s scope, but not its correctness;
thus, the Court quickly addressed how to interpret unsettled state law,
how Erie applied to conflicts of law, and Erie’s relationship to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.332 These questions were resolved in
exclusively practical terms, eschewing constitutional arguments that
some Justices (i.e., Reed and Frankfurter) had never embraced, and
that other Justices (i.e., Wiley Rutledge and Frank Murphy) were
inclined to hedge or shelve.333

330. Ruhlin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202, 208–09 (1938); Bash v. Balt. & O.R.
Co., 102 F.2d 48, 49 (3d Cir. 1939); see, e.g., Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 757–61
(1st Cir. 1939); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Munn, 99 F.2d 190, 193 (4th Cir. 1938); Brabham
v. Mississippi, 97 F.2d 251, 253 (5th Cir. 1938); Deslauriers Steel Mould Co. v. Gangaway,
97 F.2d 78, 79 (3d Cir. 1938); Hack v. Am. Sur. Co., 96 F.2d 939, 946 (7th Cir. 1938). None
of these discussed Erie’s constitutional basis.
331. These appointees were Felix Frankfurter (1939), William Douglas (1939), Frank
Murphy (1940), James Byrnes (1941), Robert Jackson (1941), and Wiley Rutledge (1943).
THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, 1789–2012 (Clare
Cushman ed., 2013).
332. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1941); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec.
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941); Fidelity Union Tr. Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 172
(1940).
333. See supra notes 313 and accompanying text (discussing the views of Frankfurter,
J.); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 91–92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring in part); Guar.
Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 113 (1945) (Rutledge, J., dissenting, joined by Murphy, J.).
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Ever since 1938, the Court has struggled to distinguish state
“substantive” law from federal “procedural” law,334 yet the Court has
never again relied on Erie’s indecipherably weak constitutional basis.335
To the contrary, the Court has synthesized Erie’s “twin aims” as
entirely practical entities: “discouragement of forum shopping and
avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.”336 Furthermore,
even as applicable doctrinal tests have become tangled over the years,
no judicial opinion has suggested overruling Erie; instead, through
decades of unbroken application and repetition, the case has only
increased in doctrinal prominence.337
Compared to Erie’s consistently positive judicial reception,
academic commentary has been diverse and unstable. Some academics
in the decades after Erie shared Frankfurter’s view that the case was
rightly decided but wrongly reasoned.338 Another group objected that
Erie limited federal courts’ independence, transforming them into a
kind of “ventriloquist’s dummy to the courts of some particular
state.”339 One professor even claimed that Erie’s repudiation of
“general common law” undermined the standard law school practice
(that continues today) of studying torts, property, and contracts
without any state-specific focus.340
Even as federal courts ignored Erie’s constitutional basis,
however, a central figure in the academy attempted a grand
reconstruction. Henry Hart was a founding influence in the “legal
process” movement, and he co-authored the greatest casebook in
American history.341 Many post-war academics expressed confidence in
their ability to design systems that, aided by properly examined facts,

334. See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393
(2010).
335. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. of Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426–27 (1996). But cf.,
e.g., Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 415–16 (invoking metaphysics and referring to Erie’s
“constitutional source”).
336. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
337. E.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011); Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 740–41 (2004).
338. PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 30, at 216–28 (collecting sources).
339. Richardson v. Comm’r, 126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J.), quoted in
Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v.
Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 284 (1946).
340. PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 30, at 217.
341. Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688, 688 (1989) (book review)
(“[I]ts first edition was beautiful and brilliant—probably the most important and
influential casebook ever written.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and
Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953, 954–55 (1994).
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could beneficially organize human life.342 Hart’s sweeping theories
about American governance—and especially federal courts—amply
reflected this self-assured tone.
Hart offered a rationalized and panoramic view of state and
federal legislatures and courts. Whereas Frankfurter saw diversity
jurisdiction as a quaint vestige or mistake, Hart saw it as a reminder of
national unity and interstate activity under law. In their exercise of
diversity jurisdiction, elite and disinterested federal judges, aided by
efficient federal procedures, were able to deliver a “juster justice than
state courts.”343 On the other hand, Hart did believe that full
adjudicative creativity was appropriate only in federal cases that
applied federal substantive law.344
For Hart, Erie therefore struck the perfect balance and was
“superbly right” in requiring federal courts to follow state common-law
precedents.345 Hart articulated a “logic of federalism” that arranged
state and federal courts within reasoned spheres of pluralist
decisionmaking.346 In Hart’s view, the “perpetual confliction” that had
plagued Swift v. Tyson was more than a pragmatic nuisance.347 He saw
the application of “inconsistent systems of law” in the same geographic
space as positive proof that Swift’s legal architecture was irretrievably
flawed.348
Hart’s core notion was that all legal institutions have a proper,
defined, and orderly role. Hart thought that some post-Erie decisions
went too far in making federal courts “only another court of the
state,”349 yet he deserves recognition as the first true theorist of Erie.
For although Hart claimed fidelity to “the foundations of principle of
Justice Brandeis’ opinion”—as opposed to its textual terms—he
offered under that banner a truly novel analysis of adjudication,
federalism, the “constitutional plan,” and nearly everything else.350
A different approach to Erie appeared in the American Law
Institute’s Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and
342. Steven Schryer, Fantasies of the New Class: The New Criticism, Harvard
Sociology, and the Idea of the University, 122 PMLA 663, 666–69 (2007).
343. PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 30, at 246.
344. Id. at 244–45.
345. Id. at 247.
346. Id. at 248–49.
347. Id. at 247 (discussing Hart’s views); see supra note 75 and accompanying text
(presenting nineteenth-century objections to federal-state disparities).
348. PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 30, at 247.
349. Id. at 251.
350. See id. at 229.
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Federal Courts in 1969.351 Chief Justice Warren had called for systemic
analysis of state and federal courts in “light of the basic principles of
federalism,” and the report offered exactly that.352 The study applied
legal-process methodologies but disagreed with Hart, concluding that
federal courts should generally avoid diversity jurisdiction’s
“undesirable interference with state autonomy,” just as “questions of
federal law are [typically] best left to the federal courts.”353
The ALI study begrudgingly stated that, “[i]f Erie had a
constitutional base, it was the absence of federal legislative power as to
the run of factual situations presented in diversity cases.”354 Yet the
authors viewed Erie as a manifestly second-best alternative to reducing
or eliminating diversity jurisdiction altogether. Thus, the report
strongly advocated “the basic proposition that federal courts should
not be called upon for the application of state law.”355
Almost fifty years of Erie commentary can be organized by
comparing Hart’s writings to the ALI’s study. One set of academics,
like Hart, have ingeniously discovered large parts of their own
intellectual theories hidden between the lines of Erie’s great and
powerful ruling.356 Such writers embrace Erie as a case worth
celebrating, but only on the authors’ own terms (federalism, separation
of powers, or conflicts of law), and often without much attention to
historical text or context.357 A second set of commentators has followed
the ALI by quietly ignoring or accepting Erie’s vague constitutional
basis, while prioritizing instead Frankfurter’s practical focus on forum
shopping and unfairness.358

351. Id. at 273–84.
352. Id. at 270.
353. Id. at 274.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. One recent effort to displace Erie’s Tenth-Amendment language, based on a
mixture of judicial biography and post-Erie legal-process theory, is particularly vigorous.
Young, supra note 30, at 65–69. In a moment of candor about his ahistorical atextualism,
Young writes: “If our understanding of Erie . . . has evolved over time, that is part of the
genius of our system of precedent.” Id. at 80–81 (emphasis added). Young’s effort to
integrate Erie-in-1938 as part of his own substantive view of “the contemporary structure
of constitutional doctrine[,]” id. at 82, connects his scholarship with political projects in
other eras, which at various times have created and relied upon a wide number of different
“contemporary structure[s] of constitutional doctrine” in promoting diverse political
results. Green, Constitutional Structure, supra note 30, at 661.
357. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 30.
358. See Green, Repressing Erie, supra note 30, at 596 n.4 (collecting sources).
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Perhaps the most important aspect of Erie’s developmental
meaning has been its enduring practical effect on diversity jurisdiction.
With only a few exceptions,359 Erie’s elimination of federal general
common law has defanged political fights over diversity jurisdiction,
making that institution safe—almost boring—in the decades to follow.
Before Erie, many politicians and commentators had clamored to
restrict or abolish diversity jurisdiction, especially insofar as the latter
symbolized pro-corporate abuse.360 After 1938, however, diversity
jurisdiction changed from a political hot button to a harmless oddity.361
Although there remain differences today between state courts and
federal courts, post-Erie variations seem mild and inoffensive by
comparison to the “confliction” that Swift produced.362 Erie ended the
Taxicab-style application of flagrantly different substantive law to
identical cases in courthouses just blocks apart.363 And a vital
precondition for political objections to Swift’s “forum shopping” was
that litigants as well as the public had to identify circumstances where
the federal forum would make a difference—otherwise the public could
not know what to protest. With one stroke, Erie drastically reduced
those differences’ number, scope, and public visibility.
4. Lessons Learned: Erie as Regime Change
Everything that modern lawyers think they know about Erie
emerged years and decades after the fact. Erie’s current meaning exists
within an elaborate cultural framework that students, lawyers, and
scholars use to interpret the case. Erased from popular memory are
Lochner-era notions of state sovereignty that were originally inscribed
as the decision’s justification. Lost are commitments to constitutional
arguments that the Court once viewed as both comfortable and
necessary. Forgotten is the radicalism of discarding a century of
precedent that no litigant had challenged or defended. Faded are the

359. See Suzanna Sherry, Overruling Erie: Nationwide Class Actions and National
Common Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2138–40 (2008) (discussing the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005).
360. PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 30, at 77–85; PURCELL, LITIGATION, supra note
30, at 15.
361. PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 30, at 265–69.
362. For a general discussion of these differences, see Burt Neuborne, The Myth of
Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977), and Burt Neuborne, Parity Revisited: The Uses of a
Judicial Forum of Excellence, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 797 (1995). See also William B.
Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 599 (1999); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, 71 B.U. L. REV. 593 (1991).
363. Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
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generational and constitutional politics that were once unmistakably
crisp.
By comparison to its complex history, today’s Erie is a cartoon: a
monument to whiskered Holmesian genius, penned by the selfrestrained Brandeis, and bolstered by hard-boiled practicalities of
forum shopping. Hardly anyone cares about Erie’s constitutional
analysis, and only experts wonder how the Court—especially
Brandeis—could embrace such poorly crafted arguments.364 Erie never
needed a constitutional basis,365 which makes the Court’s decision to
produce one even more surprising. This Article has used unnoticed
historical evidence and untried analytical techniques to challenge
conventional interpretations of Erie as an iconic case. Our last topic in
this subsection is to examine how such a reinterpretation of Erie casts
revisionist light on this period of Supreme Court history as a whole.
This Article has characterized Erie’s original meaning as a
politicized
generational
rivalry
between
twentieth-century
revolutionaries and a demonized old guard.366 In the 1950s, however,
legal-process scholars’ obsession with self-restraint obscured Erie’s
assertiveness in its own time. Insofar as one recovers an originalist
version of Erie, that reinterpretation could destabilize broader images
of the New Deal Court as constitutionally “passive” as opposed to
“activist.”367
Ordinary descriptions of the 1930s characterize Justices Brandeis,
Cardozo, and Stone as internalizing objections to Lochner and
therefore instructing courts to uphold legislative expressions of
democratic will.368 According to this familiar tale, Roosevelt appointed
new judges, Roberts “switched in time,” and the Court turned an
institutional corner, eschewing rootless doctrines such as freedom of
contract and substantive due process.369 The post-1937 Court was
supposedly different from its predecessor because the new crop of
364. Cf. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (articulating a “series of rules under which [the Court] has avoided passing
upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision”).
365. The Court certainly could have accepted Reed’s argument as an alternate holding.
See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring in part).
366. See supra Sections I.B.1–I.B.3.
367. To understand how terms like “judicial activism” entered popular discussion, see
Green, supra note 6, at 1201–09.
368. BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND
THE NEW DEAL (2000); PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 30, at 30.
369. See W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 43–44 (1937).
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judges steadfastly refused to manipulate the Constitution in the service
of their own normative visions.370
The New Deal Court never matched this image of jurisprudential
discipline, as one can see by comparing an originalist view of Erie with
its celebrated companion case, United States v. Carolene Products.371 In
Carolene Products, the makers of “Milnut” challenged a federal statute
that criminalized their blend of skim milk and coconut oil. The
producers claimed that combining milk and vegetable fat was a
perfectly safe commodity that should be freely bought and sold
wherever market forces allowed.372
The Court’s holding and its now-famous footnote four were a
manifesto for the new legal regime, as the majority announced
sweeping principles that were entirely unnecessary to the case.373 For
example, the Court bracketed and set aside the extensive congressional
record that supported the Filled Milk Act, just so it could declare
hypothetically that “in the absence of such [legislative] aids, the
existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be
presumed.”374 The Court further proclaimed, with remarkable breadth,
that “regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions
is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless . . . [one can] preclude
the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the
knowledge and experience of the legislators.”375 This was a clear and
conscious departure from Lochner-era skepticism of legislative
policymaking.
Even more expansively, footnote four of Carolene Products
explained that other cases—which might affect constitutionally
protected groups, liberties, and political processes—might require
“more exacting scrutiny” and “more searching judicial inquiry” than
mere regulation of Milnut.376 Modern observers have called footnote
four “the great and modern charter” of American constitutional law,
370. For an especially pointed expression of this mythology, see Arthur M. Schlesinger
Jr., The Supreme Court: 1947, FORTUNE, Jan. 1947, at 73 (using the term “judicial
activists” for the first time to describe sitting Justices, in contrast to other Justices who
were labeled “champions of self-restraint”). For a modern retelling of this same
jurisprudential story, see Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2617–18 (2015) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting).
371. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
372. Id. at 145–47.
373. Cf. id. at 148 (sustaining the federal statute based on a clearly applicable twentyyear-old Supreme Court precedent about state laws regulating such milk products).
374. Id. at 152.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 152–53 n.4.
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endorsing strong protection for liberty and equality, while requiring
judicial deference on topics of economic and social policy.377 The
Court’s effort to prescribe a doctrinal architecture for every application
of judicial review—especially as footnoted dicta in a case about
coconut-fattened milk—represents judicial boldness of the highest
order.
In Carolene Products, the Court itself crafted both sides of the
equation—the commitment to judicial restraint as well as the
protection of individual rights—thereby indicating the majority’s own
view of when and where judges should act. Historians once
characterized the Revolution of 1937 as a craven surrender to
Roosevelt’s court-packing pressure, but that was profoundly wrong.378
The Court’s decisions obviously represented not merely the President’s
or the public’s view of the Constitution; they also reflected ideas of the
Justices themselves. The late 1930s embodied a constitutional
reformulation by the Court, rather than simply the puppeteering of
other political agents. Even at the height of their so-called “restraint,”
Roosevelt’s new Justices profoundly revised constitutional
jurisprudence and unhorsed an older legal regime that had been
dominant throughout their adult lives.379
A revisionist account of Erie—produced with new techniques and
evidence—confirms beyond any doubt that, alongside notions of
judicial restraint, the New-Deal Court embraced immense judicial
boldness, and it did so well beyond the parameters prescribed by
Carolene Products.380 The Erie majority collected and invented
constitutional arguments without hesitation. Erie was nothing like the
chastened application of passive virtues that subsequent legal-process
scholars would urgently desire.381

377. Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1979).
378. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 228–31 (1995).
379. E.g., Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 (1937); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
380. See supra Section I.B.1 (detailing constitutional arguments in Erie that are
unrelated to Carolene Products’ concern for individual rights and “discrete and insular
minorities”).
381. See generally Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L.
REV. 40 (1961) (advocating judicial passivity in a prominent example of legal-process
scholarship that was published many years after Erie).
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Nor did the Erie decision claim any plausible link to individual
rights or democratic process.382 Instead, Erie’s result issued from a
Court that was remarkably free to pursue its own constitutional vision.
Newly appointed Justices had spent their careers watching the Court
implement constitutional beliefs of then-sitting Justices.383 They had
seen Congress and President Roosevelt promote a constitutionally
transformative agenda for federal governance.384 And Roosevelt had
dramatically threatened separation of powers by trying to alter the
number of Justices in order to serve his political ends.385
In the abstract, New-Deal Justices could have reacted to those
events with self-restrained caution about employing broad
constitutional arguments. Having seen the consequences of judicial
abuse, the Court could have renounced aggression altogether, perhaps
only with exceptions enumerated under Carolene Products. But that is
not the historical record. In Erie, Carolene Products, and elsewhere
during this period, the legal-process narrative of New Deal restraint
appeared only after front-line combat with the old regime was
complete.386 As contemporary support for this jurisprudential image,
consider the Harvard Law Review’s marvelous analysis of Erie in 1938:
In holding that for nearly a century it had pursued an
“unconstitutional” “course” by following Swift v. Tyson in an
unbroken line of decisions, the Supreme Court has made a
startling avowal. Reserving comment we now note only the
gratuitous courage of the Court and the fluidity of the
Constitution.387
Perhaps only in 1938 could such “gratuitous courage” and
constitutional “fluidity” have been celebrated so explicitly and
earnestly.388 Basic constitutional principles had become flexible, and
the new Court was more pleased than ashamed in announcing that fact.

382. See generally United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(prescribing those as justifications for greater judicial activity).
383. LEUCHTENBERG, supra note 368, at 25–34.
384. CUSHMAN, supra note 368, at 11–43.
385. PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 30, at 105.
386. Cf. supra notes 338–63 and accompanying text (describing similar phenomena).
387. Commentary, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1245, 1245 (1938).
388. By comparison, some commentators have celebrated and criticized the
constitutional fluidity of Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). See sources cited
infra note 390. But even the historically significant shift on same-sex marriage draws no
close comparison to the sudden and grand constitutional revision pronounced by Erie.
Obergefell was presaged by at least three majority opinions over the course of twenty
years that had expanded LGBT rights in particular ways. See United States v. Windsor,
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II. MEANINGS-IN-PROGRESS: WINDSOR AND OBERGEFELL
Part I examined iconic cases from the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries in order to identify different modes of interpretation and
their various doctrinal consequences. Such schemes might seem
inherently valuable to intellectuals, especially as they transform
broader understandings of Supreme Court history.389 But practicing
lawyers and judges will also see pieces on a chess board. Interpretive
techniques and evidence can be applied to many doctrinal puzzles, and
systematic modes of interpretation (textualism, originalism, living
precedentialism) can be used for debates over interpreting any set of
vague and powerful precedents.
This Part solidifies precedential interpretation as a general
theory—not just a revisionist account of Erie and Swift—by considering
United States v. Windsor and Obergefell v. Hodges, two cases from the
ephemeral present rather than the excavated past. We have seen that
applying new interpretive techniques to old and familiar cases can
dramatically revise conventional wisdom. But interpretive
methodologies are also useful for understanding new iconic precedents.
Because so much more historical evidence is available concerning Swift
and Erie, the modern project of interpreting Windsor and Obergefell
should be relatively open and unsettled. Lawyers and judges have
struggled greatly over Windsor’s meaning, and debates about
Obergefell continue today.390 Applying the same techniques we have

133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620 (1996). Also, Obergefell explicitly overruled only one per curiam opinion. See
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605, overruling Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). As we have
seen, Erie was altogether unprecedented, as it upended dozens of fully reasoned and
explained Supreme Court decisions spanning almost a century.
389. See supra Section I.B.4.
390. Katie Eyer, Brown, Not Loving: Obergefell and the Unfinished Business of Formal
Equality, 125 YALE L.J.F. 1, 1–3 (2015), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/obergefell-andthe-unfinished-business-of-formal-equality [http://perma.cc/5ZEA-VJV4]; Adam Lamparello,
Justice Kennedy’s Decision in Obergefell: A Sad Day for the Judiciary, 6 HOUS. L. REV. OFF
REC. 45 (2015); Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2016); Louis Michael Seidman, The Triumph of Gay Marriage and the
Failure of Constitutional Law, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2016); Emily Bazelon &
Adam Liptak, What’s at Stake in the Supreme Court’s Gay-Marriage Case, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/28/magazine/whats-at-stake-in-thesupreme-courts-gay-marriage-case.html [http://perma.cc/68FZ-KLKJ]; Amy Davidson, The
Here and Now of Same-Sex Marriage, NEW YORKER (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.newyorker
.com/news/amy-davidson/obergefell-v-hodges-supreme-court-same-sex-marriage [http://
perma.cc/QK8P-DG9U]; Amy Davidson, The Supreme Court Reaffirms Marriage Vows,
NEW YORKER (June 26, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/supremecourt-same-sex-marriage-kennedy [http://perma.cc/8LL3-D9WW]; Adam Liptak, “Equal
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discussed will illustrate—despite scarce historical materials and with
suitably briefer discussion—how precedential interpretation may
proceed for Windsor, Obergefell, or any other important, ambiguous
icon that may appear in the future.
To be explicit, nothing in the following analysis depends on
whether Windsor or Obergefell in fact remain enduring icons. My
purpose is to analyze the moment when each of these cases did seem
important and vague, thereby offering a template that can be used to
interpret other precedents with similar characteristics.
In its own time, Windsor embodied the notion of “iconic cases”
exceptionally well. Windsor was the Supreme Court’s most outspoken
decision involving sexual orientation and same-sex marriage, which in
turn represents one of the greatest civil rights debates in this century.391
Yet we shall see that the Court’s textual explanation was so flawed that
other interpretive tools were needed to understand what the decision
meant. Indeed, nontextual interpretations of Windsor were crucial in
producing Obergefell. And although Obergefell answered the biggest
doctrinal question left open in Windsor, it has now raised other
doctrinal puzzles that remain vague and will require precedential
interpretation.
One cannot know how or when some other case will emerge that
transforms or displaces Windsor and Obergefell as iconic cases, but that
is emphatically not the point. Tomorrow will become history soon
enough. For now, it is sufficient to consider what advanced interpretive

Dignity”, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2015, at A1; Adam Liptak, Divided Justices Spar over Right to
Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2015, at A1; Adam Liptak, Justices To Decide Marriage
Rights for Gay Couples, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2015, at A1; Jeffrey Toobin, God and Marriage
Equality, NEW YORKER (June 26, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment
/god-and-marriage-equality [http://perma.cc/U34B-WBJ9]; Kerry Abrams & Brandon L.
Garrett, Cumulative Constitutional Rights (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 42, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2642640 [http://perma.cc/ECK3-YQ9E].
391. See also Franklin, supra note 28, at 873 (“[After Windsor,] courts do not treat the
marriage question as isolated or exceptional, but rather, as embedded in a larger set of
social, political, and legal changes. The invalidation of laws restricting marriage . . . is part
of the dismantling of an entire social status regime in which gays and lesbians rank as
second-class citizens. . . . Extending marriage rights to same-sex couples . . . is part of a
broader equality project founded on the notion that discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation violates core constitutional values.”); id. at 874 (“[After Windsor,] courts have
repeatedly concluded . . . that efforts to recruit or coerce people into
heterosexuality . . . cause serious harm—to individuals of all ages and to society
itself. . . . [C]ourts’ reasoning about liberty in recent same-sex marriage cases—like their
reasoning about equality—has applications beyond the context of marriage.”).
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techniques can reveal about two of the most difficult and interesting
Supreme Court decisions in recent memory.
A. Windsor v. United States: An Iconic Practice Run?
As with constitutional and statutory textualism, to focus on
Windsor’s declared meaning draws a useful separation between what
the decision-maker said and what a later audience might wish to hear.
The distinction between textual and nontextual interpretation is
especially important for politically charged issues like same-sex
marriage, and this Section will consider the Windsor opinion’s textual
flaws because—much like Erie, Brown, or Marbury—they imply a
demand for interpretive materials outside the judicial text.
1. Textualism: Declared Meaning
Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer were married in Canada, and they
lived as a married couple under the laws of New York.392 When Spyer
died, her property went to Windsor, who claimed tax exemption as a
“surviving spouse.”393 The federal government denied that exemption
based on the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), which declared
that, in every federal statute, the word “marriage” should include only
“a legal union between one man and one woman” and “spouse” should
include only members of an opposite-sex marriage.394 Windsor
challenged that denial on equal protection grounds.395 The Supreme
Court ruled five to four in Windsor’s favor, and the text of Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion blended three constitutional themes.
Windsor’s first textual theme was constitutional equality. The
Court held that DOMA “single[d] out” same-sex marriages and
“impose[d] a disability” by declaring them “less worthy than the
marriages of others.”396 DOMA’s refusal to recognize same-sex
marriage was “unusual” because it created disparities between the
treatment of couples under federal statutory law and state family law.397
The Court saw such disparities as unconstitutionally broad and
“motived by an improper animus or purpose.”398
392. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682.
393. Id.
394. Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419
(1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012)), invalidated in part by Windsor,
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
395. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.
396. Id. at 2695–96.
397. Id. at 2692–94.
398. Id. at 2693.
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A second textual theme concerned liberty. The Court held that
failing to recognize Windsor’s marriage inflicted an “injury and
indignity” that constituted a “deprivation of an essential part of the
liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment.”399 The majority went
beyond the doctrine of “reverse incorporation,” which applies equal
protection to the federal government, and stated explicitly that DOMA
“violate[d] basic due process and equal protection principles.”400 The
Court also declared that, “[w]hile the Fifth Amendment itself
withdraws from Government the power to degrade or demean in the
way this law does, the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment makes that Fifth Amendment right all the more specific
and all the better understood and preserved.”401 The Court did not
clarify how the nineteenth-century term “equal protection” could
possibly make the eighteenth-century term “due process” more
“specific” or “better understood and preserved.”402 Nor did the opinion
explain how future courts should analyze this interaction between
constitutional equality and liberty.
Windsor’s third and most curious theme was federalism. The
Court emphasized that “[b]y history and tradition the definition and
regulation of marriage . . . has been treated as being within the
authority and realm of the separate States.”403 The Court
acknowledged Congress’s power to treat couples as married even
though some states would not and also to ignore marriages that would
be valid under state law.404 Yet the Court insisted that ordinary
examples of federal-state divergence over lawful marriage were
“limited” and were designed to “further federal policy.”405 By contrast,
the Court saw DOMA as rejecting “the long-established precept that
the incidents, benefits, and obligations of marriage are uniform for all
married couples within each State.”406
In a strange double-pivot, the Court first discarded its own
federalism analysis as dicta, explaining that “it is unnecessary to decide
whether this federal intrusion on state power is a violation of the
399. Id. at 2692, 2695.
400. Id. at 2693 (emphasis added); id. at 2692 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 567 (2003) (applying due-process liberty against the Texas state government)); see
also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
401. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 2689–90; see id. at 2691–93.
404. Id. at 2690; JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 8 (2014).
405. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2690.
406. Id. at 2692.
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Constitution . . . because it disrupts the federal balance.”407 Then the
Court switched again, declaring that “[t]he State’s power in defining
the marital relation is of central relevance in this case quite apart from
principles of federalism.”408
This “non-federalism federalism” argument understandably
confused many commentators,409 but the Court’s approach may be
analogous to “governmental interests” analysis under choice of law.410
Windsor emphasized the “status” conferred by state same-sex
marriages as a communitarian “recognition, dignity, and protection of
the class.”411 The Court reasoned that New York’s recognition of samesex marriages “reflects both the community’s considered perspective
on the historical roots of the institution of marriage and its evolving
understanding of the meaning of equality.”412 In a case about conflicts
of law—which Windsor technically was not—these factors might have
bolstered New York’s interest in applying its own broad definition of
marriage instead of the narrower federal standard.
The Court’s choice-of-law language might also clarify its decision
not to use modern “tiers of scrutiny,” which are typically used in liberty
and equality cases to analyze the existence of certain kinds of
governmental interests.413 The Windsor Court never considered
whether national interests could be found to support the federal
marriage definition; instead, it held that such unspecified federal
interests were in any event outweighed by state interests.414 This kind of
balancing approach does not figure into typical equal protection or due
process cases, but it is very familiar in conflicts law. What the Windsor
Court never explained is how a choice-of-law balancing of interests was

407. Id.
408. Id. (emphasis added).
409. E.g., Heather K. Gerken, Windsor’s Mad Genius: The Interlocking Gears
of Rights and Structure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 587, 588 (2015); Neil S. Siegel, Federalism as a
Way Station: Windsor as Exemplar of Doctrine in Motion, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 87, 88–89
(2014).
410. See Lea Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis: A House Without
Foundations, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 459, 459–62 (1985). For more language echoing conflicts of
law, see Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692–94.
411. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2681, 2692.
412. Id. at 2692–93.
413. See Craig Green, Interest Definition in Equal Protection: A Study of Judicial
Technique, 108 YALE L.J. 439, 446–47 (1998).
414. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (“[N]o legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and
effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to
protect in personhood and dignity.” (emphasis added)).
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related to constitutional principles of equality, liberty, federalism, or
anything else.
Now that Windsor’s textual arguments have been identified,
substantive problems appear in each component part. For example,
although the Court’s liberty and equality arguments stressed that
DOMA’s “injury and indignity” had “deprive[d]” same-sex couples of
rights, those statements lack context. Almost all of the laws that make
married people “married”—including solemnization, divorce, child
custody, property rules, wills and estates, evidentiary privileges,
medical visitation, contractual rights, consumer benefits, state taxation,
litigation procedures, and a great deal more—are prescribed by state
law, not federal law.415 And even though DOMA affected “over 1,000
[federal] statutes” that governed marital status in various federal
contexts, DOMA did not affect the 10,000 or more state regulations
governing marital status.416 The Court fretted over details of federal
ethics law, federal educational loans, and federal veterans’ cemeteries,
yet DOMA altered only a tiny part of the massive and multilayered
rules that define what it is to be “legally married.”417
DOMA’s exclusively federal scope also deflates Windsor’s visceral
language about personal humiliation, because the “daily lives” of
“families in their community” have always been built upon thick webs
of state-law rules and extralegal society.418 Marriage—putting aside its
significance for personal commitment and love—concerns one’s
neighbors, relatives, local community, and state-law regulations much
more than it turns on federal cemeteries and the estate tax.419
The Court’s references to federalism and choice-of-law-federalism
are similarly unsound. In the realm of federal statutory law, Congress
has no constitutional obligation to accept state-law definitions of
marriage. This includes immigration, social security, any federal-law
context, or indeed every federal-law context. It makes no constitutional
difference that DOMA implemented federal-law definitions through a
sweeping definitional statute, rather than amending each particular
statute one at a time. So long as Congress had federal power to enact
the estate tax in the first place, the Constitution did not require federal
definitions of married beneficiaries to mirror state law. Absent some
415. See HARRY D. KRAUSE ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, COMMENTS AND
QUESTIONS 19 (5th ed. 2003).
416. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.
417. Id. at 2683, 2694–95.
418. Id. at 2694; see also id. at 2683.
419. See, e.g., Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1078–79 (9th Cir. 2012).
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connection to questions of individual rights, the Windsor Court’s
theories of federalism and choice of law had no “central relevance”
whatsoever.420
Turning to equal protection, the Windsor majority held that
DOMA was “motived by an improper animus or purpose,” but such
animus was presumed rather than proved.421 The Court stressed that
DOMA had excluded all marriages and spouses involving same-sex
couples from federal statutory law, yet DOMA also excluded all
marriages and spouses involving trios, quartets, or nonhuman
participants. What the Court avoided explaining is why the exclusion of
same-sex couples was constitutionally “improper” and therefore
different from other statutory exclusions.422 Windsor was thus a great
victory for LGBT couples, but the Court’s opinion said almost nothing
about such people’s constitutional status or characteristics.
As a matter of longstanding doctrine, “heightened scrutiny” is the
constitutional mechanism for courts in both liberty and equality cases
to demand substantial justifications for governmental regulations.423
The Court made no effort in Windsor to explain or even identify the
need to apply heightened scrutiny. Yet if the Court applied “rational
basis scrutiny” by default, it is difficult to understand why DOMA
would be invalid when so many other policies that are based—at least
in part—on personal beliefs or animus are routinely upheld in other
contexts.424

420. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692, 2695.
421. Id. at 2693; see also id. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2718 (Alito, J.,
dissenting); id. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
422. Windsor was not the Court’s first ruling based on unsubstantiated findings of
“animus.” See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring
in the judgment) (collecting cases).
423. See Green, supra note 413, at 439–40, 476–77. The historical roots of tiered
scrutiny can be indirectly traced to the two-track approach of Carolene Products, 304 U.S.
144, 152–53 n.4 (1938), or even to Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873)
(“We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination
against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within
the purview of [the Equal Protection Clause]. It is so clearly a provision for that race and
that emergency, that a strong case would be necessary for its application to any other.”).
424. E.g., N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (arguable public animus
against methadone users); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (arguable
optometric animus against competing opticians); Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 144
(arguable animus of dairy farmers against producers of filled milk). For other peculiar
applications of rational basis that are based upon notions of unconstitutional “animus,”
see sources cited supra note 421 and accompanying text.
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2. Originalism: Implied and Understood Meanings
To repeat what is obvious, I would not propose to criticize
Windsor simply for the sake of doing so. The opinion has textual
problems, but that is ordinary for a high court that hears only the
nation’s hardest cases. It is the combination of Windsor’s textual flaws
and precedential importance that justifies using interpretive methods
and materials outside the opinion itself. The difficulty of specifying
precedential meaning and the cultural need to do so are what define
iconic cases to justify interpretive techniques beyond textualism.425
Understanding Windsor’s ambiguities is important not only because
that decision is a leading precedent on LGBT equality and “animus,”
but also because Windsor is a uniquely significant episode for
understanding Obergefell. Accordingly, this subsection will examine
Windsor’s original history, including evidence from lawyers and judges
to identify the decision’s “implied meaning,” and evidence from
contemporary observers to explain its “understood meaning.”
a.

Lawyers

Windsor’s case reached the Supreme Court as a culmination of
twenty years of gay-rights litigation. The DOMA statute was a reaction
to a Hawaiian state-court decision protecting same-sex couples, and the
United States Supreme Court had also moved toward protecting sexual
orientation and sexual relationships.426 Same-sex marriage was a fierce
political battleground, and Windsor seemed like a case that, alongside
Hollingsworth v. Perry,427 would finally resolve matters. As a matter of
litigative context, such expectations and resources make Windsor’s
textual shortcomings even more interesting.
Edie Windsor’s case was distinctively potent because her
biography embodied personal sacrifice and upper-class respectability.428
Her legal team included a prestigious New York firm as well as the
ACLU, and the case even drew support from the federal government,
her ostensible adversary.429 Windsor’s companion case, Hollingsworth,
directly challenged whether a state could exclude same-sex couples
425. See supra notes 7, 10 and accompanying text (discussing what qualifies cases as
“iconic”).
426. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574–78; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636–37 (1996);
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 69–70 (Haw. 1993).
427. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
428. Ariel Levy, Profiles: The Perfect Wife, NEW YORKER, Sept. 30, 2013, at 54–55.
429. Brief for the United States on the Merits Question at 12–14, United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12–307).
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from its legal definition of marriage.430 Hollingsworth had its own
sympathetic plaintiffs, its own extraordinary lawyers, and its own flock
of amicus briefs.431 Against this background, it is hard to construct any
circumstances that could have more forcefully presented the legal
questions surrounding same-sex marriage than Windsor and
Hollingsworth.
Lawyers in the two cases addressed every legal and factual issue
imaginable. Doctrinal questions such as the meaning of Lawrence and
Romer, the applicable tier of scrutiny, and analogies to Brown and
Loving v. Virginia; sociological claims about interrelationships among
marriage and sex and childrearing; cultural issues of how marriage laws
could affect perceptions of the institution; the social status of gays,
lesbians, and their children; structural concerns over the role of
constitutional adjudication in a democracy; all of these and more were
exhaustively briefed with remarkable skill.432
Most importantly, Windsor and Hollingsworth offered a
distinctively wide range of possible outcomes. At its preference, the
Court could have upheld or invalidated DOMA and/or California’s
marriage law, and it could have done so through opinions of any
conceivable breadth or narrowness. In the case that became
Hollingsworth, the Ninth Circuit ruled on grounds that invalidated only
California’s same-sex marriage ban—a so-called “one-state solution.”433
The United States argued that California and seven other states had
violated equal protection by granting substantive benefits to gay and
lesbian couples but denying nominal marital status—this was an “eightstate solution.”434 Or the Court could have applied heightened
constitutional scrutiny to invalidate all state barriers against same-sex
marriage—a “fifty-state solution.”

430. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2661.
431. Richard Socarides, The Biggest Stakes in the Supreme Court Marriage Cases, NEW
YORKER (June 24, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-biggest-stakesin-the-supreme-court-marriage-cases [http://perma.cc/58K9-VFKF]; Margaret Talbot, A
Risky Proposal: Is It Too Soon To Petition the Supreme Court on Gay Marriage, NEW
YORKER, Jan. 18, 2010, at 40–51.
432. E.g., Brief of Petitioners at 2–3, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013)
(No. 12-144); Brief for Respondents at 1–2, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013)
(No. 12–144); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1–
2, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144).
433. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub
nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
434. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note
432, at 10–11.
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Windsor was discussed by lawyers and the general public as if it
would be a landmark case, yet the Court studiously avoided every
constitutional issue concerning state marriage laws. Windsor explicitly
declined to address state definitions of marriage,435 and Hollingsworth
ruled five to four that the litigants lacked standing to pursue their
appeal.436 In both decisions, the Court said nothing about state laws
that excluded same-sex marriage, and Kennedy’s Hollingsworth dissent
maintained that same silence.437 From an originalist perspective,
Windsor and Hollingsworth were cases of immense force that somehow
managed to shrink on their day of judgment. The interpretive gap
between Windsor’s potential and its textual reality made the case
controversial and also useful as a focal point for constitutional
debate.438
b.

Judges

No one can analyze Windsor’s textual ambiguities without
considering the opinion’s author, Justice Kennedy. Kennedy may not
be a grand figure like Story or Brandeis—hardly anyone is—but he has
written every Court decision addressing gay rights for twenty years,
and his personal connection to such cases is hard to overstate.439 Each
opinion has taken small steps toward protecting lesbians and gays,
while also refusing to discuss the full implications of doing so. For
example, Kennedy’s Romer opinion about sexual-orientation
discrimination did not consider the constitutionality of banning
sodomy.440 His opinion in Lawrence protected sodomy, but refused to
address same-sex marriage.441 In Windsor, Kennedy led the Court even
closer to protecting same-sex marriage across the board, yet once again
his opinion stopped short.442
Although the fact is often ignored, Kennedy publicly addressed
gay rights long before he wrote opinions for the Supreme Court. Just
435. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (“This opinion and its
holding are confined to [state-recognized] lawful marriages.”).
436. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2652–53.
437. Id.; id. at 2668 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682.
438. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 409.
439. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2675; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see also Adam Liptak, Surprising Friend of the Gay Rights
Movement in the Highest of Places, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2013, at A10 (“Justice Kennedy
has emerged as the most important judicial champion of gay rights in the nation’s
history . . . .”).
440. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
441. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
442. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696.
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three weeks after Bowers v. Hardwick was decided in 1986,443 thenJudge Kennedy spoke to the Canadian Institute for Advanced Legal
Studies in an address entitled “Unenumerated Rights and the Dictates
of Judicial Restraint.”444 The speech was featured in Kennedy’s
confirmation hearings after the Senate rejected arch-conservative
Robert Bork,445 and it yields three overlapping ways that Kennedy’s
biography can illuminate Windsor’s ambiguities.
A first approach concerns Kennedy’s image as a cosmopolitan
advocate for human rights.446 His 1986 speech paid close attention to
the Canadian Constitution and case law from the European Court of
Human Rights. The European court had protected same-sex sodomy
based on rights concerning “respect for . . . private and family life.”447
Kennedy would much later cite this decision to justify a similar result
under the United States Constitution.448 Yet even in 1986, Kennedy
argued that basic constitutional issues were similar in Europe and the
United States, despite the absence of any explicit language in the
American Constitution about “privacy,” “family life,” or “private”
rights.449
Kennedy’s speech described Bowers with an ambivalence that
referenced political philosophy: “Many argue that a just society grants
a right to engage in homosexual conduct. If that view is accepted, the
Bowers decision in effect says that the State of Georgia has the right to
make a wrong decision. . . .”450 During confirmation hearings, Kennedy
explained his constitutional approach in explicitly multinational terms:
The framers had an idea which is central to Western
thought. . . . It is central to the idea of the rule of law. That is
443. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
444. Judge Anthony M. Kennedy, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, The
Stanford Lectures Address to the Canadian Institute for Advanced Legal Studies,
Unenumerated Rights and the Dictates of Judicial Restraint (July 24, 1986).
445. Confirmation Hearings on the Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy To Be
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 100th Cong. 41, 88 (1987) [hereinafter Confirmation Hearings].
446. See Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy’s Passion for Foreign
Law Could Change the Supreme Court, NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42.
447. See Kennedy, supra note 444, at 7 (discussing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45
Eur. Ct. H.R. 24 (1981) (quoting Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, ¶ 1, amended by Protocol No. 11, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221)).
448. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (citing Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. at
24).
449. Kennedy, supra note 444, at 9–14.
450. Id. at 13.
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there is a zone of liberty, a zone of protection . . . where the
individual can tell the Government: Beyond this line you may
not go.451
As Kennedy had written in 1986: “I am particularly gratified to
meet . . . my Canadian colleagues. We share the commitment to a rule
of law; and it is a great privilege for me to further my understanding of
the constitutional process by sharing in these discussions.”452
Alongside other biographical evidence about foreign and
international law,453 Kennedy’s discussion of gay rights in 1986 suggests
that European and Commonwealth law provided important context for
all of the Supreme Court precedents that led up to Windsor. In turn, as
future debates over same-sex marriage expand to encompass different
forms of sexual liberty and LGBT equality, Windsor’s doctrinal
meaning may be illuminated by analyzing comparable developments in
the European and Anglophone world.
A second approach to Kennedy’s biography concerns his
generational link to the legal-process movement. As a Harvard student
from 1958 to 1961, Kennedy learned law at the epicenter of this school
of thought.454 Legal-process jurisprudence—as compared with legal
realism or Warren-era rights protection—focused on achieving
institutional legitimacy through the division of labor among various
levels of government and different kinds of legal actors.455
Such themes were apparent in Kennedy’s speech. As he
elaborated the “dictates” of judicial restraint, Kennedy explained that
“the judicial method” requires judges “to decide specific cases, from
which general propositions later evolve.”456 Judges need not resort to
unenumerated rights as “a necessary antidote to the potential excesses
of a democratic majority.”457 “[T]he political branches themselves” are
more important, incorporating “checks of bicameralism, the executive
veto, and the division of sovereignty between state and federal
451. Confirmation Hearings, supra note 445, at 86 (emphasis added).
452. Kennedy, supra note 444, at 1.
453. E.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005) (Kennedy, J.) (noting “the
overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty”).
454. See, e.g., HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (1958); HERBERT WECHSLER &
HENRY M. HART, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1st ed. 1953).
455. For later applications of legal-process ideas, see ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16
(1962), and JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 4–5 (1980).
456. Kennedy, supra note 444, at 5.
457. Id. at 2.
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government.”458 Time and again, Kennedy stressed courts’ limited role
in pursuing social ideals and assuring social benefits. He claimed that
activist judicial conduct undermines courts’ own legitimacy while it also
“erodes the initiative” of responsible political actors.459 With respect to
Bowers and sodomy, Kennedy therefore concluded that:
Georgia’s right to be wrong in matters not specifically controlled
by the Constitution is a necessary component of its own political
processes. Its citizens have the political liberty to . . . make
decisions that might be wrong in the ideal sense, subject to
correction in the ordinary political process.460
This notion of compromising substantive justice in favor of systemic
credibility was a hallmark of that conservative generation of legalprocess scholarship.461
A similar focus on institutional arrangements led one modern
commentator to call Windsor an act of “mad genius,” and perhaps from
a legal-process perspective it was.462 Windsor produced the narrowest
judicial opinion possible and yielded a bare minimum of constitutional
equality. The Court granted flexibility to political branches, while
simultaneously invoking structural ideas of decentralized federalism to
define who counts as “legally married.” Without clarifying the
substantive law of same-sex marriage, Windsor took its constitutional
stand on the mild institutional thesis that states should decide marriage
issues, not Congress. The Windsor opinion thus echoed Kennedy’s
earlier belief that “[t]he judicial method . . . is the surest safeguard of
liberty,”463 as opposed to expansive recognition of unenumerated
rights. From this point of view, Windsor might support judicial reliance
on notions of constitutional structure—however hazy or ill-conceived—
if courts could thereby dodge or delay adjudicating new forms of
individual rights.
A third approach to Kennedy’s biography would cast him as the
muddled, center-right compromiser that one might expect from an
immediately post-Bork judicial nominee. Perhaps there is no deep
principle undergirding Windsor’s half-steps—neither international legal
opinion nor legal-process jurisprudence. Perhaps Windsor’s paragraph
458.
459.
460.
461.

Id.
Id. at 20–22.
Id. at 14.
See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
462. Gerken, supra note 409, at 587.
463. Kennedy, supra note 444, at 4–5 (emphasis added).
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about United States history could be viewed as its author’s closeted
autobiography:
[U]ntil recent years, many citizens had not even considered the
possibility that two persons of the same sex might aspire to
occupy the same status and dignity as that of a man and woman
in lawful marriage. . . . [M]arriage between a man and a woman
no doubt had been thought of by most people as essential to the
very definition of that term and to its role and function
throughout the history of civilization. That belief, for many who
long have held it, became even more urgent, more cherished
when challenged. For others, however, came the beginnings of a
new perspective, a new insight.464
In this sense, Kennedy’s stepwise rulings about LGBT rights might
approximate what the author believed at the time—an “evolution” in
hindsight, but something more chaotic in actual lived experience.
Confusion and paradox were also themes of Kennedy’s 1986
speech. In a partial defense of unenumerated rights, Kennedy insisted
that “[i]t forts constitutional dynamics, and it defies the pre[ce]dential
method to announce in a categorical way that there can be no
unenumerated rights.”465 Yet he immediately replied that “it is
imprudent as well to say that there are broadly defined categories of
unenumerated rights, and to say so apart from the factual premises of
decided cases.”466 True to his word, Kennedy’s speech offered no
general criteria or standards for determining when or why
unenumerated rights might comport with his “dictates of judicial
restraint.”467
Kennedy was similarly vague in his confirmation hearings. “[T]he
great question in constitutional law is [sic]: One, where is that line [of
constitutional liberty] drawn? And, two, what are the principles that
you refer to in drawing that line.”468 Without providing any reassurance
or clarification, Kennedy reiterated how courts proceed in defining
constitutional liberty: “There is a line. It is wavering; it is amorphous; it
is uncertain. But this is the judicial function.”469 In 1986, Kennedy
almost celebrated constitutional unpredictability: “I am unconcerned
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013).
Kennedy, supra note 444, at 5.
Id.
Id.
Confirmation Hearings, supra note 445, at 86.
Id.; see also Stuart Taylor, Jr., Speeches Offering Insight into Judge Kennedy, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 1987, at A10.
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that there is a zone of ambiguity, even one of tension, between the
courts and the political branches . . . . Uncertainty is itself a restraint on
the political branch, causing it to act with deliberation and with
conscious reference to constitutional principles.”470
Some modern commentators might characterize this sort of
“incomplete theorization” as desirable, while others might
acknowledge without praise a politically centrist Justice who led a
politically centrist Court toward coherence with politically centrist
public opinion.471 Irrespective of normative judgments, this last
interpretation of Kennedy’s biographical context suggests that Windsor
was ambivalent in its reasoning and implications because its author was
as well. And the opinion might be narrowly and clumsily drawn
because, for better and for worse, such stumbling incrementalism had
become Kennedy’s thirty-year habit in the dynamic field of same-sex
rights.
c.

Contemporary Reactions

Contemporary observers’ reactions are a third set of originalist
material that describes Windsor’s understood meaning when it was
decided. And although the recent sources discussed herein may feel
more like “news” than “history,” their role concerning precedential
interpretation is quite similar to what we have seen with Swift and Erie.
Windsor was a widely anticipated, front-page story with consistent
coverage across print and electronic venues as a landmark decision that
would have an immediate and huge impact.472 Journalists compared the
decision to the nation’s first legislation protecting sexual orientation, to
President Obama’s decision to support same-sex marriage, and even to

470. Kennedy, supra note 444, at 22.
471. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2010); MICHAEL J.
KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2012); Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized
Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995).
472. Gerard Bradley, Great Expectations, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2013), http://www
.scotusblog.com/2013/06/great-expectations/ [http://perma.cc/3B8W-TSVW];
see,
e.g.,
Adam Nagourney, Court Follows Nation’s Lead, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2013, at A1; Cheryl
Wetzstein, Supreme Court Hands Double Win to Gay-Marriage Backers, WASH. TIMES,
June 26, 2013, at 1; Dana Beyer, Musings on Windsor and Perry and a Better Day for
America, HUFFPOST GAY VOICES (June 28, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/danabeyer/musings-on-windsor-and-pe_b_3516169.html [http://perma.cc/Z24U-NCC5]; Judith
E. Schaeffer, Justices Uphold Constitution’s Promise for Me, USA TODAY, June 26, 2013.
But see Editorial, A Supreme Bungle: The Supreme Court Divorces America from Its
Cherished Values, WASH. TIMES, June 27, 2013.
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Brown v. Board of Education.473 After the Court’s ruling, the national
press covered public celebrations and supportive demonstrations,
which yielded dramatic visual images and personal stories.474
Even Hollingsworth’s decision to deny standing was viewed as a
victory for marriage equality because it left intact a district court
judgment favoring same-sex marriage.475 California officials proclaimed
that judgment to be legally effective across the state, thereby delivering
a massive political victory for same-sex equality in America’s most
populous state.476
Legal commentators were slightly more conflicted about Windsor,
but substantive criticism was modest.477 Almost all academics viewed
Windsor as a way station toward full protection for same-sex
marriage,478 and almost no one challenged that result as incorrect.
Instead, the prevailing intellectual questions were how and whether to
enlist Windsor’s equality and liberty arguments in other constitutional
battles over race, gender, and sexual orientation.479
To assess Windsor’s original meaning, one must remember that
the Court’s judicial text did not appear in a vacuum. Public and legal
commentators had struggled for months to understand what the
unannounced decision might mean.480 Kennedy wrote Windsor against
that discursive backdrop, and like every other Justice, he was also an
occupant of the same political and cultural world that would receive
and interpret the Court’s ultimate decision.
The complex relationship between authors and audiences is
familiar from “ordinary meaning originalism” in constitutional

473. Bradley, supra note 472.
474. E.g., Ryan J. Reilly & Sabrina Siddiqui, Supreme Court DOMA Decision Rules
Federal Same-Sex Marriage Ban Unconstitutional, HUFFPOST POL. (June 26, 2013, 3:03
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/26/supreme-court-doma-decision_n_3454811
.html [http://perma.cc/M6NN-6CKM].
475. Dylan Matthews, The Supreme Court Ended Proposition 8. Here’s What It Means,
WASH. POST (June 26, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2013/06
/26/the-supreme-court-ended-proposition-8-heres-what-that-means/
[http://perma.cc/GJ3B-JU8C].
476. Maura Dolan, Couples Eager To Wed Will Need To Wait, L.A. TIMES, June 27,
2013, at A1.
477. E.g., Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial
Equality, 127 HARV. L. REV. 127 (2013); Reva B. Siegel, Foreword: Equality Divided, 127
HARV. L. REV. 1 (2013); Yoshino, supra note 11, at 3076.
478. E.g., Siegel, supra note 409, at 87.
479. See sources cited supra notes 28, 409, 477.
480. See sources cited supra note 390, 409, 472.
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analysis.481 Using similar methods in this context shows that the public,
press, and legal community immediately minimized Windsor’s technical
details and federalist limitations. The decision was viewed by the public
as a major step toward the now-inevitable conclusion that same-sex
marriage would be constitutionally protected. Given the breadth of
that reaction, and the corresponding power of national cultural politics,
the Court could not have been at all surprised.
3. Living Precedentialism: Developmental Meaning
But what was unexpected was Windsor’s broad and rapid
application in state and federal courts. During the two years following
Windsor, almost one hundred state and federal cases about same-sex
marriage were filed in thirty-two states, and nearly every judicial
decision ruled in favor of protecting same-sex marriage.482 Even though
Windsor’s text insisted that it did not decide anything with respect to
state laws, and even as commentators braced themselves for the “next
case” that would finish the job, state and federal judges across the
country held that further instructions were unnecessary.483 They
believed that the Windsor Court had done what it did not dare to say,
announcing and affirming constitutional principles that implied full
legal protection for same-sex marriages notwithstanding federal- or
state-law restrictions.
No federal court had protected same-sex marriage before the
litigation in Windsor and Hollingsworth began, but a great many did so
afterwards—citing Windsor at every turn.484 One commentator has
written that “[t]he pace of change on same-sex marriage, in both
popular opinion and in the courts, has no parallel in the nation’s

481. Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 101, 105–06 (2001); see also Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 599, 608–10 (2004).
482. Erik Eckholm, Court Upholds Marriage Bans in Four States, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7,
2014, at A1; Adam Liptak, In Same-Sex Marriage Calculation, Justices May See Golden
Ratio, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2014, at A16; Campbell Robertson, Federal Judge, Bucking
Trend, Affirms Ban on Same-Sex Marriages in Louisiana, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2014, at
A12; see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608–11 (2015) (listing cases before
and after Windsor that addressed the constitutionality of same-sex marriage).
483. Compare United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013), with sources cited
supra note 482.
484. A Westlaw search for federal cases citing Windsor (“133 S. Ct. 2675”) returned
over 140 results when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Obergefell on January 16,
2015.
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history.”485 Windsor’s developmental history shows that the decision
was both a product of that shift and a major catalyst reinforcing it. As
once-hesitant judges surged forward to protect marriage equality,
exceeding observers’ expectations, it was obvious to everyone that
Windsor—just like other iconic cases—meant a great deal more than
one could read from the Court’s slip opinions.
For a brief time, Windsor was an iconic case not so different from
Swift or Erie. The Court had explicitly resolved one set of crucial
questions, but its tantalizing and dubious reasoning led lawyers to
wonder whether the decision signified more than the opinion
explained. This is how Windsor became a focal point for constitutional
debate: as a few interpreters read the case narrowly by relying on its
text, and other interpreters read it broadly based on the decision’s
implied and understood meanings.486
B.

Obergefell v. Hodges: Iconic et Cetera

After two short years, the Court wrote Windsor’s developmental
meaning into Obergefell’s text. Not only did the Court endorse broad
constitutional protection for same-sex marriage, as Windsor had
implied, but the Court also cited as support lower-court decisions that
had reached that same conclusion by interpreting Windsor
nontextually.487 The rapid feedback loop—from the Windsor decision,
to other courts’ expansion of Windsor, and then to Obergefell’s
adoption of that expansion—is distinctive if not unique in the Supreme
Court’s history.488 It is also an example of how an iconic precedent’s
meaning can diverge from the opinion’s text.
Despite Windsor’s doctrinal and cultural importance during its
moment, Obergefell suggests that the decision may not remain iconic
for long. Such reformulation has occurred with many other leading
Supreme Court cases: Brown absorbed the memory of McLaurin v.

485. Liptak, Supreme Court To Decide Marriage Rights for Gay Couples, supra note
390, at A1.
486. See sources cited supra note 390.
487. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608–11.
488. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 877, 905–06 (1996) (noting that the “most important changes to the Constitution”
have often occurred through lines of opinions over extended periods of time); cf. JACK
BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES: THE DRAMATIC STORY OF THE SOUTHERN JUDGES OF THE
FIFTH CIRCUIT WHO TRANSLATED THE SUPREME COURT’S BROWN DECISION INTO A
REVOLUTION FOR EQUALITY (1981); ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND
CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866–76 (2005).
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Oklahoma in the context of segregation,489 Loving overwhelmed
McLaughlin v. Florida with respect to miscegenation,490 and now
Windsor may join Romer and even Lawrence as transitional cases on
the doctrinal path to Obergefell.491 Windsor remains the Court’s most
important holding about “animus,” and it may yet imply broad
protections based on sexual orientation.492 But the decision’s most
enduring significance may be its role in producing and supporting
Obergefell.
This Section proposes that even Obergefell’s decision will not end
the doctrinal story. On the contrary, the interpretive patterns discussed
in this Article will recur yet again. Lawyers, judges, and commentators
will seek to interpret the newly iconic decision in Obergefell, which
resolved doctrinal debates over same-sex marriage, but which raised
unanswered questions concerning LGBT discrimination, polygamy,
and other forms of constitutional liberty. Where the Court’s Obergefell
opinion is textually vague or unsatisfactory—as measured against
whatever subsequent interpreters wish to learn from it—the decision’s
implied meaning and understood meaning will be identified using
historical resources such as litigative context, judicial biography, and
contemporary reactions. Over time, struggles about Obergefell’s
implications will yield developmental meanings that differ from what
the case meant at the start. Throughout this process, the decision’s
precedential force will attract strong attention and debate, much like
Erie, Marbury, Brown, Windsor, and so many other precedential icons.
Although many historical materials surrounding Obergefell have not
yet emerged, one can already see that the same interpretive patterns
will structure legal struggles over what that decision means.
1. Textualism: Declared Meaning
Jim Obergefell was just one of thirty plaintiffs whose suits were
decided together by the Supreme Court, but his case presented
especially notable facts.493 Obergefell’s partner, John Arthur, was in
hospice care suffering from ALS when the Court decided Windsor v.
489. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 491–92 (1954) (citing McLaurin v. St.
Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 638 (1950)).
490. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967) (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184, 188 (1964)).
491. See generally Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584.
492. For other examples in the Court’s “animus” line of precedent, see Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996), and the cases cited in Justice O’Connor’s opinion in
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
493. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593–95.
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United States. That same day, Obergefell leaned over and proposed to
Arthur with a hug and a kiss.494 Because same-sex marriage was illegal
in Ohio, and because Arthur’s mobility was so limited, the couple’s
wedding occurred in a medical transport plane as it sat on the tarmac in
Maryland.495 Three months later, Arthur died in Ohio, and Obergefell
filed suit so that the death certificate would reflect his status as a
surviving spouse.496 Obergefell challenged Ohio’s failure to recognize
his out-of-state marriage on due process and equal protection grounds,
while plaintiffs in other cases constitutionally challenged governmental
refusals to marry them in their own home states.497
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of all the Obergefell plaintiffs
by a vote of five to four, and as with Windsor, Justice Kennedy wrote
the majority opinion.498 Entirely absent were Windsor’s tortured
arguments about federalism and conflicts of law.499 Instead, Obergefell
exclusively concerned the relationship between constitutional liberty
and equality.
The Court held that marriage is part of the liberty “to define and
express”
one’s
“identity.”500
Acknowledging
a
historical
“understanding that marriage is a union between two persons of the
opposite sex,” the Court based its conclusion on four enumerated
reasons that “marriage is fundamental.”501 First, as a matter of
individual autonomy, the choice to marry—like “contraception, family
relationships, procreation, and childrearing”—“shape[s] an individual’s
destiny” and “self-definition,” while also leading to “other freedoms,
such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality.”502 Second, as a bilateral
commitment, the right to marriage “dignifies couples” in their mutual
loyalty, while the practical “companionship and understanding” of

494. See Stav Ziv, How Jim Obergefell’s Fight for His Dying Spouse Legalized Gay
Marriage in America, NEWSWEEK (June 26, 2015, 12:57 PM), http://www.newsweek
.com/jim-obergefell-man-behind-supreme-courts-same-sex-marriage-decision347314 [http://perma.cc/TA9X-4ZUF].
495. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2595.
496. Id.
497. E.g., Brief for Petitioners at 12, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No.
14–556).
498. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593, 2608.
499. See supra notes 410–414 and accompanying text (discussing such arguments in
Windsor).
500. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593; see id. at 2597 (“[T]hese liberties extend to certain
personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices
that define personal identity and beliefs.”).
501. Id. at 2599.
502. Id.
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married life “responds to the universal fear that a lonely person might
call out only to find no one there.”503
Third, the Court described marriage as crucial for bearing and
rearing children. In addition to providing “permanency and stability,”
the Court characterized marriage as a symbol to children about “the
integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other
families in their community.”504 Fourth, the Court celebrated marriage
as “a keystone of our social order” and “a building block of our
national community.”505 This is why marriage as a “public institution”
entails significant advantages under federal law and a massive number
of state-law benefits.506
Having defined “the fundamental right to marry” based on these
function-oriented principles, the Court held that excluding same-sex
marriage “demeans or stigmatizes” individuals, “disparage[s] their
choices and diminish[es] their personhood,” and therefore denies their
constitutional liberty.507 After all, the Court declared, the petitioners’
“immutable nature dictates that same-sex marriage is their only real
path to this profound commitment.”508
Alongside the Court’s four points about constitutional liberty,
Obergefell also noted the inequality of treating same-sex couples

503. Id. at 2600.
504. Id. (quoting Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694–95 (2013)).
505. Id. at 2601.
506. Id. (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)) (“The States have
contributed to the fundamental character of the marriage right by placing that institution
at the center of so many facets of the legal and social order.”). There is some irony in the
Windsor Court citing Maynard because that case upheld a legislatively imposed divorce,
thereby confirming that “[m]arriage . . . has always been subject to the control of the
legislature.” Maynard, 125 U.S. at 205.
507. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
508. Id. at 2594; see also id. at 2596 (“Only in more recent years have psychiatrists and
others recognized that sexual orientation is both a normal expression of human sexuality
and immutable.” (citing Brief for American Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 7–17, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14–
556))). Notably, the cited brief never actually used the word “immutable” to describe
sexual orientation. See Brief for American Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 7 (“Sexual orientation refers to an enduring disposition to
experience sexual, affectional, or romantic attractions to men, women, or both.”).
Compare Brief for Petitioners at 45, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14–
556) (“[T]he broad medical and scientific consensus is that sexual orientation ‘is an
immutable . . . characteristic rather than a choice.’ ” (quoting Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d
648, 657 (7th Cir. 2014))), with id. at 45 n.9 (“There is no requirement that a characteristic
be immutable in a literal sense in order to trigger heightened scrutiny.”), and id. at 46
(“[O]ne should not be forced to choose between one’s sexual orientation and one’s rights
as an individual—even if such a choice could be made.”).
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differently from opposite-sex couples.509 Thus, the Court concluded
that prohibiting same-sex marriage violates both due process and equal
protection:
Rights implicit in liberty and . . . equal protection . . . are not
always co-extensive, . . . [yet] each may be instructive as to the
meaning and reach of the other. . . . This interrelation of the two
principles furthers our understanding of what freedom is and
must become.510
Obergefell produced a much broader result than Windsor, and the
Court addressed issues of liberty and equality more directly than it had
done two years earlier. Yet Windsor and Obergefell resemble other
iconic cases insofar as the Court’s basic holdings—invalidating first
DOMA and then state same-sex marriage bans—raised collateral
doctrinal questions that are both important and open to interpretation.
In Obergefell, for example, the Court double-fortified its
constitutional analysis by simultaneously relying on liberty and
equality. But the Court did not explain how far either of those
principles should extend. Instead, the Court augmented doctrinal
uncertainty by emphasizing that attitudes, institutions, and
constitutional decisions can sometimes change dramatically.511 The
509. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (“This is true for all persons, whatever their sexual
orientation. There is dignity in the bond between two men or two women who seek to
marry and in their autonomy to make such profound choices.” (citation omitted)); id. at
2600 (“[S]ame-sex couples have the same right as opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimate
association.”); id. at 2601–02 (“There is no difference between same- and opposite-sex
couples with respect to this principle. Yet by virtue of their exclusion from that institution,
same-sex couples are denied the constellation of benefits that the States have linked to
marriage . . . . [E]xclusion from that status has the effect of teaching that gays and lesbians
are unequal in important respects. It demeans gays and lesbians for the State to lock them
out of a central institution of the Nation’s society.”); see also id. at 2600 (“Excluding samesex couples from marriage thus conflicts with a central premise of the right to marry.
Without the recognition, stability, and predictability [that] marriage offers, their children
suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser.”).
510. Id. at 2602–03 (citations omitted).
511. E.g., id. at 2595 (“[D]evelopments in the institution of marriage over the past
centuries . . . . worked deep transformations in its structure affecting aspects of marriage
long viewed by many as essential.”); id. at 2596 (“[N]ew dimensions of freedom become
apparent to new generations . . . .”); id. (describing twentieth-century experiences with the
rights of gays and lesbians as including “a quite extensive discussion . . . in both
governmental and private sectors and . . . a shift in public attitudes toward greater
tolerance”); id. at 2598 (explaining that, with respect to much constitutional law, “[h]istory
and tradition guide and discipline this inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries. That
method respects our history and learns from it without allowing the past alone to rule the
present. The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times”); id.
(“The Court, like many institutions, has made assumptions defined by the world and time
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Court specifically denied, “both with respect to the right to marry and
the rights of gays and lesbians,” that rights should be “defined by who
exercised them in the past.”512 And after issuing that seemingly
antiprecedential proclamation, the Court gave little guidance about
what kinds of “new insights” or “understandings” might arise
concerning liberty or equality in future cases.513
The Court’s declared meaning in Obergefell permits several
textual interpretations. Perhaps the case should apply to many forms of
LGBT rights, thereby highlighting the Court’s references to sexual
orientation as “immutable.”514 Under that scenario, every stateimposed effort to “demean,” “stigmatize,” “harm,” or otherwise
discriminate based on sexual orientation might be presumptively
unconstitutional.515 This could be called a “heightened scrutiny”
interpretation of Obergefell, although the Court did not use that
technical term.516
Or maybe Obergefell is a case just about marriage, with no
immediate implications for LGBT equality in housing, employment,
public accommodations, or elsewhere. This approach would emphasize
the Court’s claim that marriage has “transcendent” if not “unique”
importance.517 This “marriage-only” interpretation of Obergefell might
plausibly apply to opposite-sex polygamy under the Constitution
before it would invalidate other kinds of discrimination against gays
and lesbians.
A third possibility is that Obergefell represents an expansion of
liberty in widely various contexts. Marriage is certainly not the only
individual decision that affects one’s “autonomy,” “dignity,” “identity,”
or “self-definition.”518 And Obergefell’s dismissive approach to
Washington v. Glucksberg may be suggestive.519 The Court in
Glucksberg had rejected some plaintiffs’ claimed right to assisted
suicide, thereby requiring that any kind of protected constitutional

of which it is a part.” (citation omitted)); id. at 2603 (“[N]ew insights and societal
understandings can reveal unjustified inequality.”).
512. Id. at 2602.
513. Id. at 2596.
514. Id.
515. Id. at 2601–02.
516. Cf. supra notes 423–424 and accompanying text (describing the absence of
heightened-scrutiny review in Windsor).
517. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593–94.
518. Id. at 2598–99 (quoting Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954–
55 (Mass. 2003)).
519. Id. at 2602.
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liberty must incorporate a conservative and “careful description” of
fundamental rights.520 In Obergefell, the Court explained, without at all
endorsing Glucksberg, that whereas the Court’s earlier approach “may
have been appropriate for the asserted right there involved (physicianassisted suicide), it is inconsistent with the approach this Court has
used in discussing other fundamental rights, including marriage and
intimacy.”521
2. Originalism: Implied and Understood Meanings
As a textual matter, the Court’s Obergefell opinion is chock-full of
newly articulated principles, broadly construed precedents, and
history’s transformation by new ideas. The practical importance of the
Court’s protection for same-sex marriage is obvious, but the decision’s
precedential meaning remains unclear. From the opinion’s text,
Obergefell might be a pivotal case for LGBT equality, the fundamental
right to marry, constitutional liberty including assisted suicide, or all of
these at once; it also could be a case that protects same-sex marriage
and nothing more.
Comparable to other iconic precedents, Obergefell’s text alone
cannot answer important questions about the decision’s meaning. We
shall see that lawyers and judges in the aftermath are already arguing
over whether Obergefell—like Windsor—means more than it said. And
important evidence for such debates will encompass implied and
understood meanings from the decision’s originalist context.
a.

Lawyers

There are many superficial similarities between Windsor and
Obergefell, including, in both contexts, similar constitutional arguments
and a concentration of legal resources. The constitutional landscape
entirely changed, however, in the years between the two lawsuits.
When the plaintiffs originally sued in Windsor and Hollingsworth,
many observers thought that seeking constitutional protection for
same-sex marriage would result in a dangerous appeal to a socially
conservative Court.522 By comparison, the plaintiffs and lawyers in
Obergefell were engaged in something closer to a mop-up project.
520. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
521. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (emphasis added).
522. See ROBERTA KAPLAN WITH LISA DICKEY, THEN COMES MARRIAGE: UNITED
STATES V. WINDSOR AND THE DEFEAT OF DOMA 117–18 (2015) (discussing concerns
within the LGBT community that litigation would set back the movement); Douglas
NeJaime, The View From Below: Public Interest Lawyering, Social Change, and
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Immediately in the summer of 2013, the cultural force of
Windsor’s victory and Hollingsworth’s semi-victory was so great that
even nonlawyers could feel the decisions’ influence.523 By the time the
Sixth Circuit denied the claims of Obergefell and other plaintiffs, their
lawyers were so confident of Supreme Court success that they did not
seek en banc review from the court of appeals.524 Such confidence also
helps explain why the Obergefell litigants—unlike those in Windsor—
were all committed to a “fifty-state solution,” whereas the cautious
lawyers who litigated Windsor also advocated “eight-state” and “onestate” solutions.525 Arguments that same-sex marriage represented “the
right side of history” were certainly prevalent in 2013,526 but two years
later, it seemed that such historical progress was fully ripe for
application in the Supreme Court.
Evidence of Obergefell’s implied meaning based on the litigating
lawyers’ conduct supports a narrow view of the decision’s textual
ambiguities: protecting same-sex marriage to be sure, but not
polygamy, general LGBT equality, or broad multicontextual liberty.
Adjudication, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 182, 191, 195 (2013) (discussing LGBT
groups who urged that Proposition 8 not be challenged in federal court for fear of what the
Supreme Court might do); Margaret Talbot, A Risky Proposal, NEW YORKER, Jan. 18,
2010, at 40 (quoting statement of William Eskridge) (“A question that so evenly but
intensely divides the country is not one that should be decided by the courts
nationwide . . . . It is just not something that this Supreme Court is going to deliver on at
this point.”); On The Media: Plaintiff Shopping (WNYC radio broadcast Oct. 9, 2015)
(quoting statement of Kris Perry, the named plaintiff in Hollingsworth) (“[W]e were semipanicked the entire time over not prevailing and being the posterchildren of a failed effort
that, you know, despite every effort being made to do a good job, not persuading a
judge.”).
523. E.g., supra note 494 and accompanying text.
524. See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2015). Appellate advocates
ordinarily seek justice for their clients in any tribunal, and conventional wisdom might
have viewed a petition for en banc review followed by a petition for certiorari as offering
two chances to win instead of just one. On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit did have five
judges appointed by a Democratic President, as compared with ten appointed by a
Republican President, including eight appointed by George W. Bush. See Judges of The
Court—Sixth Circuit, 772 F.3d, at X–XI (2015) (listing names, geographical locations, and
appointment dates of Sixth Circuit judges serving at the time); 2 ALMANAC OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY, at 6th Cir. i–126 (Susan Alexander ed., 2015) (profiling federal
judges sitting on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals).
525. Cf. supra notes 433–434 and accompanying text (discussing the different litigative
approach taken in Hollingsworth). The only potential fallback position in Obergefell
concerned the claim in Obergefell’s own case that, even if unwilling states were not
themselves required to recognize same-sex marriage, they at least must recognize samesex marriages that were properly solemnized in other states.
526. E.g., Michelle Boorstein & Annie Gowen, Scouting World Divided on
Reconsideration of Gay Ban, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2013, at A3; Opinion Shift on Gay
Marriage Hard for Justices To Ignore, LEGAL MONITOR WORLDWIDE, June 17, 2013.
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Thus, for example, no brief in Obergefell argued for protecting
polygamy or other currently illegal forms of marriage.527 No brief
argued for physician-assisted suicide, prostitution, or any other
expansive constitutional liberty.528 And although both sides understood
the potential impact of applying “intermediate scrutiny” to sexualorientation discrimination, the Court’s decision to avoid any form of
heightened scrutiny arguably proved that Obergefell itself did not
endorse that result.529
b.

Judges

Justice Kennedy’s Obergefell opinion—even more than his prior
judicial work—cemented his status as the Court’s dominant author of
LGBT rights. Since Bowers v. Hardwick, Kennedy has written four
majority opinions in such cases, one Justice wrote a single concurrence,
and no other Justice has written any opinion endorsing claims
regarding sexual orientation.530 Correspondingly, though one cannot
yet prove the fact, Kennedy’s opinions about LGBT rights will almost
certainly be the most memorable legacy from his long judicial career.
Extending this Article’s earlier biographical analysis to include
Obergefell yields even more insights than would have been possible two
years earlier.
To consider Kennedy’s four opinions concerning LGBT rights as
an aggregate embodiment of their author’s judicial approach reveals a
deeper pattern to supplement Obergefell’s textual vagueness. In 1996,
Kennedy wrote for the Court in Romer v. Evans, invalidating under
equal protection a statewide ban on antidiscrimination laws protecting
gays and lesbians.531 The Court did not determine whether statutes that
disadvantage gays and lesbians require heightened constitutional
scrutiny across the board. Instead, Kennedy wrote that the particular
state provision at stake was “inexplicable by anything but animus
527. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No.
14–556); Brief for Respondents, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14–
556).
528. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 527.
529. See id.; cf. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (declining even to mention constitutional
tiers of judicial scrutiny); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“When a law exhibits . . . a desire to harm a politically
unpopular group, we have applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike
down such laws under the Equal Protection Clause.”).
530. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584; United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013);
Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (majority opinion); id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
531. Romer, 517 U.S. at 620.
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toward the class it affects” and thus failed even rational basis review.532
A major question that remained was whether Romer’s equality ruling
could be reconciled with Bowers, which had upheld a state
“homosexual sodomy” ban against a constitutional challenge on liberty
grounds.533
In 2003, Kennedy’s majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas
answered that open question from Romer by holding that sodomy laws
targeting “Homosexual Conduct” violate constitutional liberty.534 The
Court did not, even as an alternative holding, apply Romer’s “animus”
principle under equal protection.535 Romer thus came to be known as a
limited, vague precedent about equal protection that later propelled
the Court toward broader doctrinal conclusions about on liberty.
Nevertheless, readers will note that even Kennedy’s Lawrence opinion
ended with a series of “I’ll Never” scenarios that the Court explicitly
refused to address—presumably because most of them were
categorically unprotected by the Constitution:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve
persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in
relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does
not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve
whether the government must give formal recognition [e.g.,
marriage] to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to
enter.536
The same equality-to-liberty pattern of Romer to Lawrence was
repeated, over a much faster timeframe, on the road from Windsor to
Obergefell. Windsor’s narrow invalidation of DOMA was almost
entirely based on equal protection, despite vague references to liberty
and constitutional federalism.537 Just like Romer’s equal protection
ruling, Kennedy’s Windsor opinion claimed that the challenged law was
“motived by an improper animus or purpose,” and the Court therefore
532. Id. at 631–32.
533. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
534. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564 (majority opinion).
535. Id. at 574–75 (describing the equal protection argument as “tenable,” but
declining to endorse it as substantively correct). Justice O’Connor would have preferred to
invalidate the Texas statute on equality grounds because it was based on nothing more
than “mere moral disapproval” which like Romer’s “bare . . . desire to harm” was
categorically insufficient. Id. at 580, 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Because the Court chose not to endorse that position, Justice O’Connor concurred only
“in the judgment.” Id. at 579.
536. Id. at 578 (majority opinion).
537. See supra Section II.A.1.
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refused to consider any other constitutional issue, including state
restrictions on same-sex marriage.538 Much like Lawrence following
Romer, Obergefell’s broader liberty analysis resolved the constitutional
issue that Windsor had dodged through narrow reliance on “animus”
and equal protection.
With Kennedy’s judicial biography as an interpretive lens, this
pattern embodies Obergefell’s implied meaning from its author’s
perspective. For twenty years, Kennedy has used equality as a doctrinal
wedge that he himself has later cited as precedent for broader judicial
intervention based on liberty. This is not the structural-institutional
thinking that dominated legal-process scholarship, but it has yielded
analogous results.539
Windsor declared that equal protection sometimes makes liberty
“all the more specific and all the better understood and preserved.”540
But perhaps that was less a comment on the inherent nature of liberty
or equality, and more a memoir of how Kennedy himself has used
equal protection principles to delay broad judicial decisions and to
observe the reactions of other political and cultural actors. This could
explain why Obergefell repeatedly cited public “discussion” of samesex couples and their status.541 And it was this slow-paced two-step of
equality and liberty, over the course of two decades, that finally
brought Kennedy and the Court to acknowledge in Obergefell “the
urgency” of demands for LGBT liberty and equality.542
As though encountering such issues for the first time, Kennedy’s
Obergefell opinion mentioned the political harm that would result if
someone like Obergefell were not listed on his partner’s death
certificate, if two lesbians were unable to exercise full rights as coparents, or if other plaintiffs had to wait or travel to obtain a legally
valid marriage.543 For modern interpreters, this last tension between
Obergefell’s text and Kennedy’s biographical background—between
the decision’s declared and implied meanings—may be the most
interesting of all.

538. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 632 (1996).
539. Cf. supra notes 454–471 and accompanying text (describing Justice Kennedy’s
connection with legal-process jurisprudence).
540. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695.
541. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596–97, 2605 (2015).
542. Id. at 2594.
543. Id. at 2601.
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As a textual matter, the Court’s opinion described the slow march
of doctrinal history with a melancholy tone: “Although Bowers was
eventually repudiated in Lawrence, men and women were harmed in
the interim, and the substantial effects of these injuries no doubt
lingered long after Bowers was overruled. Dignitary wounds cannot
always be healed with the stroke of a pen.”544 A textualist might
conclude from such language that the Obergefell Court had repented its
mistakes and that litigants alleging some unspecified category of
“dignitary wounds” should therefore expect quicker justice in the
future. But such conclusions would ignore the fact that it was Kennedy
himself who wrote the very same doctrinal history that his Obergefell
opinion seemed to lament. If one were truly concerned with “dignitary
wounds,” then the Court—and Kennedy in particular—could have
criticized Bowers and sodomy laws in 1996 (Romer), could have
undermined DOMA in 2003 (Lawrence), could have cast doubt on
state same-sex marriage laws in 2013 (Windsor), and even in 2015
(Obergefell) could have criticized countless episodes of discrimination
against LGBT persons, couples, and families outside the marriage
context.545
Obergefell correctly states that the Supreme Court, “like many
institutions, has made assumptions defined by the world and time of
which it is a part.”546 But the Court, and especially the swing-voting
Justice Kennedy, has played important roles in shaping its world and
time. In moments of legal dispute—such as Romer, Lawrence, Windsor,
and Obergefell—the Court’s choice about what kind of “assumptions”
become precedents can make all the difference, as has been true for
courts throughout our nation’s debate-riddled history.
These features of Kennedy’s biography make it more difficult to
view Obergefell as a broad precedent that implicitly supports polygamy
or physician-assisted suicide.547 Although both of those practices have
plausible connections to the Court’s textual principles of “autonomy,”
544. Id. at 2606.
545. One cannot predict whether any of Kennedy’s liberal-progressive peers would
have joined him in reaching such conclusions, but it is likely that even a lone concurrence
by Kennedy would have accelerated the judicial vindication of constitutional rights that
were in fact announced years or decades later.
546. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598.
547. With respect to physician-assisted suicide, however, one should take notice of
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255–70 (2006). In that case, Kennedy’s opinion for the
Court upheld Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, 1995 Or. Laws ch. 3 (codified as amended
at OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800–.897 (2013)), based on a vague amalgamation of
administrative law and federalism. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 255–70.
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“commitment,” “families,” “society,” and “dignitary wounds,” neither
context has generated the kind of public “discussion” and support that
Obergefell cited as an important precursor to judicial intervention. Nor
have they prompted any equality-based warm-up cases similar to
Romer and Windsor.548
By comparison, it seems possible that Obergefell could entail
broader constitutional protection for sexual orientation. Although
some textualist interpreters will rely on the Court’s unique attention to
marriage as a precedential limit, Kennedy’s shift from Lawrence to
Windsor, and from Windsor to Obergefell, demonstrates a notable
willingness to turn pregnant silence into affirmative doctrine. Applying
similar logic, Obergefell’s focus on marriage may soon be replaced by
broader visions of “dignity,” “identity,” and “self-definition” that
encompass some blend of equality and/or liberty in the workplace,
housing, public accommodations, or elsewhere—especially if such
constitutional arguments include sufficient “discussion” and “debate”
to inspire new forms of “understanding” and “insight.”549

548. A case concerning a polyamorous reality television family is currently on appeal
to the Tenth Circuit after a federal district judge held unconstitutional the portions of
Utah’s criminal polygamy law prohibiting multiple cohabitation, although the state was
allowed to retain its ban on multiple marriage licenses. Brown v. Herbert, 43 F. Supp. 3d
1229, 1233 (D. Utah), cert. granted, 10th Cir. No. 14–4117 (Sept. 25, 2014). Unsurprisingly,
the Browns cite Obergefell throughout their brief, asserting that the Court has rejected
both the criminalization of private relationships and also legal barriers that are grounded
in moral and social biases. Brief of Appellees at 16–18, Brown v. Herbert, No. 14–4117
(10th Cir. filed Aug. 26, 2015) (citing Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584).
In a case on appeal to the New Mexico Supreme Court, the state’s Court of
Appeals declined to extend Obergefell to the context of physician-assisted suicide, stating
that the doctrine of judicial restraint requires the exercise of utmost care when extending
substantive due process to new rights. Morris v. Brandenburg, No. 33,630, 2015 WL
4757633, at *12 (N.M. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2015), cert. granted, N.M. No. S-1-SC-35478 (Aug.
31, 2015). Currently, physician-assisted suicide is legal only in Oregon, Vermont, and
Washington, and it is a valid defense to homicide in Montana. Id. at *2.
549. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596–99, 2602–05 (discussing past and future
classifications of marriage). One statute that is particularly likely to be challenged in the
future is Arkansas’s Intrastate Commerce Improvement Act, which states that “a county,
municipality, or other political subdivision of the state shall not adopt or enforce an
ordinance, resolution, rule, or policy that creates a protected classification or prohibits
discrimination on a basis not contained in state law.” ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-1-403 (2015).
At least five Arkansas municipal or county ordinances that “prohibit certain employers
(and others) from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity”
have been enacted to date, and a September 1, 2015, opinion from the state’s Attorney
General concluded that such ordinances are unenforceable under section 14-1-403. Ark.
Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2015–088, 2015 WL 5179158.
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Contemporary Reactions: The History of Now

For now, this is where analysis of Obergefell’s context must end, as
the decision’s historical arc begins to merge completely with its ongoing
present. It is too soon for an article like this one to assess reactions to
Obergefell that indicate the decision’s understood meaning.550 Indeed,
this Article is one of the contemporary reactions that future
interpreters might use to apply Obergefell’s understood meaning for
their own struggles over the iconic case.
Although the content of Obergefell’s understood meaning cannot
yet be known—and even less so its developmental meaning—legal
interpreters will certainly confront the same kinds of historical
materials and methods that we have seen with respect to Swift, Erie,
and Windsor. A basic pattern will reappear with Obergefell and any
other iconic case. Whenever adjudicative power gathers around an
important precedent, and the Court’s self-explanation seems
inadequate or incomplete, this Article’s methodology will help
interpreters clarify and further complicate interpretive debates over
precedential meaning.
There can never be an abstract guarantee of interpretive
resolution, nor even assurance that any sequence of interpretive
materials will be persuasive.551 On the contrary, just as with statutes
and constitutions, interpretive methodologies concerning precedents
can at most yield greater understanding and self-consciousness with
respect to the case-driven advocacy that underlies so many legal
disputes.552
III. CONCLUSIONS: TURNING THE KALEIDOSCOPE
In the course of exploring links between law and history, this
Article also has vital implications for the professional categories of
legal practice and legal history. Despite occasional overlap,
practitioners and historians of law are often different people, in

550. See generally sources cited supra note 390.
551. Cf. RODGERS, supra note 10, at 16 (“Should someone try to sell you a piece of
political goods as an authentic encapsulation of the American political faith, the wise
course is to run for cover. We have been too conflict-ridden a church to have a creed.”).
552. Compare Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598, 2604–06 (citing Supreme Court precedents
that have “expressed principles of broad[] reach” to show that the Court is “[r]esponding
to a new awareness”), with id. at 2614, 2619–20 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (contesting the
majority’s interpretation of its cited judicial decisions, and arguing that the “Court’s
precedents have repeatedly described marriage in ways that are consistent only with its
traditional meaning”).
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different environments, with different employment imperatives, and
different standards of success. Thus, for example, some lawyers who
read this Article will experience its historical details as a burdensome
weight, even as historians reading the same words might scoff at the
cursory treatment of a complicated past.553 Notwithstanding such
divergent reactions and dispositions, I suggest that legal practice and
legal history are not as separate as one could suppose, and I further
believe that the greatest work in each field will necessarily involve
significant engagement with the other.
It would be quite impossible to explain the full nature of “law”
and “history” in the space that remains, yet three metaphors may be
useful for at least a brief sketch.554 Consider law as a field of study that
is performed with a microscope, as lawyers place preselected
authorities onto glass slides and bring details into focus. This model of
legal analysis prizes meticulous attention and comprehensive
examination, but it also depends on a sharply limited field of view, with
observable objects that are especially near and easy to manipulate. In
practice, this model of legal interpretation relies almost entirely on the
examination of published and easily accessible texts.555
By comparison, history might be viewed as exploration by
telescope, using old light from distant stars to describe events that
happened long ago and far away. Particular historians look at different
parts of the sky, with different goals and tools. But just as no one can
see the cosmos all at once, an important historian’s task is to document
and interrelate particular sets of observations, in the hope of producing
better astronomical maps and general theories.
Interpreting iconic cases fits neither of these models very well;
instead, it is more like looking through a kaleidoscope.556 The tube is
pointed at something in the world, but there is no hope of seeing that

553. For every impatient lawyer’s complaint that “no one really cares about Swift
anymore,” a historian might ask “who can say anything about Obergefell except to express
one’s own politics?”
554. I offer these metaphors with due hesitation. Like historians, legal audiences tend
to “feel more comfortable in prose. They order things sequentially and argue from effect
to cause.” Robert Darnton, The Symbolic Element in History, 58 J. MOD. HIST. 218, 220
(1986). The use of any metaphor requires the author to hope and trust that readers will
find them meaningful, id. at 222, and it should be obvious that if a metaphor succeeds, that
success is properly credited to the reader as much as the author.
555. Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 120 (1984).
556. Cf. PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 30, at 296 (noting, in a very different
context, “Erie’s kaleidoscopic quality”).
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external object as it actually is.557 Instead, kaleidoscopes are filled with
plain objects, such as colored flakes or fluids.558 As the kaleidoscope
turns, mirrored reflections create patterns and make these interior
objects seem more magnificent than they would otherwise.
Kaleidoscopic images of iconic precedents are based in reality, and
they overlap with one another. The images are always derived from
shared materials, but the images change subtly and substantially
without repeating, so there is no single arrangement that can claim
objective or timeless superiority over the rest.
The kaleidoscopic metaphor captures many truths about iconic
precedents, but it overlooks others. Most important, although many
precedential interpreters “turn the kaleidoscope” to refigure or
displace existing interpretations of iconic cases, historians and lawyers
reinterpret iconic precedents for reasons greater than the amusement
of dancing colors and shimmering light.
Historians interpret iconic precedents in the pursuit of
professional and intellectual progress.559 The goal for such academics is
to say something creative and thoughtful, often by developing or
unseating other historians’ work.560 Nuance, sophistication, and
expertise are highly valued, and relationships between legal events and
other historical evidence are exceedingly important.561 That is why
some historians would supplement this Article’s categories with even
more sources of meaning, including a decision’s social effects, cultural
presumptions, or religious background. In every instance, historians’
interpretations are marked by an unshaken focus on the past, which
also embodies a corresponding emphasis on the forward march of time.
By contrast, lawyers turn the kaleidoscope of iconic cases to
advance their interests, their clients’ interests, and sometimes the legal
system’s interests. Legal audiences are not purely intellectual, and they
do not admire complexities for their own sake. On the contrary,

557. This is the sense in which precedential icons do not have scientifically indisputable
meanings.
558. These are cultural forces that create precedential meaning outside of a decision’s
unobservably essential or objective reality.
559. Cf. Friedman, supra note 18, at 253 (“Every generation looks at history through its
own lens. Something new is constantly getting discovered—new batches of material and,
more significant, new ways of looking at old or neglected material.”).
560. Id. at 253 (“Nothing in life stands still; not even the past. Historians are constantly
reworking, rethinking, reexamining old assumptions, turning over new rocks, closing off
old tunnels and caves, digging up long-buried cities. The process of revision is always going
on, and reevaluation, in general, is very healthy.”).
561. See Tomlins, supra note 18, at 323.
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professional imperatives induce judges and lawyers to use precedents,
and this creates pressure to seek interpretations of iconic cases that are
themselves usable. Simplicity, legibility, and intercontextual portability
are at a premium.562 This is why lawyers interpret or misinterpret
Marbury to prioritize all judicial interpretations of the Constitution,
Brown to proscribe all racial discrimination, and Erie to require state
substantive law in all diversity cases.563 Lawyerly interpretations of
iconic cases—and other authorities—tend to favor smooth surfaces,
simple holdings, and distortive abstractions from the messiness of life’s
extralegal experience.
The goals and professional imperatives of historians and lawyers
are especially interesting because neither modality can be fully
separated from the other when it comes to iconic precedents. On one
side, historians cannot fully describe iconic cases without accounting
for those decisions’ functionality in a precedential system. Iconic cases
are always written, read, understood, and applied in the context of a
professional legal culture; thus, such cases’ meanings cannot be
abstracted from their legally operative, oversimplifying function as
precedents.
By similar coin, lawyers who wish to simplify and operationalize
iconic precedents cannot entirely supplant the past’s complexity in
pursuing present and future policies. Doing so would contradict the
basic premise of a precedential legal system: that the law should “stand
by” decisions from the past.564 Iconic cases can always be overruled,
narrowed, massaged, or adjusted. But if the interpretation of an iconic
decision were to lose all contact with that precedent’s historical reality,
then that interpretation itself would be inaccurate, inauthentic, and
therefore illegitimate as a matter of legal doctrine.
The rule of law is not only about creating forward-looking
doctrines that are accessible, transferrable, simple, and cheap. Legal
interpretation also requires a connection to the past events that create
and embody legal authority. Constitutions and statutes are two
important examples of concentrated, anchored legal power that is
derived from past events; iconic precedents are a third. Where current
legal mandates depend on appeals to prior judicial precedent, historical
562. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.
563. See, e.g., LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our
Constitution Is Color-Blind”, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991).
564. Stare decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Latin ‘to stand by
things decided.’ ”).
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analysis is unavoidable, and it cannot be brushed aside just because it is
messy. The historian’s call for nuance must confront the lawyer’s
demand for answers, but a lawyer’s oversimplified distortion risks
exposure as unpersuasive and literally unbelievable in the face of
historical critique.
The mutual compromises of history and law that surround iconic
precedents can be frustrating or inspiring. Either way, such shared
sacrifices expose the profound truth that law’s precedential system is
not today—and has never been—governed purely by forward-looking
policy or backward-looking history. It has always been an uneasy
hybrid, and that mixture itself is the product of perpetual debates
within a complex legal culture that is partly inherited and partly
manufactured by each successive generation of lawyers and judges.
This Article’s account of legal precedent may seem complex, and
that is absolutely the point. Too many lawyers, including this author,565
have assumed or pretended that the singular meaning of an iconic case
like Erie can be read exclusively from its judicial text, though Brown
should serve as an overwhelming counter-example.566 To discern the
meaning of iconic precedents, no less than to interpret statutes and
constitutional provisions, can require elaborate effort, and it can also
generate substantial conflict—both as a matter of substance and
technique.
In the field of constitutional interpretation, Justice Souter has
criticized a “fair reading model” which assumes that “deciding
constitutional questions should be a straightforward exercise of reading
fairly and viewing facts objectively.”567 Similar phenomena are even
more apparent with the interpretation of judicial precedents, and the

565. E.g., Green, Repressing Erie, supra note 30.
566. Compare Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to
Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 24 (1959) (“Certainly the [Brown] opinion is
most obscure in its crucial elements—e.g., is inequality a ‘fact’? Whatever it is, how do
judges determine it? Moreover, the opinion does not appear to articulate any grounds for
disposing of the arguably quite different issues—segregated beaches, golf courses, buses,
and parks—subsequently resolved per curiam in apparent reliance on Brown.” (footnotes
omitted) (citing first Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955); then citing Holmes v.
Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); then citing Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); and then
citing New Orleans Parks Ass’n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958))), with id. at 30–31 (“The
fateful national consequences of Brown v. Board of Education flow from the opinion and
judgment actually rendered. . . . [And the] judgment in the segregation cases will as the
decades pass give ever deeper meaning to our national life. It will endure as long as our
Constitution and the democratic faith endure.”).
567. David H. Souter, Harvard University’s 359th Commencement Address, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 429, 430 (2010).
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impulse toward a simple “fair reading” methodology is the same in
both contexts. “[B]ehind most dreams of a simpler Constitution,” and
similar dreams of simple judicial precedents, “there lies a basic human
hunger for the certainty and control that the fair reading model seems
to promise. And who has not felt that same hunger?”568 However, with
iconic cases, the Constitution, and many other legal materials, such
“certainty generally is illusion and repose is not our destiny.”569
At the very heart of our legal order, the most urgent and vital
question is how judges and lawyers in “an indeterminate world” can
maintain what Souter calls “a state of trust,” believing that some “way
will be found leading through the uncertain future” even as the law’s
future-oriented trajectory is anchored by precedents from the near and
distant past.570 This Article’s interpretive methodology hopes to
indirectly influence how lawyers and judges chart such paths forward.
At the very least, a better understanding of precedential interpretation
should help legal agents to recognize the dilemmas they face and the
techniques that are available on the way.

568. Id. at 436.
569. Id.
570. Id.

